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"We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence . . . by the military-industrial complex."

—*Eisenhower's Farewell Address*

JUGGERNAUT

THE WARFARE STATE

Fred J. Cook

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THE NATION

JUGGERNAUT:

The Warfare State . . by FRED J. COOK

Introduction by the Editors

In his Farewell Address of January 17, 1961, former President Eisenhower uttered a grave warning to the American people: "We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex." More recently, in a CBS network program on October 12, Mr. Eisenhower once again referred to the growing power of the military-industrial complex as "a very serious matter . . . a very difficult thing to get out of after you've once got into it — no matter how intelligently you went in."

When we first read the warning in the Farewell Address, we asked Fred J. Cook, the author of a number of widely read and discussed special *Nation* issues, to write an article that would explain, in precise terms, the nature of the danger which so disturbed Mr. Eisenhower. In a word, he was to focus sharply on a single question: Has the military-industrial complex grown to such proportions that it endangers the American tradition of civilian control of the military?

Although it will be apparent to most readers, we wish to emphasize that this article is not concerned with the military budget per se; i. e., whether we are spending too much, or not enough, on national security. There is no necessary connection between the size of the military budget and the degree of civilian control. It is to the central question of *control* to which this article is addressed.

This question has a special urgency today which is not generally understood. Alexander Hamilton, who

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perhaps more than any of the Founding Fathers was aware of the dangers implicit in large standing armies, was satisfied that the Constitution contained a built-in safeguard against them. This safeguard, he believed, was to be found in the Constitutional provision giving Congress control of the national purse strings. "The Legislature of the United States," he wrote, "will be *obliged,* by this provision, once at least every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot. They are not *at liberty* to invest in the Executive Department permanent funds for the support of any Army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence."

Today this Constitutional safeguard, for reasons abundantly demonstrated in the following pages, can no longer be relied upon. More, much more, is involved here than the power of the military-industrial lobbies, great as this power may be; what is involved is the political power of all the communities, cities, regions and states that have come to feel that they have a vested interest in war contracts and in the maintenance of particular military installations. The production of armaments has become more than a dominant industry — it has become a *way of life* for the entire country.

The problem, therefore, is not merely to beat back the power of the military-industrial complex; it is to convince the American people that they have created a Juggernaut — the Warfare State — that is moving inexorably toward that very holocaust it was designed to avoid.



PART I

THE FATEFUL ISSUE

ON THE EVENING of January 17, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the tradition of George Washington, the predecessor with whom he liked most to be compared, appeared before the television cameras to make his farewell address to the nation. He began with the usual Eisenhower expressions of good will, the usual Eisenhower platitudes. Then abruptly, in midstream, he struck out on a new and decidedly uncharacteristic course. He picked this final moment of leave-taking, with the attention of the country focused upon him, to deliver a grave warning. American democracy, he said in essence, was being threatened by a new and enormous and insidious power — that of "the military-industrial complex," employing millions of men, wielding the power of fantastic billions of dollars, developing an influence that "is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government."

In the months since the former President surprised his listeners by this novel indulgence in apprehension, events have served to invest his final words with the wisdom of accurate prophecy. For hardly had the new Administration of John F. Kennedy come to Washington before it was embroiled, not in just a series of headline foreign crises — Laos, Cuba, Berlin — but in a more secret and perhaps even more determinative battle affecting the future of American democracy. This second conflict on the home front, a form of rear-guard action, was and is being waged to preserve civilian — and democratic—control over the gigantic power nexus of our time, the alliance of a war-minded Military with a war-oriented Big Business.

The issue of civilian versus military and authoritarian control was joined *sub rosa* virtually before the new Administration took office. Kennedy appointed as his Secretary of Defense one of the toughest-minded, toughest-driving American industrialists, Ford executive Robert S. McNamara, and McNamara characteristically and predictably set out to establish his own rule over the Pentagon. Bound up in this personal issue was a national issue of great moment — the traditional American principle of civilian control of the Military.

Wave from the Right

The revolt of the High Brass, instant and enduring, was both fierce and subtle, employing all the infighting techniques in which a long-entrenched bureaucracy becomes adept. This internecine strife, for the most part hidden from public view, reached such proportions that, by June, it was being characterized by none other than Senator Stuart Symington (himself one of the nation's foremost advocates of military preparedness) as "a disloyal operation."

To the heat generated by this Pentagon power struggle has been added the explosive quotient of a second and allied cause. The Kennedy Administration's advocacy of mild social reform at home and its shift of emphasis from military to economic aid abroad, has been countered by a nation-wide wave of radical Right propaganda, symbolized by the John Birch Society and supported by a powerful military-business axis that merges liberalism with socialism and socialism with communism in a syllogism that defies sanity and perverts democracy. Even the gingerly efforts of the Kennedy Administration to curb such excesses and to reassert the traditional American principle that the Military should abstain from political activities precipitated on the floor of the United States Senate a wave of denunciation reminiscent in its fierceness of the McCarthy past.

These twin developments — the internal power struggle of the Brass against the rule of a civilian Secretary, the passions aroused by the efforts to keep the Military from the

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most partisan political commitments — limn an over-all issue of great complexity and vital importance. Involved in this muted struggle are the basic elements of democracy — the essential requisites that civilian control must outweigh the Military, that a civilian population must have the final say on the great issues that lead to peace or war, that these issues must not be decided for them by a military-industrial caste either through dictatorial decree or overwhelming propaganda pressure. At conflict, in essence, are traditional American democratic principles and the kind of Prussianized military-industrial concept that produced Hitler.

In this context, then, hardly any issue of the moment, not even Berlin, is of greater importance than this relatively little-publicized tug-of-war at home, involving as it does the focus of the future. *Not at issue here are any questions of our military capacity, of the military efficiency of Army or Navy or Air Force, the command of space, or the wastefulness and duplication of military contracts and military procurements.* All of these are important questions in themselves, but all are subordinate to the great issue — the influence that the military-industrial octopus wields on the affairs of state. Is this influence such that the very democracy we are preparing to go to war — if necessary — to defend is being vitiated in the process? Is this influence such that decisions are virtually predetermined before the issues calling for decision arise? Can we reconcile our need for defense, for multi-billion-dollar armaments, with the principles of free discussion and free decision that remain democracy's greatest assets? Or must the word of the military-industrial complex become, on virtually every issue, the word of the nation? These are some of the vital questions that cry aloud for answer. As a beginning, let's see how President Eisenhower presented the problem in one of his last acts in office.

Eisenhower's Warning

He prefaced the core of his speech by warning the American people that they faced a long struggle, and he pleaded with them, in effect, for sober balance in dealing with complex and difficult issues. He recognized that, on both the home front and the foreign front, the baffling nature of our problems may lead to frustration, and frustration in turn to a demand for solution by violent action.

Eisenhower put it this way: "Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties." New threats to our democracy will arise, he said, and he proposed to discuss one that had developed during his administration and that now posed problems such as America had never faced before. He continued:

> Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well.
>
> But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create *a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.* Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. *We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.* [Italics added.]
>
> Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
>
> In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
>
> We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

In these words, the outgoing President projected the issue. He added one further, significant warning. He stressed that a "technological revolution" had made complex and costly research essential to national survival. The result had been that "the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a Government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity." The President feared "the prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment," and he feared, too, that dependence upon science would lead to a critical situation in which "public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."

Early Patterns

Though the President named no names, his very phrasing seemed to conjure up the image of Dr. Edward Teller, the so-called "father of the H-bomb," who had been widely accepted as the oracle on matters of disarmament and nuclear testing. Even without Dr. Teller's haunting presence, however, the Eisenhower farewell packed the impact of surprise. The President's final word, made doubly impressive by this very circumstance, had been a warning that the mammoth "military-industrial complex" might wag the entire nation as the tail seems to wag the over-excited dog.

If one had been making book in advance, this would have been the last topic most persons would have expected the nation's most revered General to discuss. Yet the pressures had been building for a long time. During the eight years of his administration, Eisenhower had repeatedly come into conflict with the host of special interests that a multi-billion-dollar defense industry inevitably breeds. One of the first clashes

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had occurred in 1953, when he cut $5 billion from the Air Force budget. The Air Force refused to defer to the judgment of even Eisenhower, the General-Hero-President, and carried its fight to Congress and the press. White House sources say that more than one member of Congress telephoned the President personally to tell him they were shifting votes in response to local pressures generated by the Pentagon campaign. So a pattern was set.

Time and again in the intervening years, the Air Force has been able to create such public and political pressures that Congress consistently thrusts upon the administration, whether Republican or Democratic, more millions for heavy bombers than the best military judgment considers needful for national defense.

Throughout Eisenhower's administration, the President clashed with the Brass in every branch of the services whenever he tried to clamp a lid on military spending. Significant for what it tells about the methods and the pressures that can be generated by the military-industrial elite was a special-interest missile war that broke out in 1959. Two competing branches of the Armed Forces, each aligned with its own pet maker of its own pet missile system, came into conflict in the competition for munitions billions. On one side was the Air Force, trumpeting that it had a cure-all for menace from the skies in its Bomarc anti-aircraft missile, the creation of its favored Boeing; on the other was ranged the Army, equally vociferous about the virtues of its own miracle missile, the Nike-Hercules, product of the ingenuity of Western Electric. There was considerable — and subsequent events would seem to indicate, quite sound—scientific opinion that neither of these systems was adequate to meet the menace of the kind of high-speed rockets the Russians were developing. But their advocates, with prestige and billions both at stake, mounted intense propaganda campaigns with just one end in view—to force full-scale production without bothering to wait for final tests and analysis.

Army spokesmen subsequently acknowledged to a House committee that they had encouraged Western Electric to mount a nation-wide advertising campaign extolling the virtues of Nike-Hercules. Boeing, with at least the tacit approval of its Air Force sponsor, countered with advertising glorifications of its Bomarc. This devotion of Madison Avenue's best brains to the war effort came at an especially strategic juncture—just when Congress was debating how many millions might be assigned to Nike and Bomarc. The picture that emerges from the sequence is clear. The President and Congress both were being pressured through a wave of advertising, paid for largely by funds derived from war contracts, to throw literally billions of dollars into missile systems of dubious value. Military effectiveness, national need, did not matter; all that mattered were service prestige and fat contracts.

Now the 'Missile Gap'

Against this background, President Eisenhower twice in 1959 denounced the ever-intensifying, selfish pressures of our growing militarism. Asked at a press conference in March whether he would spend more for



national defense if the country could afford it, he replied sharply: "I would not." He added that "everybody with any sense" could see that unless military spending was restricted the United States would become "a garrison state," with all its energies concentrated on military production. In June, he acknowledged that he had discussed with Senators the secret influence exerted on the defense program by what a questioner called "the munitions lobby." Although the President shied from this particular term of opprobrium, he took a strong swat at pressure campaigns of the Nike-Bomarc complexion and emphasized that he felt political and financial considerations were often playing an unwarranted role in what should be strictly military decisions.

Even these explicit statements, uttered by a leader with all of Eisenhower's prestige, failed to put the slightest checkrein on the Brass. In January, 1960, there erupted a controversy that was to engage the attention of the nation and to have far-reaching consequences. This was the national tizzy about the so-called "missile gap."

Analysis indicates conclusively that it began as strictly an Air Force promotion. The great "missile gap" debate was touched off by a speech made by General Thomas Power, boss of the Strategic Air Command, before the Economic Club of New York. Power's theme was that Soviet Russia was so far ahead of us in missiles that it would soon have the capacity to wipe out all of our defenses in thirty minutes of nuclear bombardment, leaving the nation helpless. Hardly had the General fired the initial salvo before his theme was expounded in a series of five we-are-dangling-above-the-brink articles by Joseph Alsop in the New York *Herald Tribune*. In no time, it seemed, the whole country was agitated about the horrible prospect of "the missile gap." Hardly anyone at first considered the curiously apt timing of the furore; but the fact is that the entire, horrendous "missile gap" controversy developed, by the purest of coincidence, of course, just at a time when General Power's Strategic Air Command was struggling to get Congress to appropriate additional millions so that one-third of its SAC bombers, loaded with H-bombs, could be kept airborne at all times, ready for instant war.

Eisenhower, whose military acumen and civilian leadership were both at stake in the "missile-gap"

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controversy, promptly denounced the whole issue as a fraud. Repeatedly, he denied the existence of any gap; angrily, he repudiated the suggestion that his administration, in its desire to balance the budget, had left us virtually defenseless. "There are too many of these generals who have all sorts of ideas," he commented sharply on February 3, 1960, in obvious, sharp rebuke of General Power. On February 11, the President said he felt confident of his ability to "put need above pressure-group inducement, before local argument, before every kind of pressure except that of what America needs."

A considerable body of expert military opinion supported Ike, but in the hysteria of the moment it was little heeded. A survey of the Pentagon's top Brass showed that a great number of the military experts believed there never would be a missile gap. Testifying before a Congressional committee, Admiral Arleigh Burke, one of the most militant members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, refused to join the alarmist chorus. He asserted we could "destroy any enemy who attacks us regardless of when or how he does it"; on the other hand, he said, Russia was developing "a capacity" to destroy us, too—"and we can't do anything about it either."

Eisenhower's Purpose

This picture of nuclear stalemate contrasted sharply with the Air Force's version of nuclear helplessness, but the issue of "the gap" refused to die. The controversy started by the Air Force, evidently with the primary purpose of getting the millions needed to keep those SAC H-bombers constantly flying, had effects on the country that were virtually incalculable. The charge that the Eisenhower administration, in its strait-laced preoccupation with the budget, had let down our defense guard became one of the key issues of the 1960 Presidential campaign; and President Kennedy, after having used the missile-gap controversy for all the political mileage that was in it, came to office irrevocably pledged, irrevocably committed to boosting military spending to new heights.

Such, in sketchy outline at least, were some of the developments that impelled President Eisenhower, in his farewell words to the American people, to warn against what he considered a new threat to democracy inherent in the growth of the enormous "military-industrial complex." White House estimates subsequently gave this picture of the President's thinking and motivation: Garbed in the prestige of the nation's foremost General, he had nevertheless found it virtually impossible at times to cope with the propagandistic, political and bureaucratic pressures generated by the new power combine. His successor, whether Nixon or Kennedy, would be a civilian, with no military reputation to back up his judgment when this judgment conflicted with the desires of the service Brass and their industrial cohorts. Knowing how difficult he himself had found it to keep this alliance under even partial control, Eisenhower could appreciate the almost insuperable task that would confront his young and less renowned successor. He could foresee clearly the danger that the dominance of the Military would grow. So he spoke up.

The events of the first six months of the Kennedy Administration did much to confirm this judgment. The new President recognized just as clearly as the old what Eisenhower had called the "almost insidious penetration of our minds" by the new militarism, and one of his first concerns was to try to re-establish the principle of civilian control. Both the President and Secretary McNamara made this purpose clear, but the Military and its allies in Big Business and in Congress represent a formidable opposition. And the Kennedy commitment to an even more grandiose defense program meant inevitably that additional billions of dollars, with their incalculable power to sway and to influence, would be poured into the hands of the already top-heavy militaristic complex.

The trend became painfully evident within two months after Eisenhower's farewell address. Already the Army, cheered on by Congressmen in areas where employment would be affected, was campaigning for full-scale production of its pet Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile without bothering to wait for final tests, scheduled for 1962. Already Lockheed Aircraft Corp. had been given a special $1 billion contract to design and build a hundred cargo and troop-transport jets (a development that, it was noted, meant 2,000 more jobs at Lockheed's plant in Marietta, Ga.). Already the House Armed Services Committee had reported out a bill authorizing $808 million for new military construction projects at 790 installations in every one of the fifty states. This was part of a stated Kennedy program to combat the recession by "priming the pump" with defense orders, and as Chairman Carl Vinson (D., Ga.) happily assured the House, "there is something in this bill for everyone." On top of all this came Berlin.

As Joseph Barry, the New York *Post's* Paris commentator, has written, if the Berlin crisis hadn't developed, it would have been necessary to invent it, so committed was the Administration to the thesis that what we needed most was a mightier military machine. This mightier machine could be justified only in an aura of crisis. There had been periodic Berlin crises during the Eisenhower administration, but they had passed. It is true that America—unlike its great partners, Canada and Great Britain—had retained the draft, but Washington had not found it necessary to step up the draft calls drastically, to put the Army on virtually a wartime footing. In all of these respects, the crisis of 1961 was to be different.

Defense 'Explosion'

When President Kennedy, after his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, went before the television cameras to call the nation to a new state of armed preparedness, the lid on military spending went off, and the instantaneous reaction spoke volumes about the kind of America we are building in this age of the New Militarism. There were two prominent themes: cheers for the new arms program, and insistence that now, under the guise of the greater patriotism, we must cut back on all that welfare-state nonsense like aid to education and medical

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care for the aged. Put most simply and most brutally, the reaction was: "Hurrah for more billions for the weapons of mass murder—and to hell with people!"

The television colloquies that immediately followed President Kennedy's address charted the course that has since become apparent in Congressional action. Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.), sometimes called "the gentleman from Boeing," commented with obvious satisfaction that we were now entering upon a new permanent high plateau of defense spending. Just as our military budget had been scaled to new highs by Korea, the threat to Berlin was boosting it to new peaks and we would never, never go back. Senator Kenneth Keating (R., N.Y.) agreed that Congress would give the President and the Military every penny they asked for, and he conjectured that the Administration could probably be induced now to accept some $500 million Congress had been pressing upon it to build more Boeing bombers. (Of course, there has been a rumor prevalent in the world for some years that missiles will outperform bombers, and both Eisenhower's and Kennedy's Defense chiefs had opposed investing another half-billion dollars in what was rapidly becoming an outmoded medium. But Senator Jackson now happily agreed with Senator Keating that, under the Berlin exigency, the Kennedy Administration would probably see the light; we'd get those Boeing bombers built.)

Guns, Yes; Education, No

Everybody agreed, though, that there would have to be sacrifices. A lot of lives, of course, were going to be disrupted, and naturally, if we were going to spend billions more, the money would have to come from somewhere. The American people, already burdened by high taxes, would probably have to be burdened some more—if not immediately, in any event quite soon. Even so, it was quite obvious there wouldn't be enough money for *everything*. Guns, yes; better education, no. The Republicans, led by the new voice of conservatism from Texas, Senator John Tower, hopped quite gleefully upon the prospect. The Administration was just going to have to cut back on its domestic spending programs; this welfare-state nonsense was going to have to stop. Subsequent events ratified in action these trends that had been so clearly indicated almost the moment the President stopped speaking. Congress whipped through more billions for arms without a dissent, pushing military spending toward the new, high plateau that, it was estimated, would be established at around $50 billion a year; it included a lusty $207 million for fallout shelters, while the President's aid-to-education bill lay molding in the pigeonholes of the House Rules Committee.

With defense contractors singing *Happy Days Are Here Again,* and the stock market breaking into new all-high ground on what Wall Street dubbed "the Berlin bounce," President Eisenhower's last warning about the menace of the military-industrial complex lay crumpled and disregarded in the nearest trash can. Yet it would seem only sober common sense to take a close look at the power structure of which he spoke; for when even a lifelong military man like Eisenhower becomes disturbed about the powers of the Military, this would seem to be adequate cause for the rest of us to become genuinely alarmed. And one thing is now certain: however bad the situation might have been that seemed threatening to Ike, the future, with many more billions at stake, is almost certain to be infinitely worse.

Here, then, are some of the yardsticks of power in Ike's worrisome "military-industrial complex" (many of the statistics are already outdated):

¶Property owned by the Defense Department was valued in the Cordiner Report several years ago at $160 billion, "by any yardstick of measurement the world's largest organization." The Pentagon owns more than 32 million acres of land in the United States and another 2.6 million acres in foreign countries. Its total ownings are larger than the combined area of Rhode Island, Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland, Vermont and New Hampshire. The crowning symbol of military power is the vast Pentagon building, so huge that the Capitol, the seat of the nation's government, could be swallowed up easily in any one of its five principal segments.

¶In the eight years of the Eisenhower administration, more than $350 billion was spent for defense. Out of the $80.9-billion 1962 budget as originally drafted (this is a mere historic curiosity now, of course), 59 cents of every dollar was allotted for military purposes. This cascade of billions has given the Pentagon an economic power that reaches into every nook and cranny of the nation. Military assets are three times as great as the combined assets of United States Steel, American Telephone and Telegraph, Metropolitan Life Insurance, General Motors and Standard Oil of New Jersey. The paid personnel of Defense is triple the number of employees of all of these great corporations, whose influence on affairs of state have so often worried observers.

¶These two tremendous power complexes—the Military and Big Business—join in an inevitable meeting of minds over billions of dollars in contracts the one has to award and the other to fulfill. Of the total military budget for the 1961 fiscal year, some $21 billion was spent on procurement. One hundred top corporations carved up three-quarters of this enormous pie, the top ten getting $7.6 billion. Three corporations got more than $1 billion each—General Dynamics with $1.26 billion, and Lockheed and Boeing, each with just over $1 billion. Two others, General Electric and North American Aviation, each got over $900 million.

¶Such enormous rewards are conferred on a select few top companies at the whim of procurement officers: 86.4 per cent of the $21 billion in contracts was awarded without competitive bidding. This mere fact has led to inevitable suspicions of influence peddling. So far, proof seems lacking, though the grounds for suspicion seem more than ample. Time and again, military officers who have been the champions of a particular weapon or device in their official capacities retire and promptly become well-paid executives of the com-

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panies they have championed. The Hébert investigating committee in 1959-60 found that more than 1,400 retired officers from the rank of major up were employed by the top hundred corporations that split up three-quarters of the $21 billion armament pie. Included in this list were 261 generals or officers of flag rank. The company employing the greatest number was also—coincidentally, no doubt—the company that received the fattest contracts: General Dynamics. It had on its payroll 187 retired officers, including 27 generals and admirals, and it was headed by Frank Pace, himself a former Secretary of the Army.

¶This concentration of power at the top is reinforced by money benefits that spread throughout the economy. Sub-contracts awarded by the top war contractors thread all over the nation, into virtually every city of any size. The jobs at stake mount high into the millions. The Defense Department alone employs 3.5 million persons, 947,000 of them civilians. Its annual payroll is $11 billion, more than twice that of the automobile industry, customarily considered the bellwether of the domestic economy. In addition, an estimated 4 million persons are employed directly in defense industries. This means that a total of some 7.5 million Americans depend for their jobs directly upon the Military—almost precisely one-tenth of the nation's entire labor force. In some areas of especially heavy war-plant employment, the percentage is far higher and the dependence upon military spending is almost total. California, for example, reaps the benefit of nearly $5 billion annually in military contracts. In Los Angeles, it has been estimated that fully half the jobs are dependent, either directly or indirectly, on the continuance of the arms race—and arms spending. Under such circumstances, every food store, every gas station feels it has a stake in keeping the war plants going. Under such circumstances, any cutback, even any threat of cutback, elicits screams of protest from workers who have jobs at stake, from a wide variety of businesses that have profits at stake, from politicians who have votes at stake.

Such is the colossal, the overwhelming power structure that has been erected around America's new —and permanent—militarism. It is a structure that, as President Eisenhower said, "is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government."

What does it mean to America? The answers are not pretty, nor is the apathy with which they have been received an encouraging index of our times. Senator Ralph E. Flanders, the aging but outspoken Vermont Republican, gave one estimate on the Senate floor. "It is not only that we are sacrificing to defense our standard of living and the free independence of our economic life," he said. "We are sacrificing our freedom itself. We are being forced to shift the American way of life into the pattern of the garrison state." Fifty years ago, such a statement by a veteran and responsible Senator would have been inconceivable, and if it had been made, it almost certainly would have provoked a nation-wide furore. Today, as the gauge of our acceptance of the Warfare State we have virtually become, Flanders' charge produced little more than yawns.

So Much at Stake

Yet so much is at stake, for both ourselves and the world. Not just the issue of the continuance of real democracy at home, but all of the great issues of peace and war, of mankind's very survival, are bound up in our posture. Is it possible, for example, while nurturing a militarily oriented complex of such tremendous power, to work for peace in the world? Sincerely to seek disarmament, which alone can lead to a lowering of tensions? There are many who doubt that we can finance a $50 billion-a-year military establishment and at the same time work devotedly for the disarming of that establishment. The *Congressional Quarterly* in March quoted a senior member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee as saying: "There is no question that the services and their contractors have an interest in maintaining a high degree of tension in the country." It quoted a member of the House Armed Services Committee: "There is a real danger that we may go the way of prewar Japan and Germany"—in other words, the classic way of the militaristic state that eventually finds the war it seeks.

Such statements from knowledgeable men, in a position to know, cause hardly a ripple across the surface of a society marked by somnolent indifference on the one hand, apathetic acceptance on the other. The symbol of a vitiated democracy in America today may be found in the simple fact that there is virtually no debate, not even on the most awesome issues that ever have confronted mankind. We wrap our increasingly militaristic society in the folds of the flag and the emotional words of a patriotism that requires no thought. Whether tensions are deliberately fomented, whether troublesome domestic issues are conveniently sidetracked in our preoccupation with foreign military crises—these are matters that hardly ever occur to us, much less concern us. Yet if, as the Congressman said, we are going the way of prewar Germany and Japan, we should recognize that the final cataclysm is almost inevitable. For the sober and shocking and little-realized truth is that today it is less possible than ever before to place any kind of effective check upon a dominant Military. Even the final, climactic decision that turns a peaceful world to war rests no longer with the people and their civilian representatives; it is a choice that, by the very nature of modern war technology, lies for all intents and purposes with the Military.

Weapons Dominate

This is so simply as a result of the awesome range and speed and terrible destructiveness of modern weapons. Weapons have come to dominate the Military as the Military dominates the State. Speed, the swiftness of reaction and retaliation, becomes the essence of such survival as may be vouchsafed us. And because it does, in an inevitable paradox, the responsibility for triggering total destruction descends in inverse ratio from the responsible heads of state into the ranks of the Military —even into the lower echelons.

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Let us consider for a moment how this development has sprung unheralded upon us. As everyone concedes today, Congress has become a figurehead body in deciding the paramount issue of peace or war. Under our Constitution, only Congress can declare war; but we recognize, in the missile age in which obliteration from launching bases on the other side of the world is only thirty minutes away, that there is no time for Congress to meet, to debate, to declare war. There is time only to react. And so, we say, the President will decide; he will order the buttons of holocaust pushed. This is the theory, a theory that is a delusion; for in practice the President, no more than Congress, can really decide—there is not time.

The National Planning Association, an eminently conservative institution, analyzed this little appreciated but inevitable sequence in a special report in May, 1958. After noting that "the reaction time of delivery systems will shorten," it wrote:

> The implications of rapidly decreasing reaction times are ominous. There will be less and less time for investigation and making decisions. Weapons control will become both concentrated and delegated. Modern communications will concentrate control of ready-to-fire rockets in one or a few command posts. If reaction time is to be instantaneous, command must be delegated. Neither Congress, nor the President, nor other high officials can be expected to man these control posts continuously. Concentrated, delegated control of instantaneous massive weapons will bring dangers of ill-considered, irresponsible, and even fanatical actions. While the probability of such action may be very small at any one instant of time, over the years the cumulative risks would be formidable.

Backing up this analysis was a peep into the grim world of reality written by Jack Raymond, of *The New York Times*. Raymond had gone to Colorado Springs to study the setup of the Canadian-American North American Defense Command after its creation in September, 1957. He wrote: "In the event of an enemy attack, it may well be a division commander—with the rank of brigadier or major general and not necessarily even an American—who will make the decision of firing the first nuclear weapon of World War III." General Earle E. Partridge, who then headed the only organization authorized to fire a nuclear weapon in combat without the President's specific authorization, conceded to Raymond that even he might not have time to give the crucial order. "Should the attacker be too swift," Raymond wrote, "General Partridge would not know in advance of the decision that would be made by a subordinate somewhere along the forward defense line." Of course, Raymond wrote, it "was assumed that the intention of an enemy . . . could hardly be misinterpreted. . . ."

Such an assumption obviously flies in the face of all common sense, of all reality. As reaction time narrows steadily toward zero, tensions inevitably increase, reflection takes a back seat, impulsive action becomes almost a certainty. Such is the literal dead end to which the current scientific-technological-military madness condemns us. The mere fact of awesome authority progressively delegated into the lower echelons of the military structure virtually insures the final holocaust. Not only do faulty information, bad judgment, rash action become at some time and place fatally inevitable, but one psychotic or one fanatic devotee of the let's-blast-'em-and-get-it-over-with school easily could settle the fate of the world and of mankind. A Johns Hopkins University psychiatrist has noted that many persons are "innately vicious" and might trigger total destruction out of pure malice. "Psychiatrists have nightmares wondering how many of them are patiently climbing up the chains of command in various countries," he says. The New York *Post*, in macabre comment, noted: "It takes only one."

Faced with prospects so grim and so certain, Americans today still have an invaluable and perhaps a last chance to pause for searching stock-taking. Can anyone doubt the necessity? The necessity for probing to its depths the issues of the military-industrial complex? The necessity for analyzing the bent of the American military mind and the forces with which that mind is allied?



PART II

THE GROWTH of MILITARISM

NO BREAK with the traditions of America's past has been so complete, so drastic as the one that has resulted in the growth of the present military-industrial complex. Ironically, it should be noted that the ultra Right, usually most clamorous about tradition, is the very element that backs everything military most enthusiastically and so does the greatest violence to one of the most cherished beliefs of the founding fathers — that a powerful and permanent Military was the implacable foe of democracy.

Nowhere has this obeisance to the Military been more clearly expressed than in some of the speeches of Rep. Carl Vinson (D., Ga.), chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee. Typical was Vinson's contention in March, 1949, that even a Presidential decision on armaments and the military budget should be disregarded because it "is not the expert military view. Our top source for military judgment is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . ."

America's abandonment of a centuries-long tradition, deeply rooted in our philosophy and culture, has been partially inevitable, of course—the result of our constricted world

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and the atmosphere of daily menace in a missile age. But one wonders if we need ever have found ourselves in quite the pass we do today, with a $50-billion-a-year military-industrial complex in a position to swing the entire nation by the tail. This development, so ominous in itself, becomes doubly grim when one realizes how recent is its origin, how rapid has been its growth, and what any logical projection of this trend must inevitably forecast for the future. For the truth is that today's militaristic complex in America is strictly a development of the post-World War II era, especially of the short eleven years since Korea.

In the past, when wars had ended, the Military had always faced an inevitable attrition. When armies are reduced in size, generals are reduced in rank and prerogatives, for a general is only a general if there are enough men for him to command. The Army hierarchy at the end of World War I understood clearly the almost certain sequence of constriction that it faced, and so the Army General Staff prepared a bill which would have given it increased powers and would have provided for a large standing Army and the compulsory military training of teen-age boys. Congress, then far more independent than it is now, lacking both a menace and a motive to back the Military, spurned the compulsory training idea and cut the Army down to size.

The failure of this first Army grab for status and power was followed by twenty years of drabness and professional frustration. C. Wright Mills thus describes the moribund existence of the Military in the two decades between world wars:

> During the interwar years, nothing really happened in their professional lives. It was in some ways as if a doctor were passing his life without seeing any patients, for the military were not called upon really to exercise their professional skill. But they had the services. Perhaps that is the clue to their development in such periods: in them there is intensified the desire, too deeply rooted to examine, to conform to type, to be indistinguishable, not to reveal the loss of composure to inferiors, and above all, not to presume the right to upset the arrangements of the chain of command. It was important that those above them could not find anything against them; and, at home and abroad, the life of the professional military went on in their own little colonies, quite insulated from the economical and political life of the nation. In the civilian distrust that prevailed, the military were supposed to "stay out of politics," and most of them seemed glad to do so.

Unprecedented Task

Then came World War II and the startling, overnight reversal. In 1941, from a force of 267,767 men, the Army leaped to 1.4 million. General Brehon B. Somervell was called to head the Services of Supply, and Donald Nelson, a prominent business executive, was made head of the War Production Board. Somervell's job was to obtain and deliver; Nelson's, to produce. They confronted a task of unprecedented magnitude. Thousands of miles away, on opposite sides of the globe, millions of men had to be supplied with all the materiel of war on two extended, flaming, competing battle fronts. For



this task all the resources of our huge industrial plant had to be extended to the utmost; they had to be coordinated with military needs and plans and forecasts; they had to be meshed with all the infinite, detailed problems of transportation and delivery. In one year General Somervell's Services of Supply spent more billions than the entire federal government had expended for all its operations from 1789 to 1917. In 1942, when the Services of Supply was ladling out $32 billion, *Fortune* called it "a holding company of no mean proportions" and added that "it makes U. S. Steel look like a fly-by-night, the A. T. and T. like a country-hotel switchboard."

In an operation so mammoth, involving so many billions, the Military, in whose hands had been placed suddenly the open purse strings of the nation, vaulted to a plane on the level of that occupied by the civilian heads of state and the moguls of industry. "The Chief of Ordnance," wrote *Fortune*, "has an advisory staff composed of Bernard M. Baruch, Lewis H. Brown of Johns-Manville Corp., K. T. Keller of Chrysler Corp., and Benjamin F. Fairless of United States Steel Corp." All the way down the chain of command, this merger of the business interest and the military interest was forged on the most intimate terms, and the first casualty of this partnership, though it was not evident for a long time to the public, was effective civilian control.

The trend and the dangers implicit in it early became evident, however, to those intimately connected with the higher levels of the war effort. One of these was Donald Nelson, the WPB boss. In his book, *Arsenal of Democracy*, Nelson later wrote that the Army, as the result of its lean years, at first had felt itself "starved and neglected," but "from 1942 onward the Army people, in order to get control of our national economy, did their best to make an errand boy of WPB." A Bureau of the Budget report, *The United States at War*, published in 1946, backs up Nelson. During World War II, this official government document says, the Army sought "total control of the nation, its manpower, its facilities, its economy." When the President or Donald Nelson blocked some pet scheme of aggrandizement, the Budget Bureau said, "the military leaders took another approach to secure the same result; they never abandoned the sincere conviction that they could run things better and more expeditiously than civilians." Donald Nelson, for one, was deeply disturbed about what this drive, this lust for power, portended. He warned a still unheeding public that "the question of military control will confront us not only in war but in peace. The

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lesson taught by these recent war years is clear: *our whole economic and social system will be in peril if it is controlled by the military men.*" [Italics added.]

No man in such high position ever delivered a more explicit warning, but the multi-billion-dollar military juggernaut, once rolling in high gear, was not easily to be thrown into reverse. Billions of dollars represent fantastic, inconceivable power. Supporting the power play were all the massive pressures that virtually unlimited funds can insure in profits and propaganda; opposing it were only feeble, individual voices like Donald Nelson's. The outcome was inevitable: the fiancés of World War II, the Military and Big Business, became man and wife.

In the background of their permanent connubial bliss was a haunting specter that doubtless played a great part in driving these lovers into each other's arms. This was the skeleton that has shadowed so much of modern American life: the Great Depression of 1929-32.

Today we tend to think that the New Deal measures which FDR inaugurated to overcome the depression revitalized our economy and solved its basic problems. Actually, they did not. The record says quite clearly that the Roosevelt improvisations enabled the economy to creak along more comfortably, on a level of more general prosperity—but one that was a long way from complete health. In 1939, after six and a half years of the New Deal, America still had 9.5 million men out of work, a staggering 17.2 per cent of the labor force. Not until the United States itself actually became involved in war, indeed not until 1944, when unemployment dropped to about one million, was the goal of full production and virtually full employment actually achieved.

Profits and Crises

What this record says, though often it is not recognized, is hardly debatable: since 1929, we have not had any genuine, full prosperity except in a war economy. There was a slight hiatus immediately after World War II, when military spending dropped drastically and the enormous, pent-up demand for all kinds of civilian goods created a boom economy. But with this exception—and a war-induced exception at that—the prosperity of our economy definitely has been hitched to war production. In an article in *The New York Times Magazine* in 1959, Professor Seymour Harris, of Harvard, put it this way:

> If we treat the years from 1941 to the present as a whole, we find again that a period of record prosperity coincided with a period of heavy military outlay of a gross national product of $5.25 trillion. In eighteen years, purchases of goods and services for defense and war accounted for more than $700 billion. About one dollar out of seven went for war and preparation for war, and this expenditure was undoubtedly a stimulus to the economy.

Since American businessmen are not stupid where their own ledgers are concerned, it stands to reason that the effects of such war pump-priming could not have been totally unforeseen. Nor were they. The speeches of American leaders, even before World War II had ended, make it quite clear that they realized, many of them at least, precisely what was at stake.

The viewpoint was unmistakable in the speeches of such business-official leaders as Frank Knox and James Forrestal and in those of mighty General Electric's Charles E. Wilson. In fact, Wilson, in an address to the Army Ordnance Association in January, 1944, went so far as openly to suggest an alliance of Big Business and the Military in "*a permanent war economy.*" He suggested that every large corporation appoint a liaison man with the Armed Forces, with a commission as colonel in the Reserve.

> First of all such a [preparedness] program must be the responsibility of the federal government [he declared]. It must be initiated and administered by the Executive Branch — by the President as Commander-in-Chief and by the War and Navy Departments. Of equal importance is the fact that this must be, once and for all, a continuing program and not the creature of an emergency. In fact one of its objects will be to eliminate emergencies so far as possible. *The role of Congress is limited to voting the needed funds.* . . . [Italics added.]

Continuing, Wilson spelled out the projected wedding of Big Business and the Military in these words:

> Industry's role in this program is to respond and cooperate . . . in the execution of the part allotted to it; industry must not be hampered by political witch hunts, or thrown to the fanatical isolationist fringe tagged with a "merchants of death" label.

Charted here, this far in advance, was the course that has become today's living reality. And, in truth, warnings against this very reality were penned by Alexander Hamilton nearly 200 years ago. In a perceptive paragraph that seems as if it were written for our day, Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist:*

> The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionately degrades the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.

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

PART III

MADISON AVENUE in UNIFORM

WHEN MADISON AVENUE joined the Pentagon, the American Military acquired a new and insidious power. It entered the field of propaganda on a multi-million-dollar scale, and traditions, firmly rooted in our culture since 1787, disappeared into the quicksand. The Military, historically limited to the execution of national policy, not the determination of it, now began to influence thought and decision, to determine public attitudes and to dominate Congress. It used the people's money, funneled into its hands in prodigious amounts, to indoctrinate the people with its desires and to convert them to the military view and military purposes. No longer could Congress hold a checkrein on the Military, for the Military now went over the heads of Congressmen to the public at large, propagandizing the electorate on whom the Congressmen depend for votes. With this development, the entire basis of power in America began to shift.

The new pattern expressed itself in action for the first time in the campaign waged by the Pentagon in the immediate postwar era to obtain the passage of a Universal Military Training Act. The drive to impose upon America its first peacetime conscription, and so to create a permanent and professional standing army of huge size on the Prussian model, was marked by every conceivable excess of propaganda. A menace had to be created, and Russia became the menace. People had to be scared virtually out of their wits, and the prospect of the atom bomb in Russian hands (even though Russia did not yet have the bomb, even though the Military was boasting the Russians couldn't get it for at least ten, possibly twenty years) was used to scare them. Every tactic of the public relations art was employed to create a wave of public hysteria, to convince the American people that their only hope of survival lay in the creation of an all-powerful Military. So irresistible was the pressure, so effective were the multiple slogans, that in just two and a half years (with an assist from the Russians in producing the first Berlin crisis in 1948) the Pentagon achieved its great objective: it got its peacetime draft.

The Military's version of all this was the lofty one expressed by the Army after the 1948 draft act was passed. The Army admitted, with considerable pride, that it had initiated "a nation-wide public information program. . . . The magnitude of the program . . . is without parallel for any activity previously undertaken by the Army during peacetime." The Army bolstered its claim with impressive statistics. It had enlisted the help of 370 national organizations, including the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Legion; it had contacted 351 mayors in the principal cities of the land; it had promoted at least 591 articles and editorials in the press; the Boy Scouts had distributed fact sheets and listened to Army speakers; and radio and television had been persuaded to lend a patriotic hand. It all added up, in the Pentagon view, to one great, whopping success.

But Was It Legal?

A less enchanted, but by now well-forgotten, version of the Military publicity circus was turned in during 1947 by a Congressional committee investigating military propaganda. The Congressmen, headed by Rep. Forrest A. Harness, declared flatly that the Military had been breaking the law of the land. It said the evidence showed that "the War Department is using government funds in an improper manner for propaganda activities supporting compulsory military training," and it added that the use of such funds "for the purpose of influencing legislation before Congress is unlawful. . . . " It recommended that the Attorney General put a stop to the practice, a recommendation that appears to have been little heeded.

After reciting in detail some of the evidence it had unearthed, the Harness Committee put the whole issue into focus in the concluding paragraphs of its report. In language that seems to raise the specter of the techniques Goebbels employed so well for Hitler, it wrote:

> It has become apparent to your committee that Government propaganda is designed, in most instances, to make the individual believe he is thinking for himself. In reality, Government propaganda distorts facts with such authority that the person becomes prejudiced or biased in the direction which the Government propagandists wish to lead national thinking. It is the authority and the supposed objectivity of Government which leads people to accept, without question, the words released by Government officials and agencies. Propaganda in its crudest form appeals to emotion only. Government propaganda is frequently only "slanted," but accomplishes the same result. An individual might be wary and critical of material coming from a "special interest group." He knows such groups have an axe to grind, but he will consider it as gospel truth, if the Government says the identical thing, because he thinks Government officials are impartial.
>
> Your committee, therefore, reports its firm conclusion that, on the basis of the evidence at hand, the War Department, its personnel and civilian employees have gone beyond the limits of their proper duty of providing factual information to the people and the Congress and have engaged in propaganda supported by taxpayers' money to influence legislation now pending before the Congress.

When even so caustic a report fails to arouse any spirit of resistance in Congress or the people, it seems pertinent to examine in some detail the overwhelming forces that rendered it impotent. For this purpose, a little background is necessary. The

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use by the Military of public relations men and propaganda techniques on a vast scale dates from World War II. In that conflict, the Air Corps, the new glamour arm of the services, led the way in the charge up the heights of self-glorification. The Air Corps thirsted for equal status with Army and Navy; it loaded its ranks with publicity men and pulled out all the stops in a propaganda campaign to glorify itself, its generals, its heroes, its potentialities. The pattern that it set became the pattern of the services. Soon every army headquarters fairly crawled with a publicity staff, devoted to the task of seeing that the American public got the correct perspective on its particular commanding hero of the moment. The growth of the publicity services was quite literally fantastic. By 1948 General Douglas MacArthur had 135 military and 40 civilian personnel on his Far East publicity staff; the Chief of Staff had 44 military and 113 civilians assigned to public relations; the Commanding General, European Theater, had 107 military and 30 civilians taking care of his image.

Publicity Machine

If personal glorification had been the only end product of this immense effort, the result would have been distressing enough, but the Military publicity corps soon expanded its activities beyond such simple objectives and focused directly upon the task of making up the American people's minds for them. This is really the basic issue, often obscured though it is by oratory, underlying the debates that have raged in Congress during this summer of 1961 about the role of the Military and the Kennedy Administration's attempt to keep it within bounds.* As the Harness Committee reported, it was a violation of federal law to use the taxpayers' money to propagandize the taxpayers and bring pressure on Congress for the passage of Universal Military Training. But the Military did it — and got away with it. Let's see how the situation developed and how the great propaganda campaign worked.

When World War II ended, America had some 16 million men in service, and her military might was unrivaled in the world. Swiftly — and it would seem (except for the fact that there was no visible menace on the horizon) with reckless abandon — this mighty force was demobilized. Critics have pointed out that, in the process, the Pentagon deliberately flouted the provisions laid down by Congress when it passed the Selective Service Act of 1940. This act had provided that soldiers mustered out of service should be kept in the Reserve until they reached the age of forty-five, thus forming the nucleus of a strong citizen army. The Pentagon, acting without any authority to do so, scrapped this system and granted outright discharges to some 15 million men. In justification, it contended that the great popular outcry to bring the boys home and get them out of uniform made any other procedure impossible—and, anyhow, this was the way the administration wanted it. Perhaps the administration did, although the White House on one occasion flatly denied it had known what was going on until the Pentagon was well embarked on the program. In any event, the result was that, almost overnight, our overwhelming might, to use the later words of General George C. Marshall, had "disintegrated" into a "hollow shell." This, obviously, represented a crisis; but the Pentagon, it just so happened, had had sufficient forethought to provide the perfect remedy for just such a crisis — UMT.

In the summer of 1945, with war's end in sight, the Pentagon had recalled from Europe one of the Army's ablest commanders, General J. Lawton Collins. Collins was assigned to the task of drafting the Military's plan for the creation of a strong peacetime force. His proposals, subsequently known as the Collins Plan and given the full backing of the Military, called for the establishment of a regular Army and Air Force totaling 1,070,000 and a regular Navy and Marine Corps of 662,000 — a grand total of 1,732,000 regulars. The services would be staffed by a professional officer corps, and the ranks so necessary for command status would be filled up with young Americans drafted for the purpose.

This, remember, was the dream of the Military in 1945, with overwhelming victory in hand on all the war fronts of the world, with Russia our Ally and no visible menace to disturb us — in other words, with no real or possible justification at the moment for advocating this sharp break with all the traditions of America's past.

The Build-Up

The build-up during the next two and a half years was unremitting and colossal in its scope. Every device of the propaganda arts was used, and no segment of public opinion was overlooked. Business leaders were called to "orientation" conferences, supposedly to be "let in" on some military secrets, and they came away propagandists for the Military's point of view. A special women's division was set up within the War Department, and it turned the full power of its blandishments on women's groups to win their endorsement for the conscription of their sons. Comic strips, idealizing Army life, were beamed at children; radio and television panels were "gimmicked" to get across the military point of view; officers in civilian garb were planted in audiences to feed the right questions to military speakers; a special elite training battalion was set up at Fort Knox, with 100 per cent church attendance and not a cussword on the premises, to convince touring pastors that this would be the universal pattern of UMT; and, last but by no means least, opponents of the Military's aims were pictured as either softheaded or subversive, and a deliberate campaign of fear and terror was conducted to convince the American people that we were virtually on the brink of war with Russia and that our national existence was at stake.

In all of this, the Military took the lofty view that it was acting

* See also "The Brass Trumpet; Selling Militarism to America," by Stanley Meisler, *The Nation*, Sept. 2 and Sept. 9, 1961.

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strictly from patriotic motives, strictly for the safety and good of the country. This, of course, has been the justification of the Military in every era and every nation in which it has arrogated to itself supreme power. Napoleon did not scuttle the French Revolution and establish an

Empire because he wanted personal power; he was saving France. Mussolini, similarly, rebuilt the "glory" of Italy, and Hitler devoted himself patriotically to the realization of Germany's "legitimate" national aspirations.

Military grasp for power can always be rationalized on the loftiest plane, though its results almost invariably are tragic; and whatever the future holds for America and its now mighty Military, this much is certain: the UMT campaign marked the sharpest kind of break with all the traditions of America's past, with all the democratic, civilian ideals woven into the fabric of our governmental structure. This was propagandizing by a military caste of a nation and its people on a scale that would have been inconceivable just a few years previously and that was intended to achieve just one result, the determination of national policy on a vital issue. This in itself represented the first, dangerous precedent, for obviously, if the Military could determine national policy on UMT, it could soon determine it in other areas also.

So blatant was the campaign that there could never be any pretense about its methods and its purposes. Both were made apparent quite early, in a speech by General Collins himself to an advisory council meeting of the War Department's special Women's Interest Unit on Nov. 14, 1946. "Of course," said the General, who had drafted the Pentagon's UMT plan, "one of the things right off that we are concerned with is what the reaction in Congress, particularly among the Republican leadership, with reference to our program is going to be. . . . We say, therefore, we have a nonpartisan military policy to implement the nonpartisan foreign policy; and we would like your support in that, on our approach to the Republican leadership to endeavor to get them to support a nonpartisan national military security program." This, clearly, was a high military man's proposal to build up political pressure on Congressmen.

And just about seven months later, in June, 1947, Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Peterson acknowledged before the Harness Committee that the Army's propaganda effort had been intended "to sell the program to the public with the hope that the public would sell it to Congress."

Sales Technique

The Harness Committee report in 1947 analyzed in detail the various sales techniques by which the Military had sought to build a public brush fire under the britches of Congressmen. One wing of the effort involved an extensive radio-television campaign. Alan Coutts, a New York civilian, was employed by the Army to tour "the country at the taxpayers' expense, conducting radio panels and speaking to groups wherever and whenever they could be assembled. The radio panels were top-heavy with persons selected to speak for Universal Military Training. . . . Evidence before the Committee reveals that on March 5, 1947, over Station WIP in Philadelphia, Pa., Mr. Coutts asked that the listening audience write to the radio station; and that the letters received would be forwarded to the proper Congressional authorities." Coutts, the committee found, had traveled by military plane and had made speeches and radio talks in seventeen states and the District of Columbia.

A companion drive, even more sensitive in nature, was beamed at the nation's women. The key agent in this endeavor was another of the War Department's civilian consultants, Mrs. Arthur Woods, a former lieutenant colonel in the WAC. The committee noted that Mrs. Woods was "particularly interested in influencing women and parents" and that she, too, traveled around the country making speeches on the virtues of military training. It just so happened that Mrs. Woods was on the national board of the Girl Scouts of America, and it just so happened that the Harness Committee discovered a fat file of letters she had written to Girl Scout leaders urging them to use their influence "with any organization with which you are connected" to secure the showing of a film entitled, *A Plan for Peace*. This film was described by the Congressional committee as "a propaganda film in support of Universal Military Training. Mrs. Woods admitted that she laid particular emphasis upon the spiritual value of universal military training, in her discussion with the Girl Scout groups."

The Harness Committee found that the propaganda film, *A Plan for Peace*, had been produced at a cost to the taxpayers of $36,293 and that its distribution had cost the taxpayers another $14,244. "Estimates of the War Department as to the number of people witnessing the showings of the film is 680,960," the committee reported. At the time of its report, the committee found that the War Department was spending another $35,000 to produce a second film, glorifying the work of its model UMT unit at Fort Knox. The scenario, the committee wrote, revealed use of "the most subtle of propaganda techniques as developed by the motion-picture industry in the past years." The film was propaganda pyramided on propaganda.

What the Army had done at Fort Knox was to create a *model* unit and use it to convince visiting VIPs that the *model* was exactly what the *average* under UMT would be like. The members of the unit were picked enrollees, not a prison risk or a

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health risk among them. Publicity releases from the camp emphasized that they were such devout churchgoers that attendance at Sunday services approached 100 per cent, but at least one skeptical visitor found that this was so for just the first four weeks when the enrollees were *required* to attend—and that after this period church attendance dropped from a high of 425 to 37. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson himself sent out invitations to officials of important national organizations, inviting them to visit Fort Knox at the government's expense and see for themselves just how wonderful UMT was going to be. On more pedestrian levels, the word was spread by having some of the camp's prize trainees go on extended speaking tours to describe to women's clubs, parent-teacher groups and civic luncheon meetings some of its wonders.

McCarthy Techniques

Not only did the Pentagon actively promote by every exaggerated device its conception of UMT, but it exhibited a tendency to brook no opposition from citizens who might hold opposite views. The McCarthy technique of casting suspicion on the motives and loyalty of the opposition, instead of meeting its arguments, became evident in some tactics of the Military long before the advent of the Senator from Wisconsin. The Harness Committee took a strong swipe at the practice in these words:

> Your committee found that, in some cases, the propaganda and material prepared by civilians at the War Department followed *a pattern unworthy of any Department of Government* [italics added]. We desire to quote, particularly, from one such paragraph, from the "Outline for veterans' radio panels," which relates directly to the questions to which your subcommittee is directing its attention:
>
> "The opposition to Universal Military Training is generally not based on fact but rather on such generalities as democracy, morals, aggression, education and pacifism. The chief opponents are parents, church groups, educators, subversive groups, and a large section of the public which does not think. Any attempt to sell a program of Universal Military Training must be based on a thorough job of analysis and specialized thinking along the lines of objections of each of the opposing groups and it must establish refutation and motivation for each of the groups opposed."

In pointed contrast to this position, the committee quoted extensively from the testimony before it of Dr. Ralph McDonald, of the National Education Association. Dr. McDonald sharply questioned the ethics of the War Department in trying "to turn the minds of the American people on the question of Universal Military Training by casting aspersions upon people who might think otherwise." Here was evident the origin of a national malaise—one that in the next ten years was to sweep the nation and make any meaningful national debate on the great issues of the day impossible, for the unanswerable retort to any dissent was to question the dissident's motives and patriotism. Dr. McDonald, in words that unfortunately went unheeded, put the issue strongly. He testified:

> I became increasingly concerned because to my way of thinking there are two ways of destroying human freedom, negative and positive.
>
> Soviet Russia is giving a perfect indication of how to destroy freedom both ways, through concentration camps, through censorship, through every means for punishing individuals for being individual.
>
> They suppress freedom. That is the negative procedure.
>
> There is, however, an equally devastating way to destroy human freedom and that is to establish government and government agencies and give to them the channels or the money by which to use the channels of influencing public opinion, and if millions of dollars are expended by a public agency in propagandizing the people for a particular law that agency desires, Mr. Chairman, that is one of the most effective ways of destroying human freedom I know, and it is perfectly illustrated by Russia again.

Despite the scope of the Military's nation-wide sales campaign for UMT, America was not yet ready to be bludgeoned into peacetime conscription. Congress, in late 1947, flatly rejected the plan. The Pentagon had been serenely confident the bill would pass, and no enemy blockbuster dropping squarely on that citadel of the Brass could have caused greater consternation. The Military were angered and outraged at being balked by the cumbersome legislative processes of democracy, and one Air Force general expressed what appears to have been more than just an individual opinion. He exploded in wrath over what he called the "appallingly bad judgment" of the "old men" in Congress "who would have been eliminated in any other nation."

Wrath, Unlimited

Not just this outburst, but the entire reaction of the Pentagon to its setback seems quite significant. The Military had just been chastised by the Harness Committee for breaking the laws of the land in its propagandizing of the people and of Congress. The Attorney General had even been asked to curb the Military. Did this make any difference to the Military? It did not. The Pentagon flew into a frenzy, and the propagandizing that had gone on before was mild compared to the propagandizing that began now.

An inside view of the turmoil in

the Pentagon at this time has been given by Colonel William H. Neblett in his scathing book, *Pentagon Politics*. Colonel Neblett, in 1947, was national president of the Reserve Officers Association, and he was rep-

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resentative of the type of citizen-soldier who had borne the brunt of the fighting in two world wars. A California lawyer, he had been for twelve years the law partner of William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury during the Wilson administration. In World War I, he had been an artillery officer in France; in World War II, he had been in the Air Force and had served as a base commander on the staff of General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. After V-J Day he had been ordered to Washington, and there he had been made a colonel in the legislative-and-liaison division of the Air Force in the Pentagon, with a staff of two civilian secretaries and some thirty-odd officers and men. He remained in this high-level observation post for two years and so had intimate knowledge of Pentagon maneuverings during the critical period of the UMT debate.

Man of Vision

In weighing Colonel Neblett's account, it should be kept in mind that he was the committed and articulate advocate of a policy that ran counter to the policy of the Pentagon. He believed strongly that America should depend, as it had in the past, on a regular Military of small size plus a large, well-trained Reserve. He believed in compulsory military training for this Reserve, but he was shocked at the Pentagon's plan to raise and maintain a standing force of 10 million men, dominated by a professional officers' corps into which virtually no draftee could break. Colonel Neblett believed that, in the atomic age, military forces had to be more dispersed, not more concentrated, a generally sound military proposition; and he was convinced that a skilled Reserve, organized on a local basis throughout the country, would meet the needs of the age better than huge and relatively concentrated forces.

Whatever one may think of Colonel Neblett's pet plan as opposed to the Pentagon's pet plan, the Air Force Colonel emerges from the debates of the times as a man of considerable stature and vision. For example, in October, 1949, he sent the chairman of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees a prophetic letter. In this, far in advance of the regular Military, he condemned the big-bomber program in which we were then placing all our atomic eggs. He wrote: "An absolute defense to the airplane, whether bomber or fighter, has been ignored. I refer to rocket missiles armed with the proximity fuse, or better still, the electronic eye fuse. . . . There are two effective carriers for atomic and biological weapons—the submarine and the guided missile." Now, twelve years later, in the day of Polaris and ICBMs, it would seem that Colonel Neblett was perceptive.

Having thus established Colonel Neblett's qualifications as an observer, let's listen to his version of the manner in which the Pentagon roof vibrated with the wrath of the Brass when, in the fall of 1947, Congress struck down UMT. He writes:

> When the bill did not pass, the Pentagon was thrown into complete confusion. The military forces had been illegally demobilized; drafting men under the Selective Service Act of 1940 had been terminated March 31, 1947; very few men had enlisted; and the lower ranks of Army, Navy and Air had run down so low that we had a great professional officers' corps with appropriate staffs and clerks, but few privates and seamen.
>
> The Pentagon turned on the heat. The huge professional officers' corps was converted into a propaganda organization, the like of which the world had never seen. Generals and admirals, colonels and captains, spoke throughout the land at every meeting to which they could wangle an invitation. Reams of statements of generals and admirals for press and radio were ground out for them by the civilian publicity experts, employed at the Pentagon, and the several hundreds of headquarters, camps, posts, and stations of Army, Navy, and Air throughout the nation. The Pentagon line was that we were living in a state of undeclared emergency; that war with Russia was just around the corner; and that the safety of the nation was dependent upon the speedy rebuilding of the lower ranks of Army, Navy and Air with the Pentagon form of UMT.

The campaign to scare the pants off the American people was mounted on a scale and attained a fury such as had never been seen before. General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, had not yet begun to worry about the military-industrial complex. He told Congress that "our only real security lies in internationalism," supported by adequate military strength, and he made it clear that this prescription for adequate strength was the Pentagon's form of UMT, the only "insurance against extinction." Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, Chief of Army Information, declared we were living in a "state of undeclared emergency," and unless the Pentagon got its way, the Army "would be unable to do its job" of defending the country. Lieutenant General Raymond S. MacLean, Chief of the Division of Universal Military Training for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said we were facing the prospect of a lightning war, and it would be too late to do anything about it "after the bombs began to fall." General Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Force, warned us that we faced possible devastation from the air through attacks across the North Pole.

Blithe Spirits

Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves, commander of the Manhattan Project that developed the A-bomb, testified that in the first five hours of an atomic attack 40 million Americans would be killed. (This testimony, of course, blithely ignored two facts: one, that the Russians did not yet have the A-bomb, and, two, that if what the Military itself had been saying was right, they couldn't get it for perhaps another ten years.)

General Collins, then Deputy Chief of Staff under Eisenhower, warned that World War III "would start very suddenly and come through the air" and that "the enemy would try to eliminate the United States at the outset, not making the same mistake as last time of taking on somebody else first and allowing us to prepare." The atomic bomb (his testimony, too, disregarded the elemental fact that no one else had it yet) would be used against our cities: "We would have chaos . . . civil disorder, and sabotage." Airborne troops would drop on us. Sub-

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marines might even pop up off our shores and let us have it. In a word, we would all be dead fish before we knew it.

Just in case this prospect wasn't ghastly enough, the Pentagon pulled some real horror skeletons out of its closet. The Joint Chiefs of Staff published a report of the Army Research Board on biological warfare. This tidy little document described in graphic detail how radioactive dust could be released by high-flying airplanes to spread an atomic cloud over our cities, killing all the people in them unless they were lucky enough to get out fast and find some place where they could hide for a long time, perhaps for the next fifty years. At the same time, at the request of the same Joint Chiefs, a Harvard University expert published a treatise on bacteriological warfare in which he demonstrated that germ warfare would be more deadly than the atom bomb.

The Panic Button

The effect of all of this was hardly surprising. Though there had not yet been an overt warlike gesture in the postwar world, Americans by the thousands became convinced that World War III was virtually upon them. Commenting on the situation, the eminently conservative *United States News & World Report* noted on May 14, 1948:

> President Truman is somewhat disturbed by the way the idea of imminent war with Russia hangs on in the country even after the official line has changed from war scares to more emphasis upon the prospect for peace.
>
> Gen. Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff [he had succeeded Eisenhower], was out of step with the Government's new policy when he expressed the opinion that war prospects had risen in recent days. Both at the White House and in the State Department there is a backing away from the attitude now that the Marshall Plan is law and Italy has decided to stay with the West.
>
> War scares, encouraged by high officials only a few weeks ago, so alarmed the 144 million U.S. public that top planners now are having to struggle hard to keep Congress from pouring more money into national defense than the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard as wise or necessary. *It is proving more difficult to turn off than to turn on a war psychology*" [italics added].

It was proving more difficult, indeed. The Pentagon kept a hard, stabbing finger on the panic button. It had a virtual corner on speakers' platforms across the land, and though Truman may have wanted a peace line, the Pentagon continued to purvey a war line. At the height of its carefully generated hysteria, with the peacetime conscription bill still before Congress, mayors from cities all over the United States met in convention in Washington. They were addressed by Lieutenant General Harold R. Bull, Chief of the Organization and Training Division of the General Staff. General Bull, of course, stressed the virtues of UMT, and just in case he should have any skeptics in the audience, he launched into a graphic description of the exact horrors that awaited every mayor and every mayor's city in case of an atomic attack. He pictured the utter devastation around ground zero, the instant incineration of a good part of the populace, the lingering deaths of thousands of others exposed to lethal gamma rays, the deaths of still others buried in the mountains of debris, and still more deaths of those trapped and caught in the vast fires that would sweep the city. "General Bull's speech to the mayors received wide publicity," Colonel Neblett writes. "The mayors returned to their cities carrying the message that peacetime conscription was the only way to protect the people of the big cities from destruction by the atomic bomb" (which no one else had yet).

Such tactics seem, as the Harness Committee had written earlier, "a pattern unworthy of any Department of Government." Not even a deluded sincerity could be advanced as a justification, for sincerity wasn't there. "I know from my own knowledge of the men who worked up the fear campaign that they do not believe what they say . . ." Colonel Neblett wrote. "Top military leaders had been testifying before Congress and advertising to the public that Russia did not have the atomic bomb and could not make it in quantity for years. The General Staff admitted that there was no chance whatever for the Russians to make any sort of successful attack on this country with conventional weapons." Yet, in defiance of all truth and logic, Military spokesmen kept picturing to the public the imminence of an "enemy" attack of horrifying proportions as justification for building up a huge ground army, equipped with conventional weapons—the very kind of force that would be most useless if the much-propagandized holocaust ever materialized from the skies. It was the old technique of using the Big Lie, repeated so often it is accepted as truth, to whip up the kind of emotional frenzy that overrides reason and permits the accomplishment of ends no logic could justify.

Fateful Year

In the end, the Military had its way. The year, 1948, was a Presidential election year—and so especially sensitive. The Republicans were hunting the Truman scalp and confidently expected to lift it. In this context, the Military's campaign had to be evaluated not just on its merits, but on its vote-getting impact. In the Senate, the veteran Robert A. Taft, of Ohio, the mastermind of Republican Congressional strategy, had given clear indications that he was worried about the Military's propaganda activities and was not inclined to give the Pentagon its way. But then, just at this critical juncture, there arose the first Berlin crisis. The Russians closed the access routes running through East Germany to Berlin; and Truman responded with the dramatic air lift that succeeded in supplying the beleaguered former German capital. International tensions, so notably absent when the Pentagon first began to flaunt them, suddenly and dramatically intensified into the first fearful spasm of the cold war in whose shadow we have lived ever since. In this changed atmosphere, the Republicans felt that they had to act. Already they were plotting the 1948 campaign along the lines of the soft-on-communism and treason issues, and so they could hardly afford to be put in a position where they

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would appear to be themselves less warlike than the "soft" administration they were criticizing. The result was that, on June 19, 1948, the peacetime draft bill passed Congress in exactly the form in which it had been drafted in the Pentagon. Only a few lonely voices were raised in opposition. In the House of Representatives, a small band of Congressmen—Short, Bishop, Heffernan, Philbin and Havenner—filed a stinging dissent to the favorable report of the House Armed Services Committee:

> The day is long past when a war can be won with mass armies and obsolete weapons. . . . The considerable degree of hysteria prevalent today is in a large measure due to the propaganda efforts of the Armed Services themselves. . . . The Army is spending large amounts of the taxpayers' money to obtain a permanent system of conscription. . . . The Army has acted as if it is the policy-making body of the nation. . . . Congress cannot permit itself to become the rubber stamp of a willful group of officers who want to Prussianize this Nation, and who are prepared to sabotage our defenses in the process.

Two years to the day after Congress passed the peacetime conscription act of 1948, the Korean War broke out. No conflict could have come at a more providential time for the Military, for the 1948 UMT act had been limited to just two years' duration, it was expiring, and the Pentagon wanted a new, extended, much stronger act. To achieve this goal, nothing could be more helpful than a demanding crisis. Yet the crisis, as is in the nature of the beast, had some disturbing aspects.

The peacetime draft, which was to have made us so strong we could defy even the A-bomb, had been in operation for a full two years. Yet when Korea blew up in our faces we suddenly discovered, as Colonel Neblett later wrote, that we couldn't handle a "sixth-class" enemy. Frantic calls for reinforcements sounded from the Pentagon, and Reservists and National Guardsmen were called up by the thousands and shipped off to the fighting front to do the job that, one would have thought, the greatly strengthened Regular Army had been supposed to do. Why was this necessary? Some answers to this nettling question may be found in the testimony of General Collins before the House Armed Services Committee in May, 1952. Collins was arguing at that late date that he should be permitted to keep the National Guard divisions that had been called up in service for another five years. In explaining the necessity for this drastic step, he drew another frightening picture—one of a horribly depleted Army. The Regular Army, he said, did not have a single division in the United States with which to reinforce our men in Korea. There we had a mere six American divisions; we had two more in Japan, five in Europe, and two airborne and one armored division in the United States—a total of sixteen. Included in these sixteen, though the General didn't say so, were one Marine and three National Guard divisions.

What this testimony indicated was that, despite the Pentagon's much-vaunted 1948 draft act, the Army had been able to put into the field only 12 combat divisions, numbering some 150,000 to 200,000 men. Yet the Department of Defense had a personnel of 5 million; the ground Army numbered some 2 million. What we had produced was a sprawling military bureaucracy, so top-heavy in the echelons of command, staff and administration that there weren't enough men to fight a sixth-class war. Colonel Neblett suggests that an Army one-quarter the size, with twelve men assigned to combat for every one retained for command, staff and administration, would have been far more efficient and effective, and he adds: "The idea is reasonable. The Russians do it."

More of the Same

This solution seems never to have occurred to Congress, and certainly it could never be expected to occur to generals. The Pentagon, in 1950 just as it had in 1948, pressed the panic button and pictured the disasters that would invariably descend upon us if it didn't get a stronger draft act and more, many more, men. It got what it wanted. A new draft act was passed, making the temporary conscription program of 1948 permanent. The draft age was lowered from 19 to 18, the term of service was lengthened from 21 months to two years, and the time of active and reserve service was stretched to a long eight years. The personnel ceiling for the Army regulars was lifted from 2,166,882 to 5 million men. In a nation marked by increasing apathy, few persons seemed to consider that the crisis might have been handled any other way than by putting the Military firmly in the saddle. To quote Colonel Neblett again: "With few exception, Senators and Representatives have accepted on faith everything told to them by the Pentagon. The members of Congress seem to have some sort of idolatrous complex for generals and admirals, whose words are accepted by them as law and without question."

Off to a Good Start

The members of Congress were not alone in exhibiting this worshipful complex of our times. Big businessmen and the preponderance of the nation's press have joined the claque that cheers on the Brass. This conjunction of high-level interests showed itself revealingly on April 26, 1951, at the annual dinner of the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. Charles E. (General Electric) Wilson, then Defense Mobilization Director, was the speaker, and he congratulated the publishers for their co-operation in publishing

> millions of words laying down the premise . . . that the free world is in mortal danger. . . . If the people were not convinced of that it would be impossible for Congress to vote the vast sums now being spent to avert that danger. . . . With the support of public opinion as marshalled by the press, we are off to a good start. But the mobilization job cannot be completed unless such support is continuous. . . . It is our job — yours and mine — to keep our people convinced that the only way to keep disaster away from our shores is to build America's might.

Yes, sir, we were off to a good start all right, but we couldn't let down for a minute. There was a mighty lot of work to be done and a mighty lot of munitions still to be manufactured.

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

PART IV

THERE IS NOTHING LIKE A BOMB

THE ATOMIC BOMB that fell on Hiroshima exploded with only slightly less impact among America's civilian institutions. Though hardly anyone realized it at the time, the mere existence of the bomb signaled the start of the arms race in which we are still engaged, and resulted in the virtual enthronement of the Military.

With an instrument of such awesome destructiveness loose in the world, it was inevitable that military considerations should overshadow all others. No great nation that did not have the bomb could feel secure. And the one great nation that did have it had a tiger by the tail. What should we do with it? How should we husband it? The answers to these questions seemed to lie in the hands of the men who should know best, who had special expertise in weaponry—the Military.

The simplicity of this logic, viewed in the perspective of the years, now seems to have been the great delusion of our times. For anyone studying the record is forced to the conclusion that the Military, preoccupied with their own narrow professional interests, simply did not know best. The one man in all the high councils of government who had the vision to understand what was at stake, what enormous changes the demon we had unleashed inevitably would compel, was a civilian—Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

In retrospect, the acuity of Stimson's perception seems little short of phenomenal. On September 11, 1945, little more than a week after V-J Day and only a month after Hiroshima, he sent President Truman a memorandum that foretold with uncanny precision the deadly dilemmas of our times. Already official opinion was dividing into two camps—one intent on keeping "the secret," the other believing we should "share it with the world." Stimson realized that our problem was not the world, but the USSR, the only power of comparable resources and industrial magnitude. What we did now, the first toddling steps that we took into the new atomic age, inevitably would determine, in his view, the entire course of our future relations with Russia. Hence our first decision might be our last; it might be all-important for decades to come. Filled with this clear vision, Stimson wrote:

> In many quarters [the atomic weapon] has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Soviet Government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. . . .

Stimson's Plan

The result, Stimson predicted, would be "a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. *There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.*" [Italics added.] Stimson felt that our military possession of the bomb was in itself an event of such overwhelming significance that it became, whether we wished it or not, the pivot on which our whole foreign policy must turn.

> I consider [he wrote] the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the . . . control of the bomb. . . . Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia.

Stimson wanted to make a direct, bold, friendly approach to Moscow, laying all our cards on the line. He felt that we should take the initiative, that we should not fiddle-faddle by working through intermediate nations or agencies, but that we should go directly to Stalin, with British backing, to obtain an agreement which would "limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war" and also "encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes."

This plan involved a gamble, as Stimson recognized, but he faced the supreme issue of the hour, as Walter Millis later wrote in *Arms and the State*, "with the naked lack of hypocrisy that it demanded." He acknowledged that, if we succeeded in reaching an agreement with Russia, we might well have to stop work on the development of atomic weapons, impound the bombs we had, exchange information on the peaceful use of atomic energy, and undertake never again to use the A-bomb as a war weapon. This might seem very much like the act of a man voluntarily tying his hands behind his back in the hour of triumph, but Stimson, with a prophet's vision, foresaw the inevitably fatal consequences of any other policy. He wrote:

> . . . If we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions . . . will increase. It will inspire them to . . . an all-out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need. . . . The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.

At this critically late hour, it is impossible to tell whether Stimson's logic, had it been applied to our foreign policy, would have placated the Russians, reassured them as to our intentions, and brought peace instead of cold war to the world. The Russian leaders, in any case, might have been as intransigent as all our propaganda for nearly two decades has pictured them. But one thing now seems certain: Stimson's bold and far-seeing policy represented the only hope. All the evil consequences that he foresaw in the alternative policy

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of secrecy and threat inevitably have come home to roost.

In any event, Stimson's vision ranged too far ahead of his time to be easily understood. In the background of our entire approach to the issue were traces of great delusion. Churchill has described how surprised Truman was at Potsdam at Stalin's phlegmatic reaction to the news that we possessed an entirely new weapon of awesome destructiveness. Truman had recognized that we must brief our wartime ally so that he would not be caught by surprise when we dropped the bomb on Hiroshima, but he had worried about Stalin's reaction, had been concerned whether Stalin immediately would demand a share of the secret.

Stalin, however, appeared strangely incurious; he merely grunted that it was good we had a weapon that would take care of the Japanese, but he did not even ask its name or nature. The Allied leaders reasoned that perhaps Stalin hadn't grasped the full significance of what Truman had told him, and the alternative appears not to have occurred to them—that Russian scientists, and through them, Stalin, were fully aware of the possibility of making an A-bomb and needed only a hint fully to realize what we had. Implicit in this Potsdam incident was one of the most fatal delusions of our leaders and our times. We were convinced that, in the A-bomb, we held a great and exclusive secret when, as scientists everywhere realized, we possessed in the true sense no secret at all.

The Die Is Cast

This same fatal overestimation of what we had and the possibility of retaining exclusive possession of it overshadowed the crucial debate that Stimson's memorandum ignited in the inner councils of government. With Stimson's views so clearly and forcibly spelled out, President Truman called a Cabinet meeting to determine the course we should follow. This session promptly bogged down into a confused and inconclusive wrangle in which the true issues appear not even to have been perceived, much less considered. Secretary of the Treasury Fred M. Vinson, a Truman favorite, hotly opposed Stimson's plan. So did Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, on most issues a spokesman for the professional Brass. Vinson felt that any exchange of atomic information would be "a one-sided affair," and he, Forrestal, Attorney General Tom Clark and Secretary of Agriculture Anderson soon were accusing Stimson of wanting to give Russia "the secret of the bomb."

In this acrimonious atmosphere, the Cabinet meeting broke up. It was Stimson's last. And though no decision had been reached on his proposal, Truman appears to have been impressed by the vehemence of the opposition and never seriously to have considered the Stimson plan for direct, plain talking with Moscow.

Yet, just nine months later, in another forum, we were to offer to the world virtually everything that Stimson had proposed we should offer Russia immediately. In mid-June, 1946, Bernard M. Baruch, heading an American delegation, proposed to the United Nations the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, with full control over atomic raw materials and atomic weapons. Baruch described the plan as "an international law with teeth in it," but Russia, by this time well embarked on its own experiments, would have none of it and exercised its veto in the U. N. Security Council. This action, to Americans, meant simply that Stalin and Russia could not be trusted; that they were war-bound.

From the Russian viewpoint, however, as Walter Millis wrote in *The Nation* (February 15, 1958), the choice between peace without the bomb and a desperate arms race was not as simple as it appeared to us.

> The United States [Millis wrote], believing itself to hold a monopoly of an almost absolute military weapon as well as a newly-discovered energy source of immense significance, was offering to yield both into the hands of an international authority in which the United States would have a permanently dominant influence, while both Russia and her Communist international system would be at a permanent disadvantage. The offer was surrounded by conditions as to inspection which might seriously imperil both the internal power of the Communist dictatorship and its political freedom on the world stage. It was clear that the United States would make no actual surrender of the military power until the Soviet Union had demonstrated its loyal acceptance of what was a Western solution of a problem now common to both great systems.

The alternative, Millis suggested, "was simply to wait until the Soviet Union" also had the bomb and then "to bargain on equal footing"—a reaction, as the writer pointed out, almost identical to our own reaction after sputnik, when we made desperate efforts to enter the missile age and catch up with the Russians.

An Open Secret

Could the direct, swift approach that Stimson advocated have headed off all this? Many certainly will doubt it, but no one can tell whether, in a different atmosphere, with less clamoring for a permanent war economy on our side, the outcome might have been different. Just one thing is certain: with the failure of the Baruch plan, the era of deepening international distrust, the desperate international arms race that Stimson had foreseen, became the grim reality of our times. We entered this darkening world confident of an enduring military superiority and with an almost total lack of recognition that we possessed at the best only the most tenuous hold on a tenuous secret—one we could not possibly keep.

The civilian scientists who had perfected the bomb were perfectly aware of the basic truth that no nation has a monopoly on scientific brains and that, since this is so, no scientific secret can be really "kept." The Military, operating in a different atmosphere, living in a world in which secrecy regarding strategy and weapons is a basic element, saw only that we had a great new miracle weapon which we should preserve for ourselves, and refused to see, or failed to see, that their precious formula of military secrecy was a pure chimera in the age of modern science. Their wishful thinking overrode all

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of Stimson's perceptive common sense.

Yet the fundamental facts on which the most momentous of national decisions had to be made should have been matters of common knowledge. Albert Einstein, in his mass-energy formula published in 1905, had laid the scientific basis for splitting the atom and releasing its enormous energy. In one graphic prewar article, *The Saturday Evening Post* had described for its millions of readers the first American atom-splitting experiments; it had given a vivid picture of the tremendous energy released, the staggering potential involved. Even our own development of the A-bomb had not been the work of American scientists alone. Vital contributions had been made by a number of foreign physicists, and it was folly to suppose that all the knowledgeable foreign scientific brains had been corralled for *our* experiments. And, indeed, they had not. Soviet atomic research had begun in the late 1920s. In 1942, a Soviet scientist, A. E. Brodsky, had separated the main fissionable form of uranium, 235, from ordinary uranium; and even before this, eminent Russian physicists had urged a crash program to produce an A-bomb.

Historic Blunder

From all of this, it is evident that the basic conception, the basic scientific knowledge, was available to scientists the world over. All that we had—and all that Russia needed to acquire — were the engineering techniques and the marshalling of industrial resources necessary for manufacture. This, quite obviously, in a nation of Russia's scientific ability and industrial capacity, would be only a matter of time—and of relatively short time at that.

This lead time, for which we were prepared to risk so much in long-range tensions, may well have been considerably reduced by one of the best-forgotten *faux pas* of our times, a blunder for which the Military alone was responsible. During the war, Major General Leslie R. Groves had been placed in over-all command of the Manhattan Project that developed the A-bomb. Civilian scientists and engineers created the weapon; General Groves's principal function was to insure security. One of the scientists who worked under the General was Dr. Henry DeWolf Smyth, Professor of Physics at Princeton University; and well in advance of the Hiroshima bomb drop, General Groves assigned Dr. Smyth to the task of preparing a lengthy and detailed report on the steps followed in the bomb's development. Thousands of copies of this report were printed, and on August 7, 1945, the day after Hiroshima, General Groves called a press conference in the Pentagon and issued copies of the Smyth report to all who attended.

Blueprint for the Bomb

A highly interested observer of this performance was Colonel Neblett, the chairborne Pentagon Air Force officer. Neblett writes that he obtained a copy of the Smyth Report and "studied it with a great deal of interest and enlightenment." According to Neblett, the version of the report he held in his hands gave the world all the critical information any scientist really needed to produce an A-bomb. Neblett writes:

> Dr. Smyth's report opens with a long-hand letter from Dr. Albert Einstein written to President Roosevelt in 1940, telling President Roosevelt that the making of an atomic bomb was possible. The report then goes on to tell in great detail the experiments with atomic piles, the development of uranium and plutonium, and finally how uranium or plutonium is triggered into exploding by bringing together at high speeds two critical sizes of the metal. The book is replete with formulas showing how the atomic bomb is made and the effects of an atomic explosion.
>
> The Smyth Report is a great piece of work. The report is so complete in its details that any well-equipped machine shop which had some uranium could take the report and make an atomic bomb.

In effect, the Smyth Report was General Groves's claim to fame, and press and radio, which had been full of President Truman's announcement and descriptions of the tremendous achievement of atomic scientists, now became quite full, too, of General Groves. President Truman and General Marshall were on the high seas on their way back from the Potsdam Conference when the Hiroshima announcement was made, and it wasn't until they had returned to Washington that they learned of the issuance of the Smyth Report and began to worry about its consequences.

> The General Staff decided that something had to be done to recover the Smyth Report [Colonel Neblett writes]. A directive was sent around the Pentagon and to all headquarters in the United States Navy, Army and Air, ordering all military personnel to turn into the Pentagon any copies which they might have of the report. The copy which I had acquired was taken from me in this manner. The Pentagon had no way of recovering the thousands of copies distributed by General Groves to the press, to the radio and to the public.

Colonel Neblett says "the Pentagon was buzzing with speculation on what would happen to General Groves when General Marshall got home," but nothing happened. It is a tradition in the Military for the Brass to stand by the Brass, and General Groves remained in command of the atomic project until Congress finally wrested control of atomic energy developments from the Military. When General Eisenhower succeeded Marshall as Chief of Staff, Groves even got a promotion to Lieutenant General, and shortly thereafter, at the age of fifty-four, he retired from the Army and became vice-president of Remington Rand, Inc.

The Misled Oracle

This record is stressed at some length because it was General Groves, despite his issuance of the Smyth Report, who became the veritable oracle of the Military in insisting that we could "keep the secret of the bomb." As late as October 31, 1947, *The New York Times* reported: "Major General Leslie R. Groves said today that the Russians would need fifteen to twenty years to develop an atomic bomb if they did it in secrecy and without aid from the United States, Great Britain or Switzerland."

Such was the Military counsel on

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which the Truman administration relied in formulating a basic defense plan geared to the bomb and the long-range bomber. Less than two years after General Groves had predicted so confidently it would take the Russians fifteen to twenty years to catch up with us, the Russians touched off a blast that signaled to the world they had already entered the nuclear age. On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that "within recent weeks" the Russians had achieved an atomic explosion. Just four short years after Stimson's perceptive memorandum, the "secret armament race of a rather desperate character" which he had foreseen became a horrifying reality.

Enter the Witch Hunt

It says much about the propaganda age in which we live that, in this debacle of our major military-foreign policy, no blame attached to the Military. They came out of it like shining knights by the simple device of joining forces with the rabid Right in Congress to produce a scapegoat. Beginning in the summer of 1948, Republican-dominated Congressional committees, in their partisan and ruthless attempt to defeat Truman, embarked upon spy hunts unparalleled in our history, whipping up in the country an emotional frenzy in which the word of every perjurer, if he testified about an alleged spy, was accepted as gilt-edged truth and virtually every man accused was convicted by the accusation. In this witch hunt that disgraced every democratic tradition, the Military (which had been using the same tactics to blacken foes of its conscription plan) blithely collaborated with the ultra-conservatives in Congress, big business, and the press. "The Pentagon encouraged Congressional committees to go overboard in their investigations of communism in order to turn attention away from General Groves's stupid act in giving the secret of the atomic bomb to Russia when he made the Smyth Report public in August of 1945," Colonel Neblett writes.

The headlines that screamed the hysteria of the day fully support him. In early September, 1948, an Associated Press dispatch from Washington reported: "Congressional spy investigators have enlisted Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves to help find out whether Russia got away with any atomic bomb super-secrets." On September 10, *The New York Times* ran a page-one headline: "Atom Bomb Leaks Hinted by Groves." The story began: "Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, wartime chief of the Army's atomic-bomb development, indicated today that there well might have been leaks of its secrets to Russia." The next day, more glaring headlines spotlighted the role of the Military in the witch hunt. *The Times* headlined another AP dispatch from Washington: "Russians Got Data on Bomb, Vail Says; Quotes an Officer." And the New York *Herald Tribune* put the news more briefly and startlingly with: "Army Man Says Russians Stole Atomic Secrets." Months later the House Un-American Activities Committee, at the very beginning of a 20,000-word report, put heavy reliance and emphasis on the expert word of General Groves, quoting him as testifying: "I have no hesitancy in saying that there was continued and persistent and well-organized espionage against the United States, and particularly against the atom-bomb project, by a foreign power with which we were not at war, and its misguided and traitorous domestic sympathizers. . . ."

The impact on the American public of the daily reiterations of spy sensations in the American press can never be estimated. Common sense says that it must have been colossal. And at least two results are quite obvious. In the ferment, everyone forgot that General Groves had ever released the Smyth Report, and even before the Russians exploded an A-bomb, the guilt was fixed: traitors within the Democratic administration had done us in. This deliberately fomented public hysteria was to lead directly to some of the most controversial and most dubious prosecutions in American judicial history—the Hiss case, the Remington case and the execution of the Rosenbergs for "stealing the secret" of the atomic bomb. It was to lead, too, to long years of witch hunt in which the smear, however veiled, became the unanswerable retort to truth, however documented.

The actual explosion of the first Russian A-bomb in 1949, which in another atmosphere might have been cause for sober reappraisal, became in this atmosphere only an incitement to new excesses. The rabid Right in Congress lost no time in capitalizing on the shudders of dread that fanned out from that historic detonation. Congressman Velde trumpeted that the Russians had gained "three to five years in producing the atomic bomb, solely because the American government for the last fifteen years has had the official attitude, from the White House down, of being highly tolerant of, and at times even sympathetic to, the views of Communists and fellow travelers, with the result that the Federal government has been infiltrated by a network of spies. . . ." Karl Mundt, who had been elevated to the Senate on the wings of his role in the Hiss case, proclaimed: "It now appears that earlier and prevailing laxity in safeguarding this country against Communist espionage has permitted what were once the secrets of an atomic bomb to fall into the hands of America's only potential enemy."

Sanity of Science

Lost in the phony clamor was the sanity of science. The September, 1949, issue of *Atomics* commented editorially that, after the Russian A-bomb, "radio commentators have worked themselves into a minor panic; many of them have the country practically at war with Russia." But, said *Atomics*:

> Since the discovery of atomic fission in 1938, there had been no basic secret regarding the atomic bomb. True, it was not until July 16, 1945, when the first experimental atomic explosion took place at Alamagordo, that American scientists actually knew that an atomic bomb would work. Only during the twenty-one days between that date and August 6, 1945, when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, did we possess the secret of the atomic bomb. This secret was simply that we knew the bomb would work. Scientists of

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other nations did not know it. So, when President Truman, on August 6, 1945, disclosed the fact that an atomic bomb had actually been exploded over Hiroshima, we gave away the most important secret we had. . . .

Another smothered voice of sanity in the 1949 hysteria was that of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Trying to clear up the "confusion" surrounding the nature of atomic secrets and "clarify this aspect of public thinking," it wrote:

> There existed, for instance, an unfortunate notion that one marvelous "formula" explains how to make bombs and that it belonged exclusively to the United States. Actually, the basic knowledge underlying the explosive release of atomic energy—and it would fill a library—never has been the property of one nation.
>
> On the contrary, nuclear physicists throughout the world (including those who live behind the Iron Curtain) were thoroughly familiar with the theoretical advances which paved the way for the practical development of an atomic bomb. . . . The Soviet Union, for its part, possesses some of the world's most gifted scientists . . . men whose abilities and whose understanding of the fundamental physics behind the bomb only the unrealistic were prone to underestimate. . . .

Reason, however, could not cope with emotion in the postwar world that the Military, aided by their big business and congressional partners, had done so much to create. The waves of shock that spread through the nation with the realization that the Russians were now able to play atomic tick-tack-toe with us gradually subsided; but they left in their wake profound changes. One of the most important of these was in the spirit of the Truman administration itself. From 1949 on, the administration joined its critics, adopted the thesis that Democratic administrations had been Communist-infiltrated and tried to out-witch-hunt the witch hunters. In the infinitely suspect Hiss and Remington cases, it glossed over basic perjuries in the prosecution's evidence and did its utmost to prove the most damning theses of its most severe critics. This was a form of political suicide that was to help

bring retribution on the Democratic Party in 1952. In the process, American principles of justice, our most precious heritage in a totalitarian world, were to be badly tarnished.

This internal impact was matched by a second, external crisis. The news that the Russians, the bogyman used so effectively by the Military in its campaign for UMT, had crossed the threshold of the nuclear age and entered its chamber of horrors with us, represented in itself a climactic event that gave a new complexion to every facet of our foreign and defense policies. The debate that ensued in high government circles has been called by Walter Millis "one of the truly great debates of our times . . . perhaps more significant to history than the great debates over the League of Nations, over the approach to the Second World War or over the United Nations." It was a debate, too, as Millis writes, conducted "almost wholly in secret, hidden in the upper recesses of government. . . . The Congress, the press and the public—the great organs of modern democratic government—were only peripheral parties to an argument upon which the whole future of American and Western society might well turn."

Even though many of the nation's more realistic officials had recognized that Russia some day would have the bomb, no one had been prepared for her to have it so *soon,* and no one evidently had given much thought to what we would do when this inevitable, dire event occurred. "To the responsible men in government the shock was extreme," Millis writes, and he continues:

> They knew that once a Soviet atomic industry had been successfully started, the materials and weapons would proliferate as rapidly as might be desired; it was a question only of the money and energy put into the development, and none doubted that the Soviet Union would put in all the money and energy it required. They knew that at a stroke the whole military-political situation had been transformed. Probably not many had fully realized the extent to which the atomic arsenal had already been built into our own defense structure, or the extent to which the wisdom of this policy had rested upon the supposed monopoly. . . . The potential holocausts upon which we had come more and more to rely as our instruments of military power would now be mutual. The whole international policy equation had been . . . terribly altered.

Was It Too Late?

There does not seem to have been upon the scene any man of vision comparable to Henry L. Stimson. In all probability, it was already too late; in all probability, international relations had degenerated so far, so fast, that no man of vision could have halted the "desperate" race Stimson so clearly had foreseen. We had already weathered the first Berlin crisis; we were already viewing West Germany not as a conquered foe, but as a powerful potential partner in a new "free world" alliance; we were already well embarked on the strategy of ringing Russia with powerful air bases from which to deliver the nuclear knockout that had now turned into a nuclear boomerang in our hands. Our whole approach to foreign policy, virtually from the day that Stimson had failed to talk reason to Truman's Cabinet in 1945, had been military. The fact that the military road had suddenly turned into a dead end, instead of leading upward to a land of peaceful promise, appears not to have caused anyone on the high levels of the Truman administration to stop for a minute, to pause and wonder whether there might be some alternative route. Our major concern seems to

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have been to find a fast way to top the Russian threat with a nuclear joker of more complete and awesome destructiveness.

This is not to suggest that there were no men on high government levels who had their doubts. There were. But any opposition to the naive idea that safety was to be found in weapons of greater horror was to prove quickly futile.

From the moment the Russians got the A-bomb, the minds of American planners began to toy with the idea of producing a mightier engine of destruction, the H-bomb. Scientists had always known that a thermonuclear or "fusion" reaction could release infinitely greater energy than the A-bomb's "fission" process. Theoretically, the idea was sound, but it had not yet been brought within the range of practical engineering and no one was certain that it could be. But if it could be, the Military certainly wanted it.

Drive for the H-bomb

On October 14, 1949, less than a month after the announcement of the Russian explosion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. General Vandenberg, speaking for the Joint Chiefs, strongly urged an immediate and full-scale effort to develop the hydrogen bomb. In the Atomic Energy Commission, another vigorous spokesman for the Military, Admiral Lewis Strauss, was throwing his weight behind the same idea. In a memorandum in early October, he had urgently recommended that the commission's A-bomb development program be supplemented "by an all-out program on the H-bomb."

The debate that followed split the scientific community down the middle. It led to new and wild aspersions upon the loyalty of men who recoiled from the H-bomb's prospective horrors. It inflicted scars, particularly in the case of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the renowned physicist who had been a key figure in the development of the A-bomb, that were to last for years. Oppenheimer and many other scientists, though they had cooperated in the wartime crisis of national survival in building the A-bomb, felt an increasing moral guilt and a deepening revulsion at the prospect of lending their talents to the creation of even more fiendish weapons of mass destruction. Others—a group that ultimately was to polarize around Strauss and Dr. Edward Teller, soon to be known as "the father of the H-bomb"—were able to look with greater equanimity on the prospect of destroying lives, not by just the thousands or hundreds of thousands, but by the inconceivable millions, and to equate such deeds with the public good.

To the more responsible it was clear, as Walter Millis writes, that

> . . . A super bomb was no real response to the problem created by the atomic-bomb race; it would simply raise the contest to new and more appalling levels [as Stimson had foreseen]. If the United States launched a massive thermonuclear effort, it was certain that Russian science would do the same; if the United States succeeded, it was all but certain that Russian science would succeed as well. . . . Moreover, behind such calculations lay a deep feeling that a "bigger bang" was no solution for a problem created by the fact that the "bang" was already too big for society to survive it.

The debate was close and bitterly fought. At one point Truman appointed a special committee headed by AEC Commissioner David Lilienthal to advise him. Lilienthal, brought into close contact with the Military for the first time, was shocked when General Omar Bradley told him "rather flatly that they had no reserve except the A-bomb in the event of aggression against us any place in the world. . . . We had, it seemed to me, falsely relied upon the security of merely a stockpile of A-bombs." Lilienthal wanted to take time out for a broad review of military policy, but the big-bomb advocates wanted no agonizing reappraisals. They wanted only action, and they pressed for it. Lilienthal himself soon was to be viciously attacked, a pattern that seems to repeat itself again and again in the careers of those who had the temerity to doubt the wisdom of the Military and its allies. In the end, Truman yielded to the military view, as he almost always did, and on January 31, 1950, he announced that he had ordered a crash program to develop the hydrogen bomb, predicating his decision, of course, upon the necessity "for peace and this country's security."

Beating Us to the Bang

The illusion that the H-bomb could bring us peace and security was even shorter-lived than had been the A-bomb fantasy. In May, 1951, we exploded a thermonuclear device, but it was huge, cumbersome, not at all a workable bomb. In June, 1951, Dr. Teller came up with a new approach to the engineering problems involved in making a workable bomb. But before all our plans could be perfected, the Russians came crashing through the door into what we had hoped would be our own exclusive chamber of new nuclear horror. In August, 1953, they set off their first H-bomb; and, by analyzing their fallout, it has since been ruefully acknowledged, we learned a few tricks that helped us in perfecting and detonating the first "droppable" American H-bomb in the following March.

Already the system of "massive retaliation" on which John Foster Dulles was basing the hope of the future had become the certainty of "massive mutual annihilation." It could lead only, as it has, to still further trumpetings about "total" weapons — Khrushchev's recent boasting about a 100-megaton monster that could double-destroy what can already be destroyed; our toying with the idea of a "neutron" bomb



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that would slaughter only people, leaving all the world's shining skyscrapers intact — for the amoeba to inherit, no doubt. To this dead pass have our military solutions brought us, but they have continued to remain our only solutions, to represent our only hope. We have become, as C. Wright Mills has written, a nation so completely dominated by the military point of view that we can hold no other. "...The American elite," says Mills, "does not have any real image of peace—other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the balance of mutual fright. The only seriously accepted plan for 'peace' is the fully loaded pistol."

Nor has there been any opportunity for vigorous debate, the lifeblood of real democracy. So great has been the emotional impact of the campaigns of propaganda and terror that we react, we do not think. Walter Millis, in a trenchant passage, put it this way:

> The image arose of a vast and lethal fog of Communist conspiracy, infiltration, espionage and betrayal, at work everywhere in the national community and especially in the Democratic Administration. That this was seriously to distort the more normal processes of policy formation in the military and diplomatic fields can scarcely be doubted. Tightened "security" measures were to divorce the public even further from participation in major policy issues, of which they might now be kept in almost total ignorance. Public confidence in the State Department was seriously undermined. The collapse in China, which had been rather generally accepted as inevitable at the time it occurred, was now explained on the grounds of communism or pro-communism. State was weakened in the public eye by comparison with Defense; and in a nation supposedly devoted to the principle of civilian control, almost any military advice or decision took priority—with public and Congress—over those of the diplomats or civil administrators.

In other words, the Military was in the saddle, and it was putting spurs to the civilian horse.



PART V

THE WARFARE STATE

"OUR GOVERNMENT has kept us in a perpetual state of fear—kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor—with the cry of a grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."

This quotation describes not the Germany of Hitler and of Goebbels, but the America of our own day. It comes from the lips of a man whom most Americans would probably consider, of all our leaders, the one least likely to utter such extremely critical sentiments—a man who has been called, and perhaps rightly, the greatest military genius America ever has produced—General Douglas MacArthur.

General MacArthur, a lifelong warrior, the conqueror of Japan and the advocate in Korea of the kind of all-out conflict that almost certainly would have produced World War III, now views our society from the perspective of a corporation executive, the head of Remington Rand; and in this quotation from a speech on the evils of high taxation, made to the stockholders of Sperry Rand in mid-1957, he analyzed perceptively the propaganda campaigns of perpetual "fear" and "patriotic fervor" and "grave national emergency" that have dragged the American people willy-nilly into the clutch of the Warfare State.

In this same year of 1957, another eminent American of decidedly conservative cast was giving Congress an almost startlingly frank picture of the results produced by the methods MacArthur described. This second expert, testifying about what has since become known as "the military-industrial complex," declared frankly that virtually the entire nation was acquiring a vested interest in the cold war.

> One of the most serious things about this defense business [he said] is that so many Americans are getting a vested interest in it: Properties, business, jobs, employment, votes, opportunities for promotion and advancement, bigger salaries for scientists and all that. It is a troublesome business. . . . If you try to change suddenly you get into trouble. . . . If you shut the whole business off now, you will have the state of California in trouble because such a big percentage of the aircraft industry is in California.

These words were uttered by a man who certainly knew intimately, from the inside and from the highest echelons of government, the mighty forces and the mighty pressures of which he spoke. He was Secretary of Defense Charles E. (General Motors) Wilson, who in the early days of the Eisenhower administration had created a national flap by saying that "what is good for General Motors is good for the country."

The speech of General MacArthur, the testimony of Secretary Wilson, serve well to frame the Warfare State—the methods by which we have been dragged into its repressive atmosphere, the inevitable final result of those methods in tying the self-interest of an entire nation to the industries of war. When even such eminent conservatives as MacArthur and Wilson (joined recently by President Eisenhower) begin viewing with alarm, it would seem that the present exercise of the rabid Right, in trying to brand all discussion of the issue as a deep-dyed, anti-anti-Communist plot, flagrantly flies

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in the face of reality. When such unlikely spokesmen as these men begin to worry about both the methods and the ends, it would seem that there is justification for genuine alarm about the state of our society; that the time has come for us to unshackle our minds and take a hard look at where we are and where we are going.

In some quarters, there is an almost nonchalant acceptance of the fact of the Warfare, or Garrison, State. In 1960, Arthur Wiesenberger & Co., members of the New York and American Stock Exchanges, in a four-column advertisement for the Wiesenberger Investment Report, proclaimed: "As we shed the Welfare State and gird for the Garrison State, many great and far-reaching changes will take place in our society, government, industry and finance. These changes will hurt some and benefit others—as always. You should be prepared for them—psychologically as well as financially." The Wiesenbergers obviously were psychologically prepared, and it is perhaps significant that, in orienting their minds to the Garrison State, they already had relegated the Welfare State to history.

Exit the Welfare State?

They were not, and are not, the only ones. One of the most persistent themes that threads through today's rampant militarism—from the first revealing speech of General Electric Wilson in 1944 down to 1961—may be found in the recurrent thought that the arms race is just jim-dandy because, this way, we can forget all that Welfare State nonsense with its "creeping socialism." The forces in our society that are most eager for war (at least, a cold war) are the same forces that most abhor the Welfare State. It is no accident that Congress, in this first year of the Kennedy Administration, should vote without a peep of protest almost limitless billions for more arms of every description—and at the same time shelve medical care for the aged and federal aid to education.

This is not just one of the unfortunately inevitable results of the arms race; it is one of its reasoned and much-desired ends. In the post-war wedding of the Military and Big Business, it has not mattered to business that in the Warfare State free enterprise becomes a myth, that to an overwhelming degree the welfare of the entire nation becomes dependent upon the arms race and the federal expenditures that keep it going; all of this is completely preferable to the only other visible alternatives—the funneling of comparably fantastic billions into "socialistic" programs for better housing, better highways, better schools, better medical care. In the latter program, of course, mere people benefit; in the war game, there are billions and billions of dollars for business, and if that isn't what matters entirely, it is certainly what matters most.

If this attitude seems too callous for belief, consider the manner in which the theme, "Up with the Warfare State, Down with the Welfare State" has become the dominant credo of our time. The thinking, the motivation has been revealed nakedly many times in many places. In October, 1949, for example, Professor Sumner Slichter, Harvard economist, was warmly received when he addressed a bankers' convention and asserted that as long as we had a cold war, a severe depression was "difficult to conceive." He explained: "It [the cold war] increases the demand for goods, helps sustain a high level of employment, accelerates technological progress and thus helps the country to raise its standard of living.... So we may thank the Russians for helping make capitalism in the United States work better than ever."

David Lawrence, the columnist beloved by Wall Streeters, editor of the influential *U.S. News & World Report*, early became quite vocal in proclaiming what a bonanza we had found in the cold war. In the May 14, 1950, issue, his weekly news magazine informed its readers:

> Government planners figure they have found the magic formula for almost endless good times. They are now beginning to wonder if there may not be something to perpetual motion after all. *Cold war* is the catalyst. Cold war is an automatic pump primer. Turn a spigot, and the public clamors for more arms spending. Turn another, the clamor ceases. Truman confidence, cockiness, is based on this "Truman formula." *Truman era of good times,* President is told, can run much beyond 1952. Cold war demands, if fully exploited, are almost limitless.

A month after this was written came Korea. The cold war had suddenly turned hot for the 33,629 Americans who were to die in it; and when the Democrats, in 1952, tried to sell the American people on the slogan, "You never had it so good," the electorate, as post-election analyses showed, felt twinges of guilt and voted for Ike, who promised to go to Korea and bring peace. But, of course, the cold war continued, and in 1954, after the announcement that we had exploded our first H-bomb, *U.S. News & World Report* saw in this new horror only another dandy stimulus to business in this best of all possible worlds. It wrote: "What H-bomb means to business. A long period ... of big orders. In the years ahead, the effects of the new bomb will keep on increasing. As one appraiser puts it: 'The H-bomb has blown depression-thinking out the window.'"

A Consistent Man

This ghoulish exultation in the good times that the new, fiendish weapons could insure contrasts sharply with Lawrence's inveterate hatred of every type of social legislation. His record on this is consistent and goes back to the days of Franklin Roosevelt. It would be hard to find a New Deal reform that Lawrence did not denounce as some kind of dangerous foreign "ism," and to him such proposals as Kennedy's medical care for the aged are clearly anathema. Yet he can look upon the H-bomb's horrors with equanimity, and he can even, as he did in 1959, hail the suggestion that the U. S. "might conceivably strike first in what has become known as 'preemptive' rather than 'preventive' war."

What might be left for us to "preempt" in our moment of triumph (?) is a consideration that evidently weighs little with Lawrence. He is representative of a type of mind that braves the prospect of world

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holocaust with a gay insouciance, but shudders at the prospect of such "socialistic" government ventures as better housing, medical care, aid to education, or help for depressed areas. The double motif showed itself most clearly in 1957, the year in which the Eisenhower boom toppled into deep recession. Even the expenditure of awesome billions for defense couldn't quite guarantee perpetual prosperity, and naturally there was just one solution—a much higher plateau of defense spending.

Oracles of the Big Bang

The controversy began early in the year, when good times were still with us. President Eisenhower proposed a federal budget of $71.8 billion. Of this amount, $43.4 billion —61 cents out of every dollar—were allotted for national security. But —and this was the President's cardinal sin—he also called for some $35 million for federal housing and raised his total requests for "welfare schemes" by some $200 million. *The Wall Street Journal* promptly expressed the disenchantment of the business community with Ike. "With the international situation more critical than in several years, quibbling over defense spending is pretty much out of the question," it wrote. But it was irked no end that "the President would extend the hand of Uncle Sam into an assortment of welfare schemes ranging from the care of juvenile delinquents to school construction and providing more houses for the needy aged." Obviously, it was all right to spend $43.4 *billion* for munitions; but what was that man thinking of to want to spend a few more *millions* to help juvenile delinquents or build schools or supply "more houses for the needy aged"?

In September, 1957, with the bloom definitely off the cold-war economy, an eminent spokesman for the ever-larger-military-budget school addressed the American Bankers Association and delivered a eulogy on the "cultural and economic merits" of armament spending. This warrior-statesman was Frank Pace, former Secretary of the Army under Truman, former chairman of General Dynamics (the government-spawned war baby that perennially gets the fattest war contracts), and now, perhaps significantly, a member of President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 1957, naturally, Pace wanted several additional billions spent on armaments.

So did the cold warrior who perhaps best and most consistently expresses the thinking of the business community on such matters. This oracle is Henry R. Luce, publisher of the powerful *Time-Life-Fortune* triumvirate and indisputably one of the country's most influential figures in the field of mass communications and the conditioning of the public mind. Luce, it just happened, was on the military panel that prepared the much-debated Rockefeller Brothers Report on national defense. The report took an alarmist's view of our state of preparedness and

sounded the call for the expenditure of more billions, many more billions, to make us secure. Luce backed this program all the way. In November, 1957, *Fortune* magazine published an article that made his views clear. In this, Luce called publicly on President Eisenhower to "use every ounce of his executive authority" to cut highway spending, foreign aid and other non-military extravagances. He urged Congress to "begin a massive pruning of non-defense outlays all along the line."

Our economy, said Luce — do these words sound familiar?—"can stand the load of any defense effort required to hold the power of Soviet Russia in check. It cannot, however, indefinitely stand the erosion of creeping socialism and the ceaseless extension of government activities into additional economic fields. If the advent of man-made satellites serves to reaffirm that truth, it will have accomplished a purpose as important in the long run as the conquest of outer space."

This novel equation that somehow places the conquest of outer space on the same level of importance as the erection of a roadblock against "creeping socialism" stands as a naked revelation of the type of mentality that takes positive delight, in the name of business and profits, in walking the precarious brinks of the cold war.

In this sequence of speeches and articles, the double-edged propaganda of the postwar era becomes self-evident. One purpose, as General MacArthur said, is to keep us "in a perpetual state of fear . . . a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor," so that we shall support without question a munitions budget of ever-expanding billions. At the same time, the other edge of the propaganda sword brands with the label of "radicalism" any proposal that might conceivably siphon off some of those munitions billions — and possibly interfere with the prerequisites of industry — to benefit the people.

No parlay could be more effective with a citizenry that is innately among the world's least volatile and most conservative. We instinctively distrust the strident voice, the rabble-rousing demagogue who even hints of violence. If we listen to him for a moment, the moment is almost always one of emotional strain and delusion; given time, our instinctive sense of balance reasserts itself and we repudiate, either in anger or disgust, the far-out crier of discord. So it has always been. The great mass of the American people has never fully accepted any leader who wore too bright a tinge of radicalism — not William Jennings Bryan, not Fighting Bob LaFollette. Even Franklin Roosevelt came from a wealthy, conservative background and sounded eminently conservative when he was first elected; and his trial-and-error reforms were made possible only by the exigencies of a

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great domestic crisis. Our history says that against almost any leader, almost any program, two strikes have been called if, in some way, the leader or program can be branded in the public mind with radicalism. At the same time, we are a deeply patriotic people, filled with pride in our own system, in love with the wonders of our own country, conscious of the high achievement that turned a wilderness continent into a world power in less than two centuries; and so possessed, we react as a people to almost any appeal to keep what we have untarnished, to preserve "our way of life."

These are the two poles—the innate distrust of the radical and his violent solutions, the supreme belief in ourselves and our pride of country — that make the double-edged propaganda of the military-industrial complex so uniquely effective.

Overwhelming Pressures

As a people, then, we have supported the means without any clear vision of the end. That end inevitably entails the welding of a power complex unlike anything in our previous history. The defense effort has become an octopus, with economic tentacles threading into every crevice of the nation, with every level of society involved in the perpetuation of the cold war duel. No area of human endeavor is completely immune from its influence. The airplane and missile manufacturers, with 85 to 100 per cent of their business dependent on government contracts, cannot afford peace. Neither can the local businessman or the local Chamber of Commerce when the federal government abandons an installation that has outlived its usefulness in the missile age. Every time a warplane model is discontinued or a missile fails to make the grade and contracts are canceled, thousands of workers are thrown out of jobs and their unions howl that the federal government mustn't do *this* to *them* — to someone else, yes, but not to *them*. We are all bound up in an armament rat race in which ever-maintained international tension is an essential ingredient, in which ever-new weapons of ever-mounting horror are vital not just for our protection, but to insure the obsolescence that keeps the assembly lines going — a rat race with an almost inevitable terminal point in war's explosion and world destruction, but one we have not the self-discipline, the will or the vision to try to end.

Consider the kind of pressures that are generated every time a move is made to cut back on military installations, on the fantastic billions spent for armaments. Typical was the outcry that arose when, on March 30, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced plans to close down 52 military installations in 25 states and 21 overseas bases in the next three years. McNamara's order was based upon a sane re-examination of reality in the age of missiles. Some depots were too close to major cities and too vulnerable; some sprawling air bases covering hundreds of acres of flat, sandy soil did not lend themselves to the need of the missile age for concealed launching sites, founded upon and protected by solid rock formations. These were doubtless sound military considerations, but nothing short of economic devastation impended for many local areas to whom the nearby installations represented the only hope of business prosperity. Inevitably, screams of protest resounded across the nation and in Congress.

In Del Rio, Texas, a businessman went to his cash register, punched it open, and took out $50. This was his contribution, based on an assessment of $1 for every foot of business frontage, to the expenses of a four-man delegation that Del Rio hustled off to Washington to fight the scheduled closing of the Laughlin Air Force Base. Del Rio has a civilian population of 18,612, and the Laughlin base is its one big industry. The base payroll, civilian and military, has been running at $10.5 million a year; some $42,000 annually has been spent with local businessmen for such odds and ends as office supplies and pest-control services; Laughlin accounted for 20 per cent of the town's electric and telephone services; some 1,700 Laughlin families shopped in Del Rio stores. It takes no imagination to visualize the economic impact on Del Rio if it should suddenly be deprived of Laughlin.

In Tacoma, Wash., the owner of a shoe store fitted three small children for shoes. The father gave him a $20 bill, and when the proprietor handed back the change, the father presented a small card. It read: "You have just done business with a Mount Rainier Ordnance Depot employee. How much money will you lose when the $14 million payroll goes to Utah? Write your Congressman, Senator, Governor if you want to protest this move."

In Benicia, Calif., a town of 6,000, officials were aroused by the announcement that the Bernicia Ordnance Depot would be closed down by April, 1964. Mayor James Lemos was wroth because the municipality had just constructed a $1.6 million sewage plant, about three times as large and expensive a project as would have been needed if the depot hadn't been there. He estimated that the town would lose in sales-gas-beverage taxes alone some $21,500 a year; and it would lose, too, the trade of the 2,400 civilian workers at the depot. In response to the local outcry, Rep. John Baldwin, Republican Congressman from the district, sent a vigorous letter of protest to President Kennedy, contending that the Benicia Depot was just what the nation needed for Kennedy's plan to have "an army trained to meet a limited war crisis."

Protests from All Over

So it went across the nation. Kansas protested the shifting of a naval air technical training unit from Olathe to Glyngo, Ga. Olathe sent a delegation to Independence, Mo., to visit former President Truman and see what could be done about it. Truman received the delegation graciously, but he was his usual blunt self. "The basis of the shift is political," he told the delegates. "Kansas didn't vote right." Kansas, it may be recalled, had cast its eight electoral votes for Richard M. Nixon; Georgia, on the other hand, had better bargaining power. It is the home state of Senator Richard B. Russell and Rep. Carl Vinson, chairmen respectively of the Senate

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and House Armed Services Committees. Coincidentally, of course, Georgia is crammed with nineteen military installations—so many that an indiscreet general is said once to have remarked, "One more base would sink the state." This estimate was now to be put to the test. Not only does the state not lose even one of its nineteen installations; she is to gobble up one more in the shift of the training unit from Olathe.

Ever-Widening Circle

The Olathe affair shows, in the most elementary way, the host of problems that arise every time a move is made to cut back on military spending—the local economic pressures, the political pressures and, finally, the high-level, military-political logrolling that has stuffed the State of Georgia to the gills with nineteen bases. If this is the impact of mere millions of dollars spent in the relatively limited area around military bases, what must be the influence of those colossal, all-important billions that are being funneled each year into war contracts? Common sense says that this kind of money must sway the nation just as those nineteen installations dominate Georgia, and much evidence supports common sense. War contracts running high into the billions are the key to prosperity, not only in local towns and cities, but in entire states.

Business Week on February 27, 1960, headlined a feature article: "Missile Industry Carries Utah." The article explained that, for generations, Utah's prosperity had been built around two basic industries, steel and copper. In 1959, both of these bellwethers of the Utah economy had been closed down by strikes. "Without missiles," wrote *Business Week,* "these strikes might have put much of the state flat on its back. But the growth of missiles more than offset the strikes and helped to give Utah its biggest year. Today, the industry employs over 10,000 workers —a gain of 5,000 during 1959."

What missiles are to Utah, the whole aircraft-missile-space complex is in an even larger way to the powerful State of California. California, of course, has Hollywood, but Hollywood is a piker beside the ganglion of war industries on which the prosperity of the state has come so much to depend. *The Los Angeles Times* reported in February, 1960, that in the Los Angeles metropolitan area alone twenty-seven out of every hundred manufacturing workers were employed in aircraft, missiles or space. The area had a backlog of military contracts exceeding $3 billion.

Still, there was serious concern. It was obvious to everyone that missiles rapidly were making the warplane obsolete—and a heavy cutback on plane orders would make things very, very bad. The Southern California area had had a taste of this kind of hardship in 1957, when federal orders for the huge sky birds were cut back some 40 per cent. Plants had shut down, thousands of workers had been laid off. California had snapped back smartly from this period of temporary trial. Most of its airplane manufacturers had had the foresight to see the handwriting on the wall; they were already shifting their production to missiles, the weapon of the future, and soon missile contracts took up the slack of lost plane contracts. By November, 1958, aircraft-missile payrolls on the West Coast had mounted to about *$42.4 million a week,* with more than half of this—$23.1 million—concentrated in the Los Angeles area. Still, there was unhappiness. The plane cutback had struck a severe blow at Douglas Aircraft: there were heavy layoffs in the Santa Monica and El Segundo-Torrance plants. Alarmed, the International Association of Machinists bombarded California's Congressional delegation with telegrams of protest and demands for an investigation to discover what had caused this unjust cutback of war orders at Douglas.

The moral of all this is obvious and has been often recognized, but the whole military-industrial complex of our times has become so huge, so vital in many areas of our economy, that nobody seems to know how to cope with it. And aside from other factors, war industry is the world's most uncertain business. Military technology has been changing so fast that there is no guarantee of security in the production of even the latest miracle weapon. California's war-plant workers often express a cynical philosophy: "As soon as we make it," they say, "it's obsolete." Sometimes, as in the case of the huge B-70 super bomber, originally visualized as the perfect answer to all our strategic problems, a new weapon like missiles comes along and obsolescence sets in on the drawing boards. This means that today's multi-million-dollar contract may tomorrow be cut to zero; overnight, thousands of jobs may vanish; overnight, millions of dollars in payrolls —and economic support for civilian industry—may be gone.

Virtually every community that has a war industry would like to have a more stable one, but the war industry is the one it has and the specter of what will happen if it ever loses it is horrifying, indeed. A few years ago, the Southern California Research Council, a private association of prominent businessmen and academicians, drew up a widely circulated report entitled, "The Effect of a Reduction of Defense Expenditures Upon the Los Angeles Area." It concluded that if "a 50 per cent cut in defense expenditures should occur . . . [while] business conditions and investment remain high, the estimate would be for total unemployment of about 200,000 or 12 per cent of the entire labor force. Or, if business conditions and investments are lower, unemployment might approximate 350,000 or 20 per cent." This, remember, is the kind of disaster that a cut of just one-half, *not* a total cut, would bring down on the Los Angeles area. Obviously, it cannot be allowed to happen.

Lobbying Juggernaut

The battle to see that it does not happen enlists a wide variety of power groups, draws together all the strands of pressure, in an overwhelming extravaganza of lobbying and propaganda in which the helpless American taxpayer foots the bill for his own indoctrination. Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D., Ill.) cited a graphic example in a Senate speech in July, 1959, when he charged that the Air Force was spending $1 million a year

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to ferry important civilians, key Congressmen and influential Brass to air shows designed to glorify the Air Force. Senator Douglas gave the figures on two such exhibitions held at the Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas, Nev., in early April and May, 1959. The Air Force, he said, flew 1,917 civilians (influential businessmen, community leaders, local officials) and 774 military passengers to the shows. The ferrying task required 177 military planes, which were flown "a total of 2,338 flying hours at a total flying hour cost of $626,074.75," Senator Douglas declared. He charged that the intent was "to help build up a body of permanent lobbyists for the Air Force and its appropriations." An Air Force spokesman, in effect, pleaded guilty to the charge, though naturally he put the emphasis quite differently. Such free displays, he said, were "a necessary part of keeping the American people informed of what their Air Force is capable of doing."

What the Air Force cannot do openly for itself, its contractors do for it. Rep. F. Edward Hébert (D., La.), who conducted an extensive 1959 probe into undue military influence, turned a critical spotlight on the Aerospace Industries Association. This association, he said, existed only to lobby, and it was financed by contributions from seventy-nine airplane and missile manufacturers. Dues and assessments ranged from a low of $100 to the high figure of $75,000 paid by North American, Boeing, Curtiss-Wright, Douglas, Lockheed and United. But this $75,000 bite was not even being felt by the bitten corporations, for most were charging it off as expense items on government contracts. This added up, Representative Hébert said, to "the taxpayer paying to fight against himself." Retired Air Force General Orval R. Cook, president of Aerospace, conceded that all of Representative Hébert's complaints were true, but he bridled sensitively at one assertion—that the primary purpose of association witnesses appearing before Congress was to "advance the interests of the contractors."

It stands to reason, however, that when the federal banquet board is garnished by fantastic billions in war-industry goodies—goodies for almost everybody—the scramble is going to be to see who can get the largest serving; and if nobody actually says, "To hell with the public interest," certainly nobody says, "Well, let's see if our conscience will let us take this extra $100 million to keep building this antiquated plane." That would be expecting just too much of human nature.

With war contracts that make a million dollars look like pin money up for grabs, the mutual admiration society of Big Business and retired Brass and active Brass frequently coalesces into a positively rapturous togetherness. The Hébert committee subjected at least one



such blissful merger to sharp scrutiny when it delved into the activities of the Martin Company of Baltimore (patriotic duty: airplanes and missiles; patriotic reward at the time: some $800 million in defense contracts). Martin had decided, as its board chairman, George M. Bunker, explained in his testimony, that it was essential for the greater national good to establish "an intimate relationship" with the Pentagon Brass because obviously you couldn't perfect weapons systems unless you could bring together "the major capacities of the people that of necessity have to work closely together."

Seeing its patriotic duty, Martin had done it. It had flown twenty-seven of the highest-ranking Brass on Uncle Sam's payroll to expense-paid, fun-in-the-sun outings on the Bahaman Island of Eleuthera. The list of distinguished Martin guests was topped by Gen. Nathan F. Twining, at the time Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who fell so in love with Martin togetherness that he sampled the company's hospitality on three weekend calls at Eleuthera's Cotton Bay Club. Significantly, it would seem, Martin's selected guest list of high-staffers included, besides General Twining, the choicest Brass of Army, Navy and Air Force in the fields of planning and procurement. When the Hébert committee tried to learn just what the "togetherness" at the Cotton Bay Club involved besides playing a few rounds of golf with Bunker, everybody chorused that, oh, there was nothing to it really. All of the togetherness boys were absolutely certain that they did not participate in any contractual negotiations; they did not even *discuss* contractual negotiations; they had *no* direct business relationship with the Martin Company; and only a few, in key offices dealing with procurement, acknowledged that they had heard some briefings and arguments made by contractors wanting to supply a particular weapon, but these briefings definitely had not been devoted to drumming up trade for Martin exclusively—they had covered *all* contractors in the field, certainly a most noble display of impartiality on Martin's part.

Later, on the House floor, fighting in vain for a stiff measure that would put an end to such jolly gatherings of innocents, Representative Hébert lashed out angrily at the Martin-High Brass fraternization:

> A subcommittee uncovered what was going on in the Bahamas whereby the Martin Company of Baltimore was entertaining on a lavish scale both active and retired officers, among whom were some who within thirty days would appear before the Appropriations Committee in support of contracts which included parcels for the Martin Co.
>
> I can only give you the facts. I can only say to you that when Dr. Bunker became president of the Martin Co. it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Today Martin Co. is No. 2 on the defense contract list, and paid a dollar more per share, while the

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> Douglas Aircraft was losing $93 million. The Martin Co. does not do a dime's worth of work for private business. Every nickel comes from the government in subsidies. Why should they entertain their only customer, the people they do business with?

The plain implication is that, in such cozy private arrangements, the public interest gets fractured. The implications are fundamental to our whole society. The Air Force uses taxpayers' funds to propagandize for the Air Force; the air and missile manufacturers use taxpayers' funds, by assessing the cost of their operations to government, to propagandize for the air and missile manufacturers; huge corporations involved in every facet of the munitions business spend millions of dollars (obtained from the government) in entertainment and lobbying to promote good will and insure more contracts—and against this overwhelming, conjunctive force there stands quite literally not even the shadow of a counterforce. A lone voice or two in Congress, like that of Senator Douglas and Representative Hébert, is occasionally raised—but, beyond this, nothing. No democratic society, it seems safe to say, was ever more over-balanced in one direction.

Imbalance of Power

The imbalance exhibits itself for all to see in the all-pervasive role of the Military. Those 1,400 high-ranking officers who have crossed the street and found retirement cushioned by lush salaries ladled out by the top hundred war contractors are just one symptom of the times. Hardly anyone in the nation is so naive as to believe they are all industrial geniuses. Some, of course, may have expert knowledge of advanced weaponry that makes them technically useful to weapon manufacturers; but most of them are hired, not for what they know, but for whom they know—for their contacts inside the Pentagon. As Senator Douglas once phased it, "When companies with defense contracts hire former officers of high rank to negotiate with their former fellow officers, some of whom they have promoted, the potential and actual abuses are magnified."

The Hébert committee documented the point. Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, the maverick of the services and the father of the atomic submarine, testified that the jobs those 1,400 retired officers had had were now filled "by people who are their dear friends, or even by people whom they have been influential in appointing, and naturally they will be listened to." The way this works was illustrated in the testimony of Admiral William M. Fechtler, retired, former Chief of Naval Operations and later a consultant to General Electric's Atomic Products Division. The Admiral told of arranging appointments for a G.E. vice-president in the Pentagon.

> I took him to see Mr. Gates, the Secretary of the Navy [Admiral Fechtler testified]. I took him in to see Admiral Burke. He had not met Admiral Burke before. And then I

> made appointments with him with the Chief of the Bureau of Ships. But I did not accompany him there, because those are materiel bureaus which make contracts. And I studiously avoid even being in the room when anybody talks about a contract.

Such studiousness is doubtless laudable, but does anyone doubt that there is a certain leverage working for the businessman who can walk into the Navy Department and meet everyone of consequence, from the Secretary down, under the aegis of an Admiral who was formerly Chief of Naval Operations? And does anyone believe, in this chummy "We're-all-in-the-same-club-boys" atmosphere, that the only element determining vital decisions is the national interest?

Certain incidents in the past have cast a harshly illuminating light upon this question. There was, for example, the case of General Joseph T. McNarney, top-ranker in the Air Force who became General Manager of the entire Defense Department under Louis Johnson in pre-Korean days. In 1950, when Johnson set out to decimate the Navy's carrier fleet in the name of economy, the Navy and the Air Force clashed in what the Air Force succeeded in billing as "the revolt of the admirals." But the Navy, as Walter Millis has pointed out, was not entirely self-centered; it was genuinely concerned with the national interest, and it advanced some cogent strategic criticism that deserved serious consideration instead of what was merely clever propaganda ridicule.

A key target of the Navy attack was the Air Force's pride of the moment, the long-range B-36 bomber. As Colonel Neblett, a mere Reservist, had tried to tell Congressional committees the previous year (only nobody much was listening), planes were rapidly becoming a weapon of the past, outmoded by the rocket and the proximity fuse; and probably no plane more perfectly illustrated what he meant than the B-36. The Navy attacked it as too slow, too vulnerable, too antiquated for modern war. The B-36, indeed, had gone on the drawing boards in 1941, even before we got involved in World War II, and the Navy's criticism of it in the age of jets and missiles would seem well-justified. But McNarney led the Air Force in outraged defense of the B-36 as the best weapon in our arsenal until more modern planes could come off the drafting boards. The result: we continued to pour out more millions to build a plane that was already obsolete. What happened next seems instructive.

In February, 1952, General McNarney retired. As he later testified before the Hébert committee, he then picked up a telephone and dialed a number in Indio, Calif. The number was that of Floyd B. Odlum, who headed Consolidated Vultee, now the Convair Division of General Dynamics, manufacturer of the B-36. The simple phone call worked a positive miracle. In March, 1952,

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General McNarney went on the payroll of the maker of the plane he had so vigorously defended. He became president of Convair at $75,000 a year, and he told the Hébert committee, when he testified in March, 1956, that he had drawn $324,500 in salary and expenses (plus, of course, his regular Air Force pension of $16,000 annually) in the four short years since his retirement. The General had a five-year, $75,000-a-year contract with Convair; and when that expired, he had another juicy contract waiting—one that would run for ten years and would pay him $30,000 annually as a consultant. All of this, General McNarney told the committee, had just happened; none of it had been planned. When he was defending the B-36, he had had no offer from Odlum to head the company that made the B-36. Commented *Business Week*: "McNarney knows Convair's best customer, the Pentagon, as few others do. . . . In business circles, the word has gone out: Get yourself a general. What branch of government spends the most money? The Military. Who, even more than a five-percenter, is an expert on red-tape? A general or admiral. So make him Chairman of the Board."

Reward for an Admiral

A comparable case involved Rear Admiral Lloyd Harrison, chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. The Navy had awarded McDonnell Aircraft and Westinghouse contracts to build the F3H jet fighter. In test flights, eleven of the planes crashed, causing the deaths of several pilots. But Admiral Harrison insisted F3H contracts should be continued because, he said, the record of the contractors had previously been good. The Navy continued the program at an eventual outlay of $302 million, virtually all of it wasted; and one day after Admiral Harrison retired in September, 1955, he took a job as vice-president of McDonnell Aircraft Company. He subsequently admitted to a Congressional committee that the job had been offered him as early as March, 1955, some five months before his retirement, but this, he insisted, had had nothing to do with his advocacy of the F3H jet. Congress could find no proof of misconduct or of anything but an "honest mistake."

The exploits of General McNarney and Admiral Harrison in the world of business certainly illustrate, if nothing else, the extreme good fortune of the nation's Brass in working both sides of the defense street—and the virtual impossibility of ever restoring sanity to the nation's armament program. How many billions do we actually need for the weapons necessary for our security? And how many more billions, a crushing burden on the back of the American taxpayer, are pure excess, spent for antiquated or inefficient weapons, with contracts secured by Brass-to-Brass lobbying, backed by public outcry to maintain employment and business profits? It is safe to say that no one really knows the answers to these vital questions; for in the modern age of infinitely complicated military technology, wrapped in its ever more opaque cloak of military secrecy, no one except the Brass themselves could ever possibly know.

Running the Show

The clear fact is that Congress, on whom Hamilton relied as the watchdog of the public to curb the military influence, has lost control over the Frankenstein monster that our military budget has become. The Congressional check which Hamilton evaluated so highly has failed to check in this modern age, as much by the incapacity of Congress as by the design of the Military. Congressmen, most of them, surrender to complete frustration when confronted with the bewildering world of modern science and the infinitely technical refinements of modern weapons. They are not scientists, they are not military experts; they feel they cannot possibly know. Threaded again and again through the discussions of Congressional committees on military budgets are such typical statements as, "It is impossible for this committee to go thoroughly into every operation of the Air Force," or "I am willing to take the word of the General Staff, the people who are running the show." They are, indeed, and the show they are running is not just a military one.

In the years since World War II, the military influence has been extended into virtually every department of government. In 1953, nine Army generals and fifty-eight colonels were assigned to civilian agencies. By 1957, about 200 generals or admirals were on assignment to various departments of the government, international or interservice agencies; similarly employed were more than 1,300 colonels or naval personnel of comparable rank, and some 6,000 officers on the lower levels. Rep. (now Senator) Lee Metcalf, of Montana, was one of the few who raised lonely voices in Congress in protest. In March, 1956, Metcalf declared: "Already we have a general in the first echelon of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Already we have a general in the second echelon. It seems to me that civilians should show up in here somewhere."

But civilians were rapidly becoming the vanishing Americans. They were becoming, if not extinct, at least a rare and subdued species in the departments that had formerly been their natural habitat. In no department was this more true than in State, where it soon became the fashion to regard the Military as the seers of foreign affairs. In February, 1947, the *Washington Star* reported: "Ten of the twenty men ranking as executive officers in the State Department have been brought in during recent months from the military services." A few months later, *The New York Times*, reporting that General John H. Hildring had been named an Assistant Secretary of State, added that he had "brought with him to the State Department twenty-six of his assistants in the War Department." Even before this revealing development, in January, 1947, the *Army and Navy Bulletin* had expressed the reality of the day in pithy terms. "Today," it wrote, "the Army has virtual control of foreign affairs. . . ." This expansion of the Military into the previously sacrosanct realm of diplomacy could have only one result: our foreign policy would be rigidly military; it

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would leave little room for the negotiatory spirit.

This, of course, is precisely what has happened. We have ringed Russia with air bases; we have remilitarized West Germany, and John Foster Dulles also tried to remilitarize Japan—a goal he could not reach because, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the once warlike Japanese had become for some inexplicable reason a peace-loving people. Beginning with Truman and continuing through Eisenhower, we have placed our major emphasis on a rigid policy of "containment"; and, even after the program became manifestly suicidal, we continue to hitch our foreign star to the military technique of "massive retaliation." In an atmosphere clamorous with the rattling of sabers, one became regarded as soft-headed who looked for some ray of hope in the practice of the ancient arts of diplomacy and negotiation; one was regarded as sensible only if he acknowledged the ineffable logic of finding a solution in annihilation.

The Official Line

Our official line was the Military's line: we must hold firm everywhere, we must not even consider one backward step—not though the "prizes" for which we risked world destruction were the rocky pinpricks of Quemoy and Matsu, or the jungle fiefs of a primitive people like the Laotians. Vital interests of the nation and the world became subordinated to the nation's posture; the gesture assumed the substance of the deed. Any suggestion that we might even discuss a mutual drawback in Central Europe to lessen the world's tensions, any hint that we must some day acknowledge that the continent of Asia contains a power called Red China — the mere whisper of such proposals was labeled with the dirty name of "appeasement," and even recent Kennedy appointees who might have wished to demonstrate some rudiments of common sense by espousing them have been forced to proclaim that nothing could be further from their intentions. So have we wrought. Our foreign policy has become a Maginot Line manned by our Military, cheered on by the breast-thumpings of those mighty warriors of whom the whole world stands in awe — our industrial barons and our monolithic press.

The contrast between blind military rigidity and a foreign policy based on a recognition of practical realities as they affect the national interest shows clearly in a perceptive interview with Adlai Stevenson in Theodore H. White's *The Making of the President, 1960*. Just before the Democratic Convention, White went to see Stevenson, and he found the two-time Democratic standard-bearer in a talkative mood, his mind ranging boldly over our complex foreign problems. To Stevenson, not just strength but "moral leadership" was the issue. He recalled how, in the shock after sputnik, Eisenhower had called him to Washington to draft foreign-policy suggestions. Stevenson said he had written "reams of copy" for Eisenhower and Dulles to use, calling on the NATO nations "to put their top priority not on launching pads and missiles, but on the concert of our resources to help the emerging nations. . . . This should have, at least, the urgency of national defense—but they couldn't envision it, didn't want it."

Stevenson remarked that he had probably talked with "more heads of state than any other American, and when you hear them talk of American foreign policy, it's a thing of wonder and mirth to them." Stevenson criticized the "linear thinking" of American foreign policy and contrasted this with the strategic necessity of trying to work on the Russians for the mutual withdrawal of forces in Europe. He lashed out at our living in Asia "with this mythology of Chiang Kai-shek's return to China," and he called our refusal to recognize, even to talk with, the rulers of modern China "one of the greatest political crimes of our times, for in 1955 we had a chance to talk to them, to begin to resolve some of the problems there." Stevenson denounced "that whole program of stupidity starting with the 'unleashing' of Chiang Kai-shek to the collapse of the Summit."

In briefest outline, these were some of the thoughts of a first-class intelligence devoting itself intelligently to the tremendous complexities of recurring crises, and the difference between this kind of vision and the hold-the-line-everywhere "linear" mentality of the Military is quite plain: it is the difference between devoting the mind to the attempt to achieve solutions that just possibly might avert war on the one hand and, on the other, striking a statuesque military stance with atomic lance ever at the ready, backing up a no-parleys-with-the-heathen attitude—the posture that in the long run can only insure that the holocaust will come.

'Creative Minority'

Clearly delineated in these developments, in our whole attitude, is the atmosphere of the Warfare State. As Thorstein Veblen observed, the more we become a military state, the more we *require* an unswerving patriotism and loyalty in the populace. As Toynbee has observed, human progress is generated by a "creative minority," and once you stifle that minority and destroy its creativity, society languishes and deteriorates. The great virtue of democracy has always been that, in its free air, man's thoughts were unshackled and free to soar; his creativity was stimulated. But in the Warfare State creativity is subordinated; all effort is tailored to the aims and purposes of the Military. "Our job is not to advance knowledge, but to advance the military," Dr. A. G. Hill, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of America's leading weapons research men, remarked a few years ago. And Albert Einstein himself once publicly asserted: "If I would be a young man again and had to decide how to make my living, I would not try to become a scientist or scholar or teacher. I would rather choose to be a plumber or a peddler in the hope to find that modest degree of independence still available under present circumstances."

When an Albert Einstein looks down, hunting for some obscure niche of independence, it would seem that the repressive atmosphere of the Warfare State has already claimed America for its latest victim.

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

PART VI

NO DISARMAMENT FOR US

> There is only one ray of hope. It seems to me that today the responsible leaders of the several peoples have, in the main, the honest will to abolish war. The opposition to this unquestionably necessary advance lies in the unhappy traditions of the people which are passed on like an inherited disease from generation to generation because of our faulty educational machine. Of course the main supports of this tradition are military training and its glorification, and not less important, the press which is so dependent upon the military and the larger industries. Without disarmament there can be no lasting peace. On the contrary, the continuation of military armaments in their present extent will with certainty lead to new catastrophies.

ALBERT EINSTEIN wrote those words in *The Nation*, September 23, 1931. He was trying to find some hope for the world in the approaching 1932 disarmament conference, but World War II—the most horrible war in history, the war whose legacy was to be the atom bomb and a world more wracked with tension than ever before—was just eight short years away.

In September, 1961, as this is written, there seems to be not even Einstein's "one ray of hope." It takes an almost super-human innocence to muster the slightest faith in "the honest will" of today's leaders to abolish war. They speak the right words, but their actions belie their protestations. The subterranean movements of our time all flow remorselessly in one direction—toward ever mightier military machines, equipped with ever more awesome weapons of ever more total destruction, a course that, as Einstein wrote so perceptively in 1931, "will with certainty lead to new catastrophies."

If there had ever been "one ray of hope," it appears to have been effectively dissipated in the tensions of the 1961 Berlin crisis. With Nikita Khrushchev proclaiming that he intends to forge a one-way settlement of the German problem, with the Communist East Germans sealing off access to West Berlin to halt the flow of thousands of refugees to the West, with America responding by sending more troops as "hostages to our intent" into the menaced former capital, with the tinder of international holocaust ready for explosion by one trigger-happy finger, Khrushchev and the Russians added one more appalling decibel to the register of world tensions by announcing on August 31, 1961, that they intended to resume nuclear testing—and by promptly, just two days later, exploding the first of a series of nuclear devices over Central Asia, threatening the planet Earth once more with the specter of radioactive fallout.

Two-Way Sabotage

The Russian action abruptly terminated three years of talks at Geneva during which representatives of Russia, Great Britain and the United States had held 338 meetings in an effort to negotiate a permanent test-ban treaty—the first tentative step on the long road of disarmament. During those three years, despite French bomb testing in the Sahara, the pollution of the atmosphere from the last major tests in 1958 had gradually subsided, but every approach that promised a permanent solution and permanent safety for mankind had been sabotaged—and sabotaged at least as much by the Americans as by the Russians. Increasingly, one fact had become self-evident: nobody (except the mere common people of the world) really wanted a nuclear test ban, nobody really wanted to halt the arms race. Long before the August 31 Russian announcement, there had been signs that the Russian military wanted to resume testing to perfect new weapons, to "catch up" and if possible "get ahead" of the Americans in the race to destruction. On our side, there was equal eagerness; it would be only just to say, equal fanaticism. The militaristic forces that have come increasingly to dominate our society since the end of World War II looked upon a nuclear test ban as idealistic madness. They resorted to distortions and deceit, even to outright lies, in their determination to sabotage any possibility of agreement at Geneva. Propaganda, with mass media providing as always a willing forum, was loosed with barrage effect on the American people. It worked as always on our emotions, not our minds. Its themes were the old familiar ones: you could never trust the Russians; you could never adequately check up on what they were doing; any cutback on our part would be suicidal and anyone who advocated it must be some kind of pro-Communist appeaser; world survival depended upon test resumption.

The hand of the hidden forces that mold our thinking and shape so much of our policy showed clearly in the spring of 1961. On May 23, Marquis Childs reported from Geneva on a conversation he had held with Arthur Dean, President Kennedy's test-ban negotiator. Dean, a civilian and by all evidence an earnest and dedicated man, had been startled to receive a telephone call from a friend in New York, the head of a large advertising agency. The friend demanded in forcible terms that the test-ban talks be broken off at once. When Dean refused, the advertising executive flew into a tirade, upbraiding him for wasting the taxpayers' money. Since Dean was serving without pay and without even an expense allowance, he was understandably puzzled by such vehemence, and he decided to investigate. When he did, he learned that his New York friend had been one of a group of 200 advertising executives who had been privileged to attend a Pentagon-sponsored Washington orientation conference at which the "realities" of the test-ban negotiations had been explained to them.

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And who was the impartial expert who had done the explaining? Dr. Edward Teller, the proud papa of the H-bomb.

Dr. Teller had laid it on the line. He had told the 200 military geniuses from the advertising agencies just what was at stake in the resumption of nuclear testing. Why, he avowed, if scientists were just allowed to resume testing, nuclear warheads could be reduced from a weight of 200 tons to thirty-five tons per megaton, and the missiles carrying the warheads could be reduced proportionately in size, weight and complexity. Just think of that! What a boon to mankind that would be! Dr. Teller could envision an era of unbounded nuclear plenty in which 50,000 missile-equipped trucks would tour the United States night and day, ready at all times to blast the Soviet Union off the face of the globe should those Russians try any monkey business. Each truck would be manned by a lieutenant and a sergeant, and it would take only the jab of the sergeant's finger, any hour of the day or night, to reduce Kharkov to a hole in the ground. With 100,000 lieutenants and sergeants having at their fingertips such economy-sized packages of world destruction, it seems inevitable that there would finally appear among them just the kind of psychotic whom the Johns Hopkins University psychiatrist envisioned worming his way up the chain of command to a post of button-pushing holocaust; only, in the marvelous new world of Dr. Teller, everything would be much simplified. The psychotic's climb would not have to be very far, only to the rank of sergeant or lieutenant, and at any given moment, all it would take would be one fanatic among the 100,000 guardians of the Bomb.

It says much for the sanity of our age that Dr. Teller was not alone in his vision of this millenium. He was supported by a host of cold warriors devoted to the proposition that safety is to be found only in the perfection of weapons that will more efficiently destroy the world. A consistent exponent of this brand of thinking has been Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a man who always has been prepared to beat Khrushchev to the nuclear-test punch. By one of history's more apt coincidences, Admiral Strauss beat Khrushchev into the public prints in an article in *Reader's Digest* that appeared on the stands several days before the Russian



August 31 announcement. The title conveyed the message Strauss was delivering to millions of American homes: "Why Nuclear Testing Is a 'Must' for Freedom."

Practice for Annihilation

Several themes run through the Strauss message, and most of them are reinforced and italicized for the reader by prominently boxed inserts from other eminent American cold-war warriors. Principal themes: the whole three-year suspension of nuclear tests was a fraud because the Russians obviously had been testing secretly (there is no evidence of this, but obviously, being Russians, they had); there is no danger in radioactive fallout from bomb testing—the whole issue is a myth trumped up by pro-Communist agitators in our midst; you can't tell whether a stored H-bomb is going to retain its potency forever and so it's necessary to spot-test the hoard from time to time to make certain it can still turn Kharkov into a hole in the ground; it's impossible to have a nuclear-test ban agreement of any kind, anywhere, any time, because it's impossible to detect and prevent "cheating"—and, as everyone knows, the Russians are going to cheat; and, finally, more tests are necessary to perfect "several sophisticated new nuclear weapons" that were on the drawing boards when we suspended tests in 1958—devices designed to meet various types of menace, enemy missiles in the atmosphere, deep underground launching sites, submarines, "etc." The "etc." doubtless includes Dr. Teller's 50,000 bomb-touring trucks.

The entire Strauss exhortation was summed up in the boxed excerpt with which the *Digest* headed his article. It read: "The message is clear: Soviet intransigence and duplicity have made United States nuclear supremacy crucial to the survival of the free world. For this, *resumption of testing is essential.*" (The italics belong to the *Digest.*) The prominent boxed inserts reiterated the message. Dr. Teller: "Secret tests can give Russia an overwhelming advantage. If we do not resume nuclear tests, we may lose our power to resist Soviet conquest." Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa, member of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy): "Since Russia clearly shows no intention of making any reliable agreement to ban atomic testing and, in my opinion, has been secretly testing, our own security and that of the free world demand that we stop marking time and resume non-atmospheric testing for new weapons as well as for peaceful uses." Sen. Thomas J. Dodd (D., Conn., member of Foreign Relations Committee): "If, through sneak testing, Soviet Russia were to score a single major technological breakthrough like the neutron bomb, it might very well cost us our freedom. As a matter of survival, we must immediately resume underground weapons tests, which would not contaminate the atmosphere."

Though Senator Dodd, unlike Admiral Strauss, seemed to recognize a fact of life on which scientists the world over, including the Russians, have been in general agreement—that radioactive fallout is a menace to life—the cumulative, reiterated, italicized message of Admiral Strauss and the *Digest* was the familiar emotional blockbuster of propaganda. We stood at a crisis; our liberties, our very existence, were at stake. To save ourselves, we must hop to it and get banging away with those bombs again. The *Digest* had hardly conveyed this happy thought

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into millions of American homes when Khrushchev gave himself charter membership in the Strauss-Teller bang-away club.

Strangely, for a man who had doubtless been conducting secret tests for three years, he made a public announcement that he was going to resume testing; and strangely, for a nation that obviously had been hiding its atomic tests so that we couldn't detect them, the first thing the Russians did was to resume testing in the atmosphere, right where we could and did detect what they were up to. But it's obviously useless to quibble about such irrelevancies; the big issue is: how did those Russians all by themselves, *unaided by us,* ever get the world into such a fix?

Marking Time

The years immediately following our failure to win Soviet acceptance of the Baruch plan in 1946 were years of marking time. Here was the first great failure to halt the arms race of "desperate" character that Stimson had foreseen; and, while we had not acted with the kind of forthright vision he had advocated, the major blame must be laid at the door of Russia. America's proposal to put all atomic developments under United Nations control was made at a time, early in war gamesmanship, when existing atomic stocks were entirely in our possession, when raw-material sources were limited in development, when it would have been possible to clamp on tight controls and make it impossible for any nation to sequester for future use a secret atomic punch. But Russia clearly distrusted us — a distrust for which the warlike trumpetings of our Pentagon and its business allies gave her some justification — and she felt that any U.N. control would be dominated by us, that she ran the danger, if not of being absolutely double-crossed, at least of being hampered and restricted in the uses of atomic energy. Therefore, since the alternative was much simpler than we supposed, Russia simply pressed ahead with work on her own atomic-energy developments, intent on coming to the bargaining table on a basis of equality. In this chase for an ever-vanishing meed of equality, the Russians were, of course, as deluded as we have been, and the opportunity — the best opportunity to halt the fateful trend of world events — was lost.

Club's Newest Member

The U.S. position, rigidly maintained for several years, was that there must be agreement on atomic control before there could be any discussion of other steps to limit or control armaments. But in 1949 Russia signaled her entrance into the nuclear club; she had the bomb and there was nothing we could do about it. This was followed by the outbreak of limited war in Korea. Under the pressure of these twin developments, the American position finally was modified. In a speech in October, 1950, President Truman called upon the United Nations to form a new, unified Disarmament Commission to consider all types of arms limitations. This was done, and British, French and American delegates began to draft proposals for a strict numerical limitation of armed forces. In May, 1952, the three Allies proposed a formula that would restrict the U.S., China and the USSR to ground armies of 1 million to 1.5 million men each; Great Britain to 700,000; France to 800,000; and other countries to 1 per cent of their total populations. Two years later, in June, 1954, the British and French refined this proposal and set up a detailed schedule for arms control in four stages — creation of a control body, freezing of military manpower and expenditures at 1953 levels, reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces halfway to the eventual quotas; and, finally, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and conversion of all nuclear materials to peaceful uses.

The initial Soviet reaction to all this was negative — the "*nyet*" the West had come to expect. But then, abruptly, without any previous indication of a possible change of attitude, the Russians on May 10, 1955, did a complete about-face. Jacob Malik, speaking for the Russian disarmament delegation in London, announced that the Soviet was prepared to accept virtually all of the West's proposals. Russia was willing to accept the West's suggested manpower ceilings, the reduction of conventional armaments and, most significantly, the West's proposals to abolish the use of nuclear weapons. In this last and vital category, the Soviet offer was far-reaching. Russia agreed to "the complete prohibition of the use and production both of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes"; and to "the establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee in the case of all states alike the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions."

The Kremlin's Proposal

Just what were "adequate" guarantees? This, of course, would be the crux of the case. Russia made specific suggestions. She proposed that the U.N. establish a permanent staff of inspectors in countries joining the disarmament pact, with access to all "objects of control"; control posts along reciprocal lines in big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and airdromes, to watch for any dangerous concentration of ground forces or air and naval forces; the right to demand necessary information from every nation on the carrying out of the agreed reduction of armaments and forces; unlimited access to national budgets showing appropriations and to legislative and executive decisions. Periodic reports would be submitted on the steps taken in implementation of the agreement.

The Russians, so long intransigent, had made a truly astounding proposal — one that, it seemed at first glance, should go a long way toward making continued international disagreement impossible. Philip Noel-Baker, a member of the British Parliament and winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1959, considers this Russian offer the crucial point in the long disarmament struggle. In his book, *The Arms Race and the Case for Disarmament,* he discusses the proposal at

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length under the heading: "The Moment of Hope: May 10, 1955." He reports that the British delegate on the scene was elated at the Russian switch and exclaimed that the proposals of the West "have now been largely, and in some cases entirely, adopted by the Soviet Union."

With the Russians ready to bargain, with the Russians committed to what was essentially *our* position, it would seem that this should have been the moment to call all-night sessions, if necessary, to hammer out a pact for future security of the world. But what happened? The American delegation, instead of leaping to embrace opportunity, acted as if the Russians had just detonated a tactical atomic bomb in its midst. Instead of going ahead, we drew back. Beseeching and obtaining a three-months adjournment of the disarmament conference, we went home.

The developments of the next few months, studied in the cold light of reality instead of the glow of the moment's propaganda, do not make pleasant reading for Americans who like to be proud of their government, who like to believe it means the peace it professes. For in the summer of 1955 our actions can only, and charitably, be described as less than candid.

Counter-Proposals

With the Summit conference at Geneva scheduled for July, Eisenhower named Harold E. Stassen as his special Secretary for Peace, with Cabinet rank, to handle all disarmament negotiations. Stassen had hardly begun his labors when, at Geneva, Eisenhower made his dramatic "open skies" proposal, suggesting that each of the nuclear powers let the other's spy planes roam at will above its territories to guard against the possibility of surprise attack. This plan reportedly was urged on Eisenhower by Nelson Rockefeller and was looked upon with considerable skepticism by Stassen and by virtually all foreign diplomats.

No one ever questioned President Eisenhower's sincerity, which was completely moving and convincing; what was questioned was his logic. For the hard fact behind the headline hoopla with which the "open skies" proposal was greeted in America was that it was essentially a one-way street: we had everything to gain; Russia, everything to lose. In our more open society, nearly everyone, including the Russians, knew where our atomic plants and installations were located; but in the vast, walled-off interior of Russia, there existed huge areas of which we were in either partial or total ignorance. The "open skies" proposal, if only the Russians obligingly would agree to it, could almost be guaranteed to fill in these gaps in our knowledge.

This consideration, if both we and the Russians had been completely sincere, should have made no difference; but — and this was the point that seems never to have been adequately appreciated in America — there was an obvious flaw in Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal, one that called instantly into question our intentions and our good will. The clear fact was that the plan did not go nearly so far as the Russian proposals of May 10; indeed, once all the propaganda elements were washed out of it, the plan represented little more than a well-concealed drawback on our part. The hard nubbin of truth lay in the sudden limitation that we now, for the first time, put upon our proposals. The "open skies" plan provided only for nuclear *control,* not for the nuclear *disarmament* we had for years been advocating. As Jules Moch, the French representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission, later wrote in *The Reporter*: ". . . My American friends will remember my skepticism at the time. The months that followed only strengthened it. Never have I believed that a formula for *control without disarmament* would receive the unanimous support of governments — any more than a formula for *disarmament without control.*"

It is virtually certain that this basic shift in our policy was pressured by the Pentagon. The Pentagon's attitude toward the Russian disarmament proposals was described as one that ranged from skepticism to outright alarm. Disarmament is a word that can hardly be expected to exist in the Pentagon's lexicon of hope, and as the summer months of 1955 drifted past, American policy hardened into what was to become a rigidly military posture. The Russian proposals of May 10 lay neglected on the international bargaining table, and it is obvious now that we never had any intention of taking them up. The result was that the Russians were never put to the test, and left unanswered for all time was the question so important for all mankind: Did they really mean it?

In attempting to judge Russian sincerity, the crucial point that should have been considered, but that it seems was not, was whether Russia had impelling reasons to want what she said she wanted, to make good on her word.

Russia's Self-Interest

It would seem that she had, that the reasons existed. Stalin, the iron dictator and man of war, had died, and there was reason to believe that his successors, including Khrushchev, were going to be more concerned than he had been about the domestic economy and the natural desire of their people for a relaxation of war tensions and the improvement of living standards. This was not just wishful thinking; hard facts backed it up. Russia, after all, had agreed to a peace treaty with Austria; she had demobilized the number of troops withdrawn from the Austrian occupation; and she had announced a further cut in her armed forces of 640,000 men to take effect on December 15. These were all clear-cut actions. And the reasons for the change in the Soviet attitude that they indicated were not too hard to find.

Economic analysts recognized that the pressures of the extremely costly nuclear-arms race were putting even greater strains on the Russian economy than they were on our own. Russia at the time had an industrial base only about one-quarter or one-third the size of ours. Yet we, the largest and wealthiest industrial nation in the world, were finding the burdens of our $40 billion to $50 billion-a-year armament program extremely onerous. What, then, must have been the burden for Rus-

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sia? Economists estimated that we could get some dim idea only if we were capable of imagining what an armaments race pegged at $140-$150 billion a year would have done to us. Such were the realities pressuring the Russians in the direction of disarmament.

We apparently gave these facts little consideration, yet we were not ignorant of their existence. Our State Department had been informed in precise terms of the Soviets' domestic situation. On August 29, 1955, Joseph Alsop reported in the New York *Herald Tribune* that the State Department had been advised the Russians were sincere. The word had come directly from Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and one of the ablest diplomats in the State Department. Bohlen had warned specifically against any tendency on our part to regard the Russian overture as a sign of weakness or imminent collapse — a fantasy with which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles regularly toyed, convinced that if we just "kept the pressure on," the entire Russian Communist system would disintegrate. This was simply not true, Bohlen said, but his analysis of the situation inside the Soviet Union convinced him that the Russians really felt they needed — and would accept — a considerable measure of disarmament.

America's Dilemma

This self-interest of the Russians and their selfish desire to disarm put the United States in a truly fearful dilemma. Here we had been beating the Russians over the head for years with disarmament proposals which they, just as we had expected, had disdainfully and haughtily rejected. In doing so, the picture the Russians had painted of themselves coincided perfectly with the image we had of them. But now, suddenly, all was changed. The Russians had said, in effect, "All right, we'll take you up. We'll play ball. Will you?" This, as anyone can clearly see, is not quite cricket, and it puts the fellow whose bluff is called in the very devil of a spot. How is he ever going to get out of it?

Our answer to this poser was delivered when the U.N. Disarmament Commission reassembled in New York in September, 1955. Stassen made a lengthy speech, but the guts of it was contained in just one statement. America, he said, felt that adequate inspection was impossible, and so we were placing "reservations" against all of the disarmament proposals we had made in the past. In other words, we were backing out; we were taking every offer we had ever made off the bargaining table.

If Russia previously had had any suspicions about American good faith, they must have been intensified, not just by our precipitate retreat from our own proposals for disarmament before the U.N. Disarmament Commission, but by our new and publicly proclaimed policy never to give up the bomb — on the contrary, to place all our reliance on its ever more fiendish (and more suicidal) deterrence. This new determination of the Eisenhower administration to reduce foreign policy to military considerations was announced to the world, most appropriately and most significantly, by one of our highest military spokesmen. At the same time that Stassen was withdrawing our disarmament proposals from the U.N. bargaining table, the new Secretary of the Air Force, Donald A. Quarles, was speaking in Philadelphia to an audience of air attachés of foreign missions in this country. The very character of Quarles's audience seemed to lend heavy added significance to his words, for listening to him were representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In these circumstances, it was impossible for anyone to miss the message. And James Reston of *The New York Times* later described that message in these words:

> What he (Quarles) made clear was that the United States was not thinking at all about a disarmament system in which everybody would disarm to the point where nobody would have sufficient power to wage a major war.
>
> He told the air attachés in plain words that the United States was going to rest its security not on the abolition of power, but on the retention of an overwhelming air-atomic power; not on "disarmament" in the old-fashioned sense, but on the capacity to retaliate; not on "banning" or "destroying" atomic bombs, but on retaining them in such quantities that no nation could hope to start a major war without being destroyed by atomic and hydrogen retaliation; not on international monopolies of atomic power or "foolproof" inspection systems, but on mutual surveillance designed to prevent surprise attack by either side.

Intentions and Deeds

This was a statement of policy of "peace" by a "peace-loving" nation?

One has to ask the question, and one has to be sickened by the hypocrisy any attempt at an answer must reveal. Here we were beating our breasts before the world and proclaiming our lofty intentions — and here we were at the same moment announcing that we were not even going to think about a disarmament system "where nobody would have sufficient power to wage a major war." We had been prattling for years to the world about our good intentions, our desire to disarm and ease world tensions — and here we were, the first time we had a real chance to put up, announcing our intention to keep "an overwhelming atomic power," announcing that we did not intend ever to "ban" or "destroy" our bombs, but instead to stockpile them in such quantities that any nation attacking us would be destroyed. We proclaimed all this despite our full knowledge that Russia also possessed the hydrogen bomb and so had advanced with us into the upper chamber of nuclear horrors; we did all this despite the certainty, even then clear on the horizon, that nuclear warheads soon would be harnessed to intercontinental ballistic missiles, adding new dimensions of terror to the war rat race, putting a still higher premium on the surprise stroke of aggression, practically vitiating any hope of defense. Since we did not intend to become the aggressor, the folly, even if judged only from the narrow standpoint of our own self-interest, seems clearly evident, and it hardly takes the mounting tensions, the hour-by-hour hazards of a 1961 Berlin crisis,

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to make us regret the slaughter by our own hand of what Noel-Baker has called "The Moment of Hope."

This is not, it should be emphasized, just an individual analysis. Many foreigners judged us largely responsible for prolonging the horrors of the nuclear race after 1955. Many knowledgeable and patriotic Americans agree. For example, in a 1956 conference on disarmament at Columbia University's Arden House, a devastating analysis of American intransigence was submitted by R. S. Leghorn, a consultant to the Air Force Advisory Board, reconnaissance group commander in World War II, and after that in charge of planning, reconnaissance and intelligence at Wright Field in 1951 and at the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force in Washington in 1952. Leghorn wrote:

> It seems incredible that the U. S. Government continues not to act favorably on a valuable arms-control measure offered by the Soviets. Yet the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, since reiterated persistently, to exchange ground-control posts at major airfields, ports and transportation centers, has evoked no U. S. acceptance, despite the November 17, 1956, supplemental Soviet offer of an aerial component in Europe.

Lost Advantages

Leghorn listed major advantages that we were casting aside: "a valuable system to warn against surprise attack," increased East-West contacts, a major intelligence gain, considerable warning of technological surprise, an opportunity to get observers into Hungary and into other iron curtain territories from which we had been barred, increased opportunity to negotiate nuclear and space-flight controls, and (depending on how we managed our announcements) important psychological gains on our part. Why had we refused all these obvious advantages? Leghorn gave the answer in this acid analysis:

> U. S. non-acceptance to date is partly because we are confined and trapped by our own propaganda about aerial inspection, guilty of a tendency toward all-or-nothing thinking about inspection, fearful of Soviet intentions to the point of irrationality, and apprehensive of relying at all on any arms control for security.

Such was the view of a well-qualified American expert. It had no effect. No arguments appealing to the rationality of man have had any effect. In the intervening years, we have persisted in our course, the adamant foes of disarmament to which we continue to give political lip service. Until the President's speech to the United Nations on September 25, at least, it could be argued that we were the main obstructionists in the disarmament field. In a Senate speech on February 8, 1960, Senator Joseph S. Clark (D., Pa.) scathingly summarized our role in these words:

> The U. S. is the only nuclear power which has not accepted total and permanent disarmament under adequate international safeguards as its goal and put forward a comprehensive plan to achieve that end. I think that is a disgrace. The British have done it. The Russians have done it. We have not done it....

Deliberately, determinedly, we refrained for years from committing ourselves to any plan, our own or anyone else's, calling for permanent disarmament. "The Moment of Hope" in 1955 was not a swift space ship that flitted past us in the night and was gone before we had a chance to grasp or to comprehend. We had plenty of time to study and to know; we had repeated opportunities to change our course. For the Russians continued for a considerable time, despite the suspicions of our motives that our actions must have confirmed in their minds, to pursue what might be described as their own unilateral program of military cutbacks.



The next peace-mongering deed of the unsettling Russians was performed on May 14, 1956. On that day, in Moscow, Premier Bulganin announced that the Soviet was reducing its Armed Forces by another 1.2 million men. The slash was in addition to the 640,000 mustered out of service in 1955 and was to be completed in one year, by May, 1957. The rollback, Bulganin announced, involved these items: the withdrawal of 30,000 troops from East Germany, the placing of 375 warships in reserve, the disbanding of sixty-three divisions and independent brigades and the closing of a number of military schools of the Soviet Army. In making the announcement, Bulganin appealed directly to the powers of the world for disarmament and peaceful coexistence. He stressed the Soviet's willingness to embark on disarmament without waiting for the settlement of questions like German reunification. "There is no other way out under present conditions," he said. "There are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history."

Bulganin's analysis, whether we like the idea of peaceful coexistence or not, may fairly be said to have posed to the world the only alternatives. Furthermore, the Russian announcement of further force reductions did not catch the American government by surprise—and so unprepared—as had the Russian about-face on disarmament in 1955. This time, the Russians had taken care to let us know what they contemplated a full three weeks before they did it. At a diplomatic reception in London on April 24, the Russian leaders had confided their plans to Harold Stassen, and Stassen promptly had informed the State Department. Yet, with three weeks to digest this intelligence and prepare a reaction to the Russian move, the American government went off riding its hobby horses in three different directions when the expected happened. The over-all impression we gave the world was that of a spoiled child in a huff because some sneaky comrade had stolen some of the goodies out of his atomic cookie jar.

The huff was most noticeable in

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the reaction of James C. Hagerty, the President's Press Secretary, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Hagerty gave the back of his hand to the Soviet announcement, opining we would be able to put a lot more faith in the Russians if they had stopped their obstructionist tactics at the disarmament conference and gone along with the President's "open skies" proposal. Dulles growled darkly that he would much rather have seen Russia keep her 1.2 million soldiers on guard duty because all she would do when she got them back home was to put them to work making atomic weapons.

One Clear View

Only one member of the Eisenhower "team" failed to view the Russian development through smoke-obfuscated glasses. Secretary of Defense Charles E. (General Motors) Wilson said he couldn't assess what the Russian move might portend, but at least it was "a step in the right direction." Any ray of sunlight the American people might have glimpsed from this gingerly optimism was swiftly eclipsed, however, by Secretary Wilson's own hired hands in the Pentagon. They didn't agree with the boss, and they let it be known that they didn't. The Russian announcement didn't mean a thing, said the Pentagon Brass, because there was no way of checking on it; nobody could believe the Russians; nobody could tell what kind of arms reductions, if any, they might make; and all it amounted to was that the Russians were reaping propaganda hay—and we should beware.

With the Pentagon in conflict with its own boss, with the White House and the State Department taking grim views of Russian deviousness, a new voice was now added to the confusion—that of Harold Stassen. On May 18, Stassen said what it seems someone in higher authority might have found the wit and will to say earlier—that, while technological advances in weaponry probably would offset the Soviet's reduction of 1.2 million in manpower and leave the Soviet Army as strong as before, nevertheless the Soviet step was one in the right direction; it improved the prospects for peace and it was "an initiative we wanted them to take." Stassen made it clear that he was speaking out only because he felt the overwhelmingly negative reactions of high American officialdom were unfortunate, to say the least, and because he wanted to stress that Russia's actions seemed to underline her sincere desire to proceed with disarmament talks. Though Stassen was most circumspect in his remarks about his superior, Secretary Dulles, his hopeful view wasn't Dulles' view, and the Stassen scalp became one Secretary Dulles fully intended to nail to the wall of his State Department office.

The weary, interminable disarmament talks dragged on. They lasted for so many years and went through so many convolutions that only the dedicated expert could keep track of all their twists and turnings, and to the American people as a whole they assumed the unreality of a sparring match performed by two blindfolded boxers jabbing at each other in a London fog. Yet there were a few clear-cut developments, a few moments of hope, swiftly banished.

Possibilities of the Impossible

The issue that assumed supreme importance, that hovered over all mankind like a black pall of eventual and inescapable doom, was of course the menace of the bomb, now bloated to hideous hydrogen proportions. In discussing this problem, a basic Russian attitude must be understood. The comprehensive Russian proposal of 1955 had been linked directly to disarmament; the Russians traditionally have insisted, with irrefutable logic, that mere control of arms is a tricky business, far more difficult of enforcement than disarmament itself. Their publicly professed attitude has been that only full-scale disarmament can relieve world tensions, inspire mutual confidence and bring peace. To achieve this end, they repeatedly expressed their willingness to go the limit in inspections and enforcement because under conditions of disarmament no nation would retain the power to wage "a major war." The Russians, however, have not been willing to open up their country to inspection for the mere purpose of control, with potential enemies insisting on the right to retain war-making arsenals. It is not an illogical attitude, and it represents, furthermore, a Russian policy that dates back to the days of the Czars. In the 1890s Russia was advancing the same arguments, urging total disarmament on the great powers of Europe and meeting then with the same lack of success she has had with us now.

From the time our policy took its radical military shift in the "open skies" and Quarles's big-bomb statements of 1955, our attitude has been that we must have nuclear control first; only then will we discuss disarmament. In advocating this policy, we have also advocated its impossibility, for we have made it clear that, in our view, any adequate control of the bomb simply is not feasible. Apparently, we have been perfectly content with this dead-end vision, though we have, of course, protested with our usual piousness that, any time controls should become really possible, it would be a different matter and we should be the happiest people on earth. In an effort, then, to make us happy, some of the most eminent scientists of the world were summoned to Geneva to investigate the possibilities in our impossible—the problem of adequate control.

The scientists met on July 1, 1958; they numbered fifteen, and they came from five nations of the West, including the United States, and five nations of the East, including the USSR. For fifty-one days, they wrestled with the technical problems involved in establishing a detection system for nuclear-weapons testing. If such a system could be established, the testing that was raining radioactive fallout on the world could be halted—an important first step in lowering world tensions. On August 21, 1958, the East-West scientists announced a unanimous conclusion: a nuclear-test ban could be policed effectively.

"This agreement makes an effective dent in a problem which so far has proved rather intractable—the problem of disarmament," the U.N. Secretary General commented.

Throughout the world there was

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general agreement and relief. Russia, capitalizing on this mood and seizing a propaganda advantage, announced she would suspend nuclear-weapons testing if we would. This, as was doubtless intended, put us on the spot. In the 1956 Presidential campaign, Adlai Stevenson had first called world attention to the invisible death seeping down from the skies and had urged a halt to nuclear testing and nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. Eisenhower had flown into one of his towering rages and denounced the proposal as irresponsible, downright idiotic. Now, less than two years later, it didn't seem quite so idiotic, and the White House, put in the position of having to catch the tail of the Russian kite, announced that it would go along—it would suspend tests for one year, beginning October 31, 1958.

To firm up a permanent test-ban treaty, of course, required much bargaining, and the fall months of 1958 were filled with complicated negotiations. But progress, it seemed, was being made. By December 19, four articles of a proposed test-ban treaty had been hammered out, and the prospects for eventual agreement seemed bright when the conferees adjourned for the Christmas holidays. They were scheduled to reassemble on January 5, 1959.

Surprise Statement

On that day, in a development timed to coincide exactly with the resumption of the conference, the White House startled the world with a new announcement. Fresh data, it said, showed that underground test explosions were much more difficult to detect than the Geneva experts had thought; the unanimous conclusions of the fifteen eminent East-West scientists who had agreed a control system was possible no longer were accepted as valid by the United States. Again we were drawing back—this time in a gesture that flouted a unanimous finding of the world's best scientific minds. Our action provoked an international uproar. The USSR flatly accused the United States of "looking for an excuse to torpedo the current Geneva talks."

Of course, we denied any such intention; we were, as always, pure boys wanting peace and disarmament in the world, our patience sorely tried by such intemperate Russian charges. Our self-righteousness, which has been one of our most offensive characteristics in the field of world opinion, this time served us even worse than usual; for the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee quickly exposed it as a tawdry tissue compounded of outright lies and subtle deceit, its one purpose the scuttling of any possibility of agreement at Geneva.

Unholy Trinity

Partners in the deed were the Military, the Atomic Energy Commission and the mass media of information—a trinity that never had desired an end to the arms race. A nuclear test-ban agreement, the first toddling precedent on the road of disarmament, could be torpedoed only if the American government and the American people were convinced (1) that no inspection system was scientifically feasible; (2) that the Russians could and would cheat at will by using underground tests; and (3) that, as a result, we would be stripping ourselves to the point of helplessness and handing ourselves over, bound hand and foot, to an implacable enemy if we ever agreed to anything at Geneva. Only if this kind of pressure campaign should succeed could we continue to follow the policy the Military had superimposed on our foreign relations in September, 1955—the policy of no disarmament ever, of ever bigger and better bombs, of an ever more massive "deterrent."

The hand of propaganda showed through the sanctimoniousness of the initial announcement. Even before the White House had spoken, the drum beaters had been briefed and were ready. The first crushing diapason was sounded by Warrior Luce's *Time*. In an article set in type *before* the January 5 announcement, *Time* told all and rendered judgment. The AEC, it said, had important new data which showed that underground tests could not be detected. "The new data," said *Time*, "were enough to curl the scientists' hair." It disclosed no details of the exact nature of the facts that would cause this scientific frizzing, but *Time's* account was horrifying enough to frizz the hair of the public as well. In strident alarm, *Time* asked its readers the hypothetical question: "Should the U.S. trust to any stop-test agreement where the chances of deception are so great as to be a major risk of survival?"

In the headline furore that followed, there was widespread popular agreement that *Time* and all the other cold warriors in our culture had been indisputably right, and those egg-headed scientists, as usual, had been indisputably visionary and wrong. By January 18, Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times* was writing that Dr. Teller (no disarmament man, he) had opposed the inspection system all along and now he "had been proven right once again on an issue of high importance to the world." *Time*, returning to the attack, trumpeted on February 2 that the new data showed "the Russians could presumably cheat on any agreement at will."

The New Gospel

With such eminent experts leading the pack, the public at large seems to have accepted the new verdict as gospel. Yet there existed from the outset highly valid grounds for suspicion. The Atomic Energy Commission had been infinitely suspect ever since it had been caught in one outright prevarication. On September 19, 1957, the commission had conducted a deep underground test in Nevada, and later it had issued a statement that the test had been detected on seismographs at a distance of some 250 miles—and at no greater distance. Subsequent investigation established beyond question that, on the contrary, the test had registered on seismographs in Alaska, thousands of miles away—and that, significantly, the AEC had had reports to this effect in its files when it made its 250-mile-limit announcement. The importance of the issue was obvious; for, if the AEC had been right, if underground explosions could not be detected beyond a range of 250 miles, it would be impossible ever to monitor underground tests in the great land mass

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of Russia. The exposure of the AEC by the uncooperative Alaskan seismographs, as a result, naturally precipitated a tingling controversy in which frantic efforts were made to muddy the waters. In the end, it wasn't quite clear whether the commission had made an innocent little error through some humble and bumbling clerk's oversight, or whether it had falsified by deliberate, high-level intent. One thing did seem certain: it had condemned itself by its eagerness to make a much-desired point, by lending its official imprimatur to a completely misleading statement on a highly sensitive issue.

Bang — or Quake

Against this background, the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee began to pry into the validity of the AEC's "new data" that had erected such a roadblock in the path of any possible nuclear-test agreement. Involved were infinite technical complexities; simply stated, the basic issues came down to this: nuclear tests above a certain range of power will register on seismographs, and the vibrations they cause will be distinctly different from those caused by earthquakes. Blasts of lesser power will also register on seismographs, but it will not be clear what caused them — earthquakes or nuclear bombs. To determine this, inspectors would have to go to the scene of each registered disturbance. The delicacy and precision of the scientific instruments of detection thus became all-important; for if instruments could not record, sift out and identify the nature of the vast majority of earth tremors, so many on-site inspections would have to be made that the whole detection system would be overwhelmed by physical impossibilities.

The Soviets contended that we were deliberately falsifying scientific data to prove the impossibility. They argued that some of our data, taken from temporary stations set up to monitor our tests in the past, were by no means as reliable as data obtainable from up-to-date stations—and even this last data would not be as good as could be obtained from the still more efficient system the fifteen East-West scientists at Geneva had perfected. Before the Humphrey Subcommittee, Dr. Hans Bethe, a leading world scientist who had represented the United States at Geneva, upheld in essence the Soviet contention. He testified that the controls devised at Geneva were better than those used to monitor U.S. tests in 1958 and "much better than almost any now existing station."

Margin of Error

Another key contention, based on the AEC's "new data," received rough handling by America's own experts before the Humphrey group. The point involved was the size of the explosions whose nature could be determined by scientific instruments. The new calculations showed that there was a much greater margin of error here than the Geneva experts had supposed; and if this were true, of course, the number of necessary on-the-spot inspections would be multiplied to unmanageable proportions. The Russians had charged that our "new data" were not accurate, adding significantly "as the U.S. authors themselves admit." Such admission, indeed, was wrung from U.S. experts by the Humphrey Subcommittee. It became clear that the AEC's "new data" simply could not be supported scientifically; our own experts were compelled to admit that, under the controls devised at Geneva, no significant cheating would be possible. Philip J. Farley, special assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament, put it this way: "It is very unlikely that anyone could achieve a significant new nuclear capability or a significant improvement in his existing capability without being clearly and publicly in the position of having violated or otherwise evaded the agreement."

When one's own officials cannot support one's own publicly announced policy, the whole affair becomes embarrassing; and even if powerful forces behind the scenes remain disenchanted, there really isn't any way, if one is to save any face at all, to call the whole business off. So once more the talks progressed at Geneva, with scientists devoting their attention to surmounting the Americans' "new data" roadblock. In the meantime, international tensions showed signs of easing. Russian Foreign Minister Mikoyan visited the United States; Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain had a series of talks with Premier Khrushchev; and the fateful Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange of visits was arranged.

These outside political pressures seemed, for a time, in danger of forcing agreement at Geneva. By September, 1959, seventeen treaty articles had been accepted by both sides. Khrushchev, at the urging of Macmillan, made what seemed like an all-important concession. For the first time, in negotiations for a control proposal not linked to disarmament, he agreed to veto-free, on-site inspections by mixed national-foreign teams on a quota basis. In view of the long-held Russian conviction of the danger inherent in such inspections without disarmament, this overture by Khrushchev seemed again highly indicative of a real desire to put an end to the nuclear race that menaces all mankind.

There remained, of course, areas of disagreement still to be settled. One of the most important of these dealt with the number of inspections that would be permitted each year. Russia wanted to limit these inspections to ten; the U.S. wanted 100. But a compromise on such an issue seemed highly feasible; with Khrushchev's abandonment of the veto, eventual agreement seemed for the first time positively likely.

The Americans, however, were

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still putting up a stiff fight. On November 25, 1959, scientists from Great Britain, the United States and the USSR reconvened at Geneva. The Americans were still arguing that the originally proposed Geneva test system wasn't sufficiently foolproof scientifically; the Russians contended that it was and that, anyway, it could be made better. The British took a stance half-way between the two major antagonists, agreeing with the Americans that the controls originally proposed were not perhaps as good as the scientists had thought, but agreeing with the Russians that the system could certainly be made better, eliminating any real chance of cheating. This action of the British in almost throwing their weight on the Russian side made things rough. It began to look, indeed, as if we might have to accept an agreement; but this was a tragedy that we had foreseen and against which we had guarded. We had a hole card, and now we played it. It was a real blockbuster — Dr. Edward Teller's so-called "big hole" theory.

Hole in the 'Big Hole'

At Teller's suggestion, the RAND Corporation (a government-subsidized "think" agency) had concluded, after a special study, that nuclear explosions could be concealed if they were conducted underground in a hole large enough to "contain" the blast. The AEC released these findings to the press on December 21, 1959, and *The New York Times* promptly concluded that this method of muffling nuclear explosions would "make the international test-detection program virtually useless."

A little sober-minded analysis soon revealed, however, that the Teller "big hole" idea, though theoretically valid, was in all practical aspects little more than an imposing fraud. Its absurdity was thrown into high relief by experts like Professor Jay Orear of Cornell. He estimated that a hole large enough to muffle a relatively small 100-kiloton explosion would require a cavity 800 feet in diameter—big enough to contain a dozen Rockefeller Center skyscrapers. Such an excavation would require the removal of some *25 million tons* of rock, and one can appreciate the enormity of this task when one realizes that the entire anthracite production of the nation in 1959 was only 20 million tons—and that this required the labors of some 21,000 persons. The RAND brain-trusters apparently had realized this difficulty and had endeavored to get around it by suggesting that the hole could be made by flushing out a salt dome. But even this system would require the removal of some *20 million tons* of salt—and the entire salt production in the United States in 1959 was a mere 5 million. Even RAND admitted that its salt-hole flushing process would require from two to four years of labor and cost $40 million—all for just one hole in the ground to hide one small-scale atomic explosion. In the light of such realities, the fantasy of the "big hole" theory, which had become our new roadblock to a nuclear-test agreement, becomes obvious.

At least, it was obvious to both the British and the Russian scientists at Geneva. The Russians, though they at first denounced the whole idea, finally conceded the validity of Dr. Teller's "big hole" theory, as theory, but they argued that the whole attempt, from any practical standpoint, was ridiculous. The British agreed. The Soviets bluntly accused the Americans of bad faith, and the U.S. delegation, in self-righteous indignation at such an unjust imputation, announced abruptly that it was winding up its part in the conference on December 19 and going home. Both the British and the Russians protested. Sir William Penney, of the British delegation, pleaded with the Americans not to leave just when "the technical matters show signs of coming together." But the Americans wouldn't listen; they were walking out. Also, they said, they wouldn't have any part of issuing a joint report on the conference with the British and the Russians; they were going to prepare their own separate report. This infuriated the members of the other two delegations, especially the Russians. Dr. Federov, head of the Soviet contingent, declared: "I consider the action of the U.S. unprecedented. . . . I think such action is aimed at undermining our deliberations because, just as soon as some partial agreement came into sight, just as soon as we got to that agreement, immediately the U.S. delegation took steps to ruin it."

During the heated argument, one U.S. delegate affronted the judgment of the other scientists by making the fantastic assertion that it would be perfectly possible to muffle and conceal an explosion of the awesome magnitude of *1.8 million tons* of TNT. Since this would be eighteen times the size of the 100-kiloton blast requiring a hole that would swallow a dozen Rockefeller Center skyscrapers, Federov would seem to have had sanity on his side when he snapped that the Americans were "on the brink of absurdity." On this acrimonious note, the conference broke up and the Americans went home.

Truth vs. Propaganda

The official American report which was shortly submitted to Eisenhower placed heavy emphasis on the Russian "brink of absurdity" remark. This went to show, we argued, just how intractable and unreasonable the Russians were. How could any peace-loving American be expected to get along with such people? John A. McCone, the AEC chairman, solemnly placed full blame for the disruption of the conference at the door of the Russian delegation. The Russians, he said, had refused to consider U.S. data, had submitted little or no data of their own, had been determined obstructionists throughout. We, of course, had done our best and now, said McCone in a typical chins-up exhortation: "We must face resolutely the hazards of the future."

It seemed then, as it seems now, that we had no choice; but it should perhaps be realized that, once more, our protestations of self-righteousness didn't fare well when submitted to close scrutiny at our own hands. McCone's version of Russian obstructionism got some rough handling before the Humphrey subcommittee—and from the lips of members of our own Geneva delegation, at that. "Up until the last day [the day that in effect we blew up the conference] the Russians were their

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usual selves," one member of our delegation testified. "They discussed sensibly and made good contributions. They were a very able group of people." Another American delegate flatly denied the charges that the Russian scientists had made no contributions to the conference. On the contrary, he said, they made "elaborate theoretical contributions on the distortions of seismic waves"; they submitted data on large underground chemical explosions; they offered seismic records taken in the USSR of American underground tests in Nevada. Once more, it would seem, truth was at war with our propaganda—and, as usual, lost.

Food for the President

Eisenhower was fed our official version of the Russians' conference-wrecking role. Not unnaturally, he believed it, and not unnaturally, believing it, he blew his stack in five-star style. He announced that we weren't going to be stymied by any further moratorium on nuclear testing; after December 31, 1959, we would consider ourselves free to resume testing at will. Once more, it appeared, the militarism of the Pentagon and the AEC had prevailed over all other forces in American society. Wrote *The New York Times* from Washington on February 13, 1960: "It is no secret here that the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission are eager to conduct some small underground tests. These, they maintain, are essential to perfect the nuclear warheads for the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, the anti-missile missile, and to develop a better tactical weapon for the Army."

Our position was in callous conflict with the world position, with the interests of all mankind. Our policy committed us to an arms race of the most desperate character in which the very existence of mankind was at stake, for hardly any sensible man doubts that this constant war of ever-increasing tension and ever more horrible weaponry can lead to any end but one. Yet that end is the end to which we are constantly driven by all the overwhelming pressures of propaganda, and the voice of reason is rare, muted and unheard. One such voice of reason is that of Walter Lippmann. Writing for the thoughtful, as he always does, he analyzed American policy in a column on February 16, 1960, and called it "unrealistic" because we had refused to work out "any one of many compromises which are quite conceivable." We were, Lippmann said, basing our policy "on the assumption that no treaty is better than an imperfect treaty"— a proposition, parenthetically, that has been disproved many times in our history, perhaps most vividly in our acceptance of the one-sided Jay Treaty that so imperfectly settled the left-over issues of the Revolution, but that insured peace and gave us a chance to build a nation.

Dealing with our "no treaty" fixation, Lippmann wrote:

> I think this assumption is miscalculated. The miscalculation is a failure to realize the significance of the concessions which have been made by the Soviet Union in agreeing to an elaborate world-wide inspection system, of which a large number of stations, manned by foreigners, would be on Soviet territory.
>
> Our policy-makers have not, it seems to me, taken into account the full consequences of the Soviet concessions. It is that the Soviet Union is by way of convincing most of the world outside this country that it is sincere about ending nuclear testing. We have been told by experts of the Atomic Energy Commission not to worry about fallout. But mankind is terrified by it, and the Soviet Union is buying world support by agreeing to be inspected by foreigners in order to end the testing.

Such words of reason were lost in a world in which the helpless millions comprising two peoples who do not want war, the Russians and the Americans, were being driven steadily to the brink by remorseless forces they were powerless to control. More than a decade of cold-war tensions had led each nation to think of the other as a power of undiluted menace, one that obstructed every move for peace and made the eventual holocaust inevitable. Sincerely and fatally, each nation today believes the worst of the other. Dr. Ralph K. White, chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the U.S. Information Agency, has found three extremely dangerous delusions that are common to both countries. Neither Russia nor America, he says, will believe that each is afraid of the other; each has a mental image of evil leadership on the other side that deliberately wants and drives towards war; and both Russians and Americans believe that everything the leaders of the other side say is a lie and not worth listening to. The Russians especially, in Dr. White's view, have considered themselves an innocent and peace-loving people, incapable of wanting war after the trauma of World War II, and to them the American alignment with West Germany, the one-time common enemy, the enemy that almost tore Russia apart, is simply incomprehensible.

Enter Mr. Kennedy

Into this atmosphere, into a world already riding the toboggan of doom, the Kennedy Administration stepped in January, 1961. It is to be doubted whether any American administration, except perhaps that of Abraham Lincoln, ever inherited a worse mess. The U-2 incident in which the American government had lied and double-lied to its own people and the world; the collapse of the Summit that the U-2 precipitated; the bitter election campaign in which Kennedy, like virtually all leaders of his party since the McCarthy era, felt compelled to demonstrate how tough he was on the Communist issue by rattling the saber more vigorously than Eisenhower; the Cuban fiasco, a legacy of the Eisenhower administration compounded by the doubts and indecisions of Kennedy's, producing again in the United Nations the bare-faced deceit that cannot be reconciled with our own image of ourselves as a people of good will and candor—all of this, one disaster piled upon another, one ugly revelation vying with the next, in the incredibly brief span of less than a year, vitiated American prestige and reduced the entire world to the nadir of its hopes. What could ever reverse this trend? What could ever offset such repeated hammer strokes of fate and disaster? Only the most enlightened, the most bold, the most imag-

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inative and most liberal leadership. Perhaps not even that.

Unfortunately, at this writing, there are few signs that America may expect that quality of leadership.

Platitudes Solve Nothing

True, President Kennedy, much more than Eisenhower, has indicated that he appreciates the depths of the problem and recognizes that solutions are not to be found in self-righteous platitudes. Under Arthur Dean at Geneva, he made the kind of attempt to reach a nuclear test-ban agreement with the Russians that, two years earlier, without "big-hole" sabotage, very probably would have been successful. But now Russian policy had changed and hardened. American Polaris submarines were roaming the seas, their destructive warheads homed in on Russian cities; even worse, from the Russian viewpoint, we had expressed the determination to equip the resurgent German Army with nuclear weapons, giving the enemy that had devastated Russia in World War II all the knowledge and the incalculable power of nuclear arms. The U-2 disaster had exposed our constant, years-long transgressions in the Russian skies, a license no nation can permit in an age in which one high-flying plane, if it happens to be equipped with a bomb instead of a camera, could obliterate Moscow or Chicago. With U-2 and the collapse of the Summit, with Polaris and nuclear arms for Germany, there had been signs that Khrushchev might no longer be full master in his own house; that his own Strausses and Tellers, his own Military, considered him too "soft" toward the West; that only by a more strident, more aggressive posture could he retain his own grip on the affairs of state. In all probability, the pressures on him to resume nuclear testing were comparable to those upon Kennedy, which were constant and severe; and in this atmosphere, no agreement was to be found at Geneva. It soon became clear that the only issue really in doubt was which of the two leaders would yield first, which country first would take the fatal step. Khrushchev did; Russia did. For this much we can be thankful, if for little else.

We, at least, will not be responsible this time for the silent and invisible rain of strontium-90 and other lethal, radioactive particles sweeping across a helpless world. They come from the Soviet tests in Asia, and the radioactive pall that has swept over Japan, over Alaska, over Canada and the northern United States, is this time exclusively Russian in origin. But we have announced, as many people think we had to in view of the Russian action, our determination to resume underground nuclear testing; we have indicated that very probably we will be "forced" to resume testing of larger scale weapons in the atmosphere. We are being steadily driven to participation in a crime that condemns the peoples of the world and future generations. We are back on the nuclear treadmill, and there seems little chance, at the moment, that we can soon get off.

One-Way Street

The kind of vision, and the kind of courage to back the vision, that alone might stand some slight chance of reversing this somber trend of events are both lacking. For the inescapable fact is that the overwhelming, indeed the almost exclusive, emphasis of the Kennedy Administration has been military. From the election campaign, from its earliest days in office when it engaged in military pump-priming of the economy down to the recent call-up of Reserve and National Guard divisions, its deeds have gone in one direction, and only a small quota of its words in the other. Some of those words have indicated a fuller intellectual conception of what is involved in good intentions, but the emphasis of the deeds, by which alone Russia and the world will judge us, has been almost exclusively devoted to the welding of an ever mightier military force. Now there is the beginning of negotiations looking toward negotiation—talks about talking. There seems little hope in any of this, for the talks of the past shed no bright augury upon the future. Even the manner in which the Berlin crisis developed illustrated graphically our preoccupation with military solutions to the virtual exclusion of all else.

President Kennedy, still licking the wounds of Cuba, went off to Vienna to talk face to face with Khrushchev. He came back and told the American people grimly, like Winston Churchill summoning the British to blood, sweat and tears, that he had seen the face of the enemy and that it was a hard, uncompromising face indeed. Khrushchev was determined to force a settlement of the Berlin-German issue; he was determined to recognize the Communist East German state, determined to remove Berlin—stuck 110 miles inside East Germany like a "bone in the throat"—as a cause of periodic international tensions. If we wouldn't go along, he was determined to do all this alone, whether we liked it or not. Khrushchev had been told that for Berlin, suddenly the symbol of freedom, we would fight, whether he liked it or not. Khrushchev had gone home. Kennedy had come home. And now there was left for us just one more move —the call to arms. War might not come, we would try to see that it did not; we even recognized that Russia had some legitimate right to worry about her border in Central Europe, and we would try to see whether something could be done about that. But in the meantime the face of the foe was implacable. We must be prepared to fight for all that mankind holds dear. This was the gist of it. The emphasis was almost entirely a martial emphasis. No American would ever have known from his President that the fierce face of the enemy tiger had shown, if only momentarily, a decidedly softer and more reasonable side.

Call of Conscience

One of the few men in America who realized this and felt compelled, in all conscience, to call attention to it was Senator Clark (D., Pa.). In a speech in the Senate on July 10, backing Kennedy's proposal for the establishment of a permanent Disarmament Agency, the Senator called attention to one development in the Vienna talks that had been almost *universally* overlooked. He quoted

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from the June 4 *aide-mémoire* handed to President Kennedy by Premier Khrushchev. It read:

> The Soviet Government, as is well known, has already more than once emphasized that the Soviet Government, on its part, is *willing unconditionally to accept any Western control proposals if the Western Powers accept the proposal for general and complete disarmament.* [Italics added.]
>
> The Soviet Government reaffirms its readiness and in this case agrees to sign a document which will include the Western Proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests. We can take this step because the question of security of states will be on a different level in conditions of general and complete disarmament. There will be no armies nor will there be threats of attack by one state on another.
>
> In these conditions we are ready to accept any control proposed by Western Powers.

After Khrushchev's return to Moscow, Senator Clark said, the Soviet Premier made a broadcast to the Russian people in which he repeated these words from his *aide-mémoire* and then elaborated upon them. Khrushchev said:

> We have declared, and I categorically repeat this now: If the Western Powers will agree to complete and general disarmament, the Soviet Union is ready to accept any system of control which they would like to put forward. . . .
>
> Our proposals provide for strict control on each stage of implementation of the disarmament agreement. We consider that if complete disarmament is implemented, then the most thorough control will be needed.
>
> The control organs should have access everywhere without any so-called veto, without any prohibition, without any restriction. There should be access at any time and at any place, and we are ready to provide this for the control organs.
>
> Only on conditions of complete and general disarmament under the strictest control is it possible to achieve the confidence and create the necessary conditions for peaceful coexistence of states when no country or group of countries could secretly arm to attack other countries.

Apparently under the misapprehension that here was a new development, Senator Clark called attention to the Soviet Premier's abandonment of the "troika" principle, the veto. Actually, at Macmillan's urging, Khrushchev had made this offer originally in 1959; and actually, in his *aide-mémoire* and his broadcast to the Russian people, he was restating and re-emphasizing the nuclear-ban and disarmament position the Soviet government had taken on May 10, 1955—the startling offer that had caused our own about-face and precipitate retreat, the offer that in the intervening years we seemed to have forgotten ever was made.

> Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev doesn't mean what he says, [Senator Clark told the Senate]. But it must be recognized that he has said, about as clearly as it can be said, that he is ready to accept whatever system of control is considered necessary by the Western powers to insure total, complete and effective disarmament.
>
> I suggest that the least we can do is to put Mr. Khrushchev to the test. If he means what he says on disarmament controls and we can get him to recognize the need for a strong international peace-keeping authority in a disarmed world, would we not have found the road to permanent peace?

Voting 'Aye' for Guns

A good question, but one we, as a nation, are not even asking, let alone trying to answer. Since September, 1955, when Secretary Quarles announced we intended never to "ban" or "destroy" our bombs, we have never really given serious thought to disarmament—since that time, we have evinced no interest in any immediate and concrete proposals that would make "a major war" impossible. The whole drive of our society, dominated by the Military in the Pentagon, their allies in the AEC and big business and the mass media that mold men's minds, has been in exactly the opposite direction—to create, as in 1955 and again in 1958 and 1959, those situations that will prolong the cold war and escalate to ever higher levels the multi-billion-dollar armaments race on which our society has come to rely so heavily. In his speech, Senator Clark took cognizance both of this prevailing public attitude and of the internecine struggle within the Administration over the course we should follow.

"There is obviously a struggle going on right now within the Executive Branch of our Government for the mind of one man—the President of the United States," he said. "On the result of that struggle may depend whether we and our children will live out our normal life span."

Senator Clark hailed the President's advocacy of the Disarmament Agency as an indication that this battle might be won by the apostles of peace. He acknowledged that the American people were not yet ready to accept the idea of disarmament (how could they be?), and he suggested that the Chief Executive should go to the people and explain "the overriding needs for such a plan to reverse the arms race." Evidently no one was listening. The President goes to the people only to call for more billions for the military establishment—billions that are promptly voted. The disarmament proposal limped haltingly through Congress.

The contrast is graphic testament to the measure of our ideals and interests. Billion-dollar boosts in the military budget had zipped through Congress without a dissenting voice, but the advocates of the Disarmament Agency had a battle on their hands to keep the infant from being strangled in the Senate. A motion by Sen. Everett McKinley Dirksen, of Illinois, the Republican leader, to put the whole disarmament proposal on file until next February lost, but by a vote of only 54 to 33. An amendment by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), the darling of the Birch Society, the far Right, and the Air Force, would have emasculated the new agency by forbidding it to conduct research and development—a fine, stiletto approach to the problem of our times—that marshaled forty-three votes and lost by only three. One of the most shocked of the Senators was Richard B. Russell, the gentleman whose home State of Georgia is almost foundering under the weight of its military bases. He urged the defeat of the entire Disarmament Agency proposal because the mere existence of such a body would be "more likely to promote a

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nuclear war" than to prevent one. In the end, the measure passed the Senate in trimmed-down version, but the diehards of the Right—prominent among them Goldwater, Mundt, Schoeppel, Tower, Russell, Talmadge, Thurmond, Byrd, Eastland—were ranged against it. And the nation as a whole, more preoccupied with our announced intention to send another 40,000 troops to Germany, may fairly be said to have yawned.

It is not as if the issue were so complex no man could see it. On the contrary, it is so simple no man can miss it. Modern technology, the continuous fashioning of weapons of ever-increasing horror and destructiveness, have reduced the problem to its simplest and most visible terms, to sharp-cut black and white. One of the great Americans of our times, a man whose slightest word used to make the headlines, has given evidence that he sees quite clearly the real simplicity of this great issue. He is not, of course, in the position that President Kennedy is to offer leadership to the American people, but in a speech on July 5, 1961 (a speech, significantly, that seems to have been little quoted), he called for the abolition of war through disarmament in these terms:

> You will say at once that the abolition of war has been the dream of man for centuries, every proposition to that end has been promptly discarded as impossible and fantastic. But that was before the science of the past decade made mass destruction a reality. The argument then was along spiritual and moral lines, and lost. But now the tremendous evolution of nuclear and other potentials of destruction has suddenly taken the problem away from its primary consideration as a moral and spiritual question and brought it abreast of scientific realism. It is no longer an ethical question to be pondered solely by learned philosophers and ecclesiastics, but a hard-core one for the decision of the masses whose survival is the issue....
>
> Many will tell you with mockery and ridicule that the abolition of war can only be a dream—that it is but the vague imagining of a visionary. But we must go on or we will go under. And the great criticism that can be made is that the world lacks a plan that will enable us to go on.
>
> We are in a new era....We must have sufficient imagination and courage to translate the universal wish for peace—which is rapidly becoming a universal necessity—into actuality.

These words were spoken, in an address to a joint session of the Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.



PART VII

FACE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, the intellectual Arkansas Democrat, early this summer stirred up the lions of the radical Right by the simple device of writing a memorandum; and ever since the roars of outrage of these jungle beasts, and the trumpetings of dinosaurs, have resounded through the halls of Congress and filtered out in confused bellowings across the land. In the volcano of sound and fury, the issues that Fulbright raised have been clouded in denunciation and vituperation; there has been virtually no sensible debate of the facts; and the public at large probably retains only a vague impression of what causes all the shouting. Yet in a world of resumed nuclear testing—a world in which, if we succeed according to our expectations, Dr. Teller's 50,000 nuclear-armed trucks will ultimately be roving the land, with the potential of world destruction at the fingertips of any individual among their 100,000 guardians—it is vital to understand the significance of the points that Fulbright raised. For he jabbed at the jugular vein that pumps blood into an ever more heated war psychosis—the almost panoramic activity of the Military in promoting the tenets of the radical Right and inculcating in the Armed Forces and in the civilian population the belief that the only solution to our problem is to let Russia have it.

The point that obviously concerned Fulbright is both simple and basic. If the Military is to be allowed to propagandize the civilian population, if this propaganda convinces both the Military itself and a large percentage of the people of the nation that we are engaged in a holy crusade, that war is inevitable—then war becomes inevitable and world destruction certain. Then all chance, all hope, is lost. Then no room is left for the President of the United States or the Department of State to negotiate, to seek possible political settlements, to make even a try for peace; for all talk of peace is weakness, all negotiation becomes "appeasement," even the thought of disarmament is disloyal, and any concession, any compromise, with the heathen and implacable foe becomes treason. Once this view comes to dominate our Military, once the Military is allowed to propagandize a sizable percentage of our people into acceptance of it, we have abandoned all recourse to sanity in seeking a solution to our problems; we have sacrificed every moral ideal to the brutal concept of power; and we can come to only one end—eruption in an emotion-charged crusade of violence that will bring down the world—if any of it survives—into a new Dark Age compared to which the centuries after the fall of Rome will seem like the epitome of culture and enlightenment.

This, then, was the great issue to which Sen. Fulbright addressed himself when he sat down and wrote a private memorandum to Secretary of War McNamara. He began by calling attention to a fateful step that had been taken late in the second

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Eisenhower administration, despite Ike's slowly awakening concern about the dangers of "the military-industrial complex." In 1958 the National Security Council—the top-level, ultra-secret brain trust that determines all high strategy—had decided that the nation must be aroused to the dangers of the cold war. Behind the decision lay the shock of Army Brass over the performance of our troops in the Korean War.

Disgraceful Record

American prisoners of war in the hands of the Chinese had not tried to escape; great numbers of them, it seemed, had not had the will to endure and to live, they had simply pined and died; and many others had allowed themselves to be brainwashed into acceptance of Communist dogma. The record was a disgrace unique in all the wars of our history, shocking by comparison with the performance of other U.N. soldiers in Korea; none of the Turks, for example, succumbed to Communist blandishments. Our Military, probing the causes for our sorry performance, decided that U.S. troops had not appreciated the cause for which they were fighting; they had not sufficiently understood the evils and dangers of communism. And so it was decided they must be taught. The National Security Council, however, did not stop here; it decided that the people also were too apathetic and that they, too, should be taught—and that the Military should do the teaching. For the first time, by its 1958 directive, the National Security Council authorized the Military to use its personnel and its facilities to propagandize the civilian population and arouse it to the dangers of the cold war—a decision that represented a complete break with all the traditions of our past and one that, it is safe to say, would have shocked the founding fathers.

Sen. Fulbright, in his memorandum to Secretary McNamara, called pointed attention to the extremely aggressive rightist nature of the propaganda with which the American people had been indoctrinated as a result of the 1958 order. He divided his criticism into two parts. At the outset, he called attention to the widespread use being made of a basic text, *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, which openly advocates a broad program of aggressive action that almost certainly would lead to war—a policy that, as Sen. Fulbright said, "is by no means representative of the President's announced strategy for the nuclear age" which seeks to retain at least the hope of peace. Secondly, Fulbright called attention to eleven specific seminars that had been staged throughout the nation under Military auspices. In all, he said, "extremely radical right-wing speakers and/or materials" had predominated.

Discussing this propaganda campaign to condition the mind of the public, Sen. Fulbright wrote:

> The content no doubt has varied from program to program, but running through all of them is a central theme that the primary, if not exclusive, danger to this country is internal Communist infiltration. Past and current international difficulties are often attributed to this, or ascribed to "softness," "sellouts," "appeasements," etc. Radical right-wing speakers dominate the programs.

Build-Up of a Menace

The "menace" of domestic communism is built up, Fulbright wrote, by over-simplifications which equate all social legislation with socialism and socialism with communism. He pointed out that, under such a view, much of the Administration's domestic program—continuation of the graduated income tax, expansion of Social Security (especially medical care), federal aid to education—"would be characterized as steps toward communism."

> This view of the Communist menace [Fulbright wrote] renders foreign aid, cultural exchanges, disarmament negotiations, and other international programs as extremely wasteful, if not actually subversive. This is a most moderate characterization. . . . There are many indications that the philosophy of the programs is representative of a substantial element of military thought, and has great appeal to the military mind.

Turning to foreign affairs and the supreme issue of war and peace, Fulbright pointed out that President Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, had said we must be prepared to bear "the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out" and that solution might not come "in our lifetime on this planet." The frustrations of such a protracted struggle are obvious and the temptation to solve them by some radical, decisive action is great, as President Eisenhower had warned in his Farewell Address. Considering the same point, Fulbright wrote:

> In the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we've got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laoses. . . .
>
> The radicalism of the Right can be expected to have great mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple solution, easily understood: scourging of the devils within the body politic, or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.
>
> If the military is infected with this virus of right-wing radicalism, the danger is worthy of attention. If it believes the public is, the danger is enhanced. If, by the process of the military educating the public, the fevers of both groups are raised, the danger is great indeed.

Fulbright urged reconsideration of the 1958 directive that had projected the Military (legally, this time) into civilian propaganda activities. He considered that the directive had committed "a basic error: that military personnel have the necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to another." He urged that such military activities be brought "under effective civilian control," and that long-range studies be started by a board of civilian educators to develop a more balanced program of instruction for rising young officers at the National War College. He asked—and this was most significant — for a re-examination of the relationships among the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Institute for American Strategy (which produced *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*) and the Richardson Founda-

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tion on the one hand and the National War College and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other.

It seems clear that Fulbright, in high-minded concern, had no conception that he was stepping on an exposed and quivering nerve end that would send the radical Right into frenzied explosion. An article by Cabell Phillips in *The New York Times* of July 21 disclosed that Fulbright had sent the memorandum to McNamara about a month earlier and that, acting upon it, McNamara had given his Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs sharply increased powers to supervise programs "directed in whole or in part to the general public." Previously, under McNamara, a policy had been initiated of trimming some of the more warlike and provocative utterances out of the public speeches of the Brass, and this second move to curb excesses of the Military in the propaganda field brought a loud and spontaneous outburst of oratorical thunder from the way-out Right.

Thurmond to the Ramparts

The eruption was led by Sen. J. Strom Thurmond, the conservative Democrat from South Carolina, himself a Major General in the Army Reserve and a former president of the Reserve Officers Association. In a statement to the press, Thurmond denounced what he called "a dastardly attempt to intimidate the commanders of the U.S. Armed Forces and prevent those commanders from teaching their troops the menace of world communism." The Military was being muzzled, Thurmond cried, and he clearly implied the muzzling was the work of either dupes or subversives in our midst. Some of our generals, like Maxwell Taylor, were brilliant men. Why shouldn't they have the right to speak their minds on public issues like other Americans? Day after day, Thurmond took the Senate floor, backed by other leaders of the far Right, Goldwater and Mundt the most vocal among them. He denounced this attempt to "gag" the Military; he cried in outrage against "the infamous attacks on our military leaders"; he called such attacks "a disgrace and disservice to our Republic and its people." There was no recognition of fact or issue—no recognition that all Fulbright had sought was maintenance of a fundamental American tradition that has endured for nearly 200 years and has spared us the kind of military dominance of public policy that, in Germany, led to Hitler and, in Japan, to Tojo. The performances of Thurmond and Goldwater reduced fact to the least common denominator and, in manner reminiscent of McCarthy, used the shrill voice of the demagogue to cry the unthinking into panic with the familiar formula of plot, subversion and duplicity.

Fulbright, who had not intended originally to release the text of his memorandum, felt compelled at last to take the Senate floor and defend himself. He expressed a mild wonder that, in taking so traditional an American stand, he had aroused such "great controversy."

> The memorandum was based [he said] on my strong belief in the principle of military subordination to civilian control. There has been a strong tradition in this country that it is not the function of the military to educate the public on political issues. Military officers are not elected by the people and they have no responsibility for the formulation of policies other than military policies. Their function is to carry out policies formulated by officials who are responsible to the electorate. . . .

The Battle Lines

At stake, in other words, were the very fundamentals of American democracy—the control of a people over their own destiny, contrasted with the kind of militarism that in France has led to the brutality of Algeria and Army plots against de Gaulle; that, in Latin America, has led to more than a century of military dominance of policy and to military revolutions and dictatorships; that, in virtually every land in which it has ever been tried, has led to the subjection of the people, to tyranny, misery, war and disaster.

Arrayed in battle lines over the Fulbright memorandum, then, (though Fulbright himself apparently had no suspicion of such a thing when he wrote it) are two irreconcilable forces—those liberals who retain a faith in democracy and believe that government should still derive its powers from the governed, and the radical Right which, except for convenient lip service at election time, holds no such belief but would impose government downward from a power plexus at the top where the Military and Big Business, fed by fantastic billions in war contracts, can employ all the arts of propaganda to brainwash the nation's people and predetermine public policy. Threaded throughout the entire history of the postwar era—ever since that revealing speech by "General Electric" Wilson in 1944—is this master design for the wedding of the Military and Big Business and the imposition of government from the top. What the Fulbright memo did was to threaten this combination by threatening to silence its most important and persuasive partner—the Military. This is the challenge that cannot be allowed to succeed; this is the challenge that has stirred all the roaring and trumpeting in the jungles of the far Right.

Frenzy on the Far Right

One cannot appreciate the significance of the alliance and its deep penetration of the American mind unless one takes an in-depth look at the combination in action. Throughout the nation in this year of 1961, ever since the Kennedy Administration brought a slightly more liberal look to Washington, the activity on the far Right has been especially frenetic. In widely separated areas of the country, countless seminars, alerts, freedom forums and strategy-for-survival conferences have been held, all focused on the task of arousing a more militant spirit in the American people. In conference after conference, two films have been used for indoctrination—*Operation Abolition*, a badly distorted version of the student riots in San Francisco against the House Un-American Activities Committee, and *Communism on the Map*, which gives an even more distorted picture of the Communist menace sweeping the world and all but engulfing the United States. Time and again, in the showing of these films, military

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officers have collaborated on the speaker's platform with speakers of the radical Right, sounding the message of frenzy and alarm.

Many of the films so important for propaganda impact, like *Communism on the Map,* for example, are products of little-known Harding College, tucked away in the small central Arkansas town of Searcy. The college has sponsored the National Education Program, aimed at propagandizing the grass roots; and the president of both college and program is Dr. George Stuart Benson. Dr. Benson, after serving for eleven years as a missionary in China, returned in 1936 to assume the presidency of Harding College, operated by the Church of Christ, a fundamentalist sect that eschews most modern doctrine, including Darwin's theory of evolution. Dr. Benson began to write and talk about the fundamentals of Americanism. He attracted a gradually wider audience, but it was not until the post-World War II period that he struck pay dirt. Then, according to Cabell Phillips of *The New York Times,* he began to gear "many of his speeches to the theme that the free-enterprise system would be lost 'unless American industry succeeds in reselling our own people on the fundamentals of our way of life.'"

Sloan's Liniment

Dr. Benson's brand of fundamentalism carried with it a definitely anti-labor bias; and when the late Alfred P. Sloan, president of General Motors, heard one of his orations, there was, almost immediately, a fine meeting of minds. Sloan decided to bankroll Dr. Benson in his noble enterprise and in 1949 made a gift of $300,000 to Harding College to enable it to set up its National Education Program. Sloan was merely the first of America's multi-millionaire industrialists to discover and back a good thing. The Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh and other wealthy business organizations followed in Sloan's pioneering footsteps; and when Cabell Phillips visited the Searcy campus in May, 1961, he found ample visual evidence of the prosperity that had been brought to Harding College by such industrial angels. Ten handsome new college buildings graced the campus, and an eleventh was being constructed. Harding's endowment fund had reached an impressive $6 million, "virtually all of it from industrial donors."

The National Education Program, which carries on the propaganda work made possible by these industrial millions, occupies rent-free quarters on the Harding campus and is set up as a non-profit, tax-free agency. It is headed by Dr. Benson, and two of its full-time vice presidents, interestingly enough, are Brig. Gen. William P. Campbell, retired, a former assistant chief of finance for the Department of the Army, and Howard W. Bennett, a former official in the employee relations division of General Electric. Dr. Benson, Campbell and Bennett, with a clerical staff of eight, comprise the "operating force of N.E.P.," Phillips reported, and they reach a tremendous audience.

Dr. Benson writes a weekly column that is distributed free to 3,000 weekly newspapers. A monthly reprint of one of these columns, titled "Listen, Americans!", is sent in bulk lots to 1,000 business organizations. A monthly newsletter is sold by subscription at $1 a year to 50,000 subscribers. A series of high school study outlines is sent free to any school requesting it. Some thirty motion pictures of high professional caliber have been produced and are offered for sale at from $42.50 to $125 each, and for rent at $5 a showing. The impact of these films may be gauged by the fact that the historical distortion entitled *Communism on the Map* has been viewed during the past year by some 10 million Americans who have seen it on television, in schools, in service clubs, industrial plants, political forums and defense establishments in all parts of the nation.

This is certainly large-scale propaganda, and it is made possible by eminent sponsorship. Great industrial organizations and the Military have joined hands in a concerted campaign to see that these one-sided films reach the greatest possible audience. Lockheed Aircraft Co., for example (more than $1 billion in war contracts), sponsored the showing of *Operation Abolition* to its employees; but it says, making a nice distinction, "We always advise the employee audience that Lockheed neither supports nor opposes" the House Un-American Activities Committee; it just "uses the film to show the actions of identified Communists in this area." *Communism on the Map* has been purveyed to the public under equally high auspices. Boeing (another $1 billion in war contracts) has sponsored the showing of both films because, according to a spokesman, it believes they "serve as an alarm clock alerting the country and the people to the dangers around us." Joining Boeing in promoting wide viewings of *Communism on the Map* on the West Coast have been the Puget Sound Power & Light Co., a natural foe of public power, and officers of the U.S. Navy.

Film Exposed

The propagandistic nature of the film which, under such high aegis, did its work on some 10 million American minds, has been exposed in detail by Dr. Giovanni Costigan, of the University of Washington history department. In a long critique, Dr. Costigan wrote that the message of the film is "that Communism today dominates the entire globe, except for West Germany, Formosa, Switzerland, and the United States. (Canada is finally left 'white' on the map, and not 'pink,' despite the allegation that there are Communists in the Canadian government.)" Dr. Costigan continued:

> It is untrue to assert, as does the film-strip: That democratic socialism, whether in Britain, Scandinavia, Israel or India, is identical with communism. The fundamental distinction between communist and free societies is the absence from the former of individual freedom and private property. But personal freedom and private property are preserved in Britain, Scandinavia, Israel and India as they are in the United States. Incidentally, one of the strongest outposts of the free world, which it is our duty to support to our utmost strength, is West Berlin, a socialist municipality. . . .

Dr. Costigan picked out other gross distortions: the statement that

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Venezuela under President Betancourt is a "Communist satellite," that Ireland is practically bankrupt and "deep in Socialism," that Hawaii is controlled by Communists, that Iceland is a full-fledged Communist country. The film charges, too, that despite eight years of Eisenhower there were still Communists "deep in the heart-mechanism of our nation."

"One of the things I most dislike about the Communists," Dr. Costigan remarks, "is their deliberate falsification of history and their belief that the end justifies the means." Convinced that *Communism on the Map* adopts the same perverted philosophy, he arranged for a showing of the film to a large University of Washington faculty group, and ninety-two faculty members signed a statement in which they denounced the film's "irresponsible mingling of fact and falsehood" and "its gross distortion of historical events."

When Cabell Phillips asked Dr. Benson for a comment on this criticism, he got this answer: "If you are going to move Washington to do the things it ought to do, you have got to move public opinion. My aim is to move public opinion at the grass roots in the direction of godliness and patriotism."

And there, clearly implied, you have it—the Communist philosophy, advocated in the name of Christianity, that the end justifies the means.

Storm in the Northwest

Some of the means that were employed to achieve the desired end in the great Northwest were decidedly illuminating. In the furore raised by Dr. Costigan and the University of Washington professors, the active partnership of Boeing and U.S. Navy officers in the area in promoting showings of *Abolition* and *Map* came under public scrutiny for the first time. As Alex Gottfried and Sue Davidson reported in *The Nation* (July 29, 1961), the forces of the Right marshaled for battle. The *Northwest Progress,* organ of the Seattle Catholic diocese, championed the showing of the films. So did spokesmen for the House Un-American Activities Committee, the John Birch Society, fundamentalist churches, reservists, chambers of commerce, PTAs, trade unions, business groups and service clubs. Some Protestant ministers, student campus organizations and Democratic clubs came to the defense of the embattled professors, but in the press the chorus of the far Right all but drowned out their voices. Seattle newspapers did a gingerly fence-sitting job, but their sympathies were clearly indicated by treatments of the controversy like the one in the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer.* When the paper ran the statement of the ninety-two college professors attacking *Communism on the Map,* it placed beside the statement a long article supporting the film (written, incidentally, by the newspaper's aviation reporter who covers the Boeing beat).

A Captain's Message

A prime mover along with Boeing in the propaganda campaign in the Northwest was Capt. Kenneth J. Sanger, Commandant of the Sand Point Naval Air Station. During 1960, Capt. Sanger set up a program for lectures on Americanism and "anti-communism" to Seattle junior and senior high school classes, and he also maintained a volunteer speakers' bureau of Navy men to lecture on "good citizenship" to civilian groups. In less than a year, Sanger's unit presented 233 talks. On one occasion, Capt. Sanger delivered his message in person to some fifty suburban principals and heads of social studies departments in the Bellevue High School. Both *Operation Abolition* and *Communism on the Map* were shown at the meeting. When one of the teachers had the temerity to write a letter of protest to Senator Henry M. Jackson (the so-called gentleman from Boeing), the boomerang was virtually jet-propelled. Capt. Sanger complained to the principal about the teacher's letter, and the principal severely admonished the teacher. The teacher's effectiveness had been impaired, he was told, by his daring act in presuming on the privileges of citizenship to write a letter to his Senator—and by a further indiscretion, his "identification," through a two-dollar membership, with the American Civil Liberties Union. The moral, in this America that is constantly betraying the ideals of our Revolutionary forebears, is obvious: it does not pay to dissent, it does not pay to think or raise the voice of conscience. Get not in the way of our propaganda.

The Pacific Northwest was not an isolated example of the activity of the Military-industrial-propaganda triumvirate in indoctrinating the minds of the American people from children in the grade schools to their parents in PTA and Rotary clubs. In this campaign, a number of radical Right groups have joined forces with impressive military sponsors, who can be guaranteed to attract a civilian audience, and with big-league war manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed, who gladly defray the costs of obtaining films and meeting the expenses of overhead. The right-wing speakers for such occasions frequently include some of Dr. Benson's cohorts from Harding College; representatives of the John Birch Society headed by Robert Welch, Jr., of Belmont, Mass., and of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade masterminded by Fred C. Schwarz, of Long Beach, Calif. The different propaganda groups welded into this military-industrial effort have individual objectives, but they reinforce each other on general themes. These include the idea that "the American way of life" is being attacked by fifth columnists operating under such "socialistic" guises as "liberalism," "the welfare state" and "one-worldism." A commonly held view is that it is a mistake even to try to negotiate with the Russians, whether on disarmament, cultural exchanges, Laos or Berlin. Foreign aid not coupled with anti-Communist military alliances is wasteful. We must rely on invulnerable military and economic strength; and this dedication to force is often coupled, as it is in the Birch Society ideology, with the idea that we must adopt communistic methods to fight communism. In this context, we must even rely on force to break up liberal meetings, meet the Big Lie with the Bigger Lie, and ultimately strike first with nuclear weapons.

The manner in which some of these

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themes have been put across to the public is perhaps best illustrated by a series of seminars, conferences and alerts that have been held in the North Shore area of Chicago and have resulted in deep community division. One of the most significant of these rallies was a five-day school on anti-communism held at the Glenview Naval Air Station, beginning on August 29, 1960 [see "Saving America, Inc.," *The Nation*, Sept. 30, 1961]. Heading the conference was Dr. Schwarz, head of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. The audience consisted of base personnel, Naval Reservists and civilians from surrounding communities. The faculty, besides Dr. Schwarz, included several Naval officers; Herbert Philbrick, a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the hero of *I Led Three Lives;* Dr. E. Merrill Root, author of *Brainwashing in the High Schools;* and Richard Arens, at the time staff director of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Prize exhibits during the five-day school were, of course, *Operation Abolition* and *Communism on the Map.*

Dangers of Dissent

Dr. Schwarz's program at Glenview, Cabell Phillips later wrote, was similar to others he had given around the country, including one in the spring of 1961 in St. Louis. His course purports to give a scholarly résumé and exposition of the purposes of communism, with special emphasis on its impact on the United States since World War II. Phillips wrote: "The principal theme is that the American way of life is being subtly but systematically undermined by Communist fifth columnists and their 'stooges' who often operate under the guise of socialism. Evidence of their influence, the course points out, is found chiefly on the campuses of American colleges, among the Protestant clergy and in the policy-making levels of the Federal Government."

Sponsors considered the Glenview school a great success. But not everyone agreed. Some citizens, Phillips wrote, considered that "the school fostered an atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance toward persons of moderate and liberal convictions, and that it held up to ridicule and criticism certain established foreign policy positions of the Federal Government that the Navy was required to support."

One of the dissenters was Mrs. Norma Morrison, a housewife who served on the Glenview Village Board. She cast the only negative vote against a resolution passed by the board commending the manner in which the school had been conducted at the Glenview Naval Air Station. What happened to Mrs. Morrison, like what happened to the letter-writing school teacher in the state of Washington, seems instructive. "I received a number of nasty telephone calls about it," Mrs. Morrison told Phillips, "most of them anonymous and at night. They accused me of being a 'Red,' or 'pink' or 'anti-Catholic'—which, of course, I am not." At the next meeting of the village board, a resolution was presented demanding Mrs. Morrison's resignation, but the chairman refused to consider it.

A second dissenter also discovered that the Founding Fathers' respect for freedom of beliefs and their veneration of dissent, an art in which they were all past masters, are ideals that have been foresworn in large degree by their descendants. This second critic of the Schwarz school conducted at the Glenview base was Dr. Tyler Thompson, a professor of Religion at Northwestern University and also, in the fall of 1960, a Democratic candidate for Congress. Dr. Thompson sent William B. Franke, then Eisenhower's Secretary of the Navy, a telegram protesting "the apparent official link of the Navy to the political propaganda being disseminated . . . at the Glenview Naval Air Station. Official program and early publicity clearly indicate Naval sponsorship. Please investigate."

The facts to which Dr. Thompson referred seeemed clear. Prominent citizens of Glenview had received invitations to attend Dr. Schwarz's conference in large envelopes bearing the official U.S. Navy return address and mailed under the franking privilege. Navy personnel and their families had also received rather pointed notices that it might be a good idea for them to attend. "Attendance is not compulsory," these notices read, "but every man, woman and student who volunteers participation will acquire the experience, poise and know-how which we hope will germinate into discussion groups being organized in every community of the midwest." In the face of this, Secretary Franke did three things: he denied that the Navy officially had sponsored the Schwarz rally; he conceded that some officers at the Naval station "went somewhat further than may have been appropriate"; he said that he was ordering the station not to sponsor such activities in the future, but at the same time he defended its activities in the past, writing, "I am sure that you do not consider that information regarding the dangers of the international Communist conspiracy is 'political propaganda' which should not be given to the American people." Two months later, Dr. Schwarz played to the public of Glenview in a return engagement at the Naval base.

Anonymous Smear

In the meantime, Dr. Thompson had been well taken care of. An anonymous four-page document suddenly blossomed out on drug store counters and appeared in mail boxes. It attempted to smear Dr. Thompson with the brush of pro-communism. It seemed he had associated himself with the Methodist Federation for Social Action, the Conference for Peaceful Alternatives to the Atomic Pact and the National Committee to Repeal the McCarran (immigration) Act. Each of these groups, said the leaflet, had been cited either for its Communist affiliations or sympathies by either the House-Un-American Activities Committee or the Senate Internal Security Committee. The leaflet was turned over to the FBI for investigation. Dr. Thompson was soundly defeated at the polls. What part the right-wing smear pamphlet played in his defeat is uncertain, because he was running in an overwhelmingly Republican district—just the kind of district, of course, in which such a smear might be presumed to be most effective.

The disruptive effects of Dr.

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Schwarz's five-day school at Glenview air base live on in the Chicago area. In some communities, Cabell Phillips discovered months later, the split ran bitter and deep, with Catholic priests supporting the Schwarz evangelistic anti-communism and Protestant ministers opposing its rabble-rousing tendencies. In Glenview, in a bitter campaign, Mrs. Morrison won re-election to the village board, but she acknowledged that "a great deal of bitterness" had been left over and added: "Our town is divided in a way I've never seen it before." And fuel was still being added to the fire. Though the Navy had disclaimed responsibility for those franked envelopes and official-looking invitations, the air station kept open for months its office for "The Education for American Security Program," and some of its enlisted men this spring were still active in addressing meetings and whipping up fervor for the anti-Communist crusade. Throughout the North Shore area, Phillips discovered, converts of Dr. Schwarz and the Birch Society were going out with fanatical, missionary zeal to hold meetings nights and weekends in living rooms, American Legion Halls, school assemblies and club rooms.

Military Cooperation

Not everyone viewed with sympathy this passionate appeal to the prejudices and the emotions. A woman school teacher in Winnetka recalled that some of her family had lived in Nazi Germany, and she asked: "Have you ever thought of the parallel between John Birch and Horst Wessel? I have, and it frightens me when I see this anti-Communist feeling getting out of hand."

The deep involvement of the Military in stimulating the nation-wide wave of radical-Right propaganda clearly reveals itself in public ties that have been exposed on speakers' platforms from north to south, from coast to coast. Not just lower echelon officers, but the highest Brass have lent the prestige of their stars to these endeavors. In Corpus Christi, Tex., Rear Admiral Louis J. Kirn, chief of Naval Advanced Training at the base, led a community "alert" at which the chief speaker was William Strube, vice president of Dr. Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. In New Orleans, at the Eighth Naval District Headquarters, Maj. Gen. Marshall S. Roth, of the Air Force, held a Crusade "seminar" at which Dr. Schwarz was the speaker, and Rear Admiral W. G. Schindler, commandant of the district, declared: "I am delighted to lend my support to this noteworthy seminar." At Fort Smith, Ark., Maj. Gen. William C. Bullock, commandant of the XIX Army Reserve Corps Area, covering Oklahoma, Arkansas and Louisiana, helped set up a two-day Strategy for Survival Conference on April 14 and 15, 1961. One of the principal speakers was Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, vice president of Dr. Benson's Harding College, and he told an audience of 1,000 persons: "Your [Congressional] representative in this area has voted eighty-nine per cent of the time to aid and abet the Communist Party." The second day of the Fort Smith conference, April 15, coincided with a Fourth Dimensional Warfare Conference held in Pittsburgh with the aid of some of the largest industrial firms in Pennsylvania. At the conference, government policies were attacked and community action was urged to "identify public officials displaying 'softness' toward Communism." The conference staff gratefully acknowledged "the assistance and support" of Lt. Gen. Ridgely Gaither, commanding the Second U.S. Army, and his staff; and of Maj. Gen. Ralph G. Cooper, commanding the XXI U.S. Army Corps, and his staff.

Effects on Congress

The effects of this kind of Military-radical Right propagandizing showed up in the mail Congressmen began to receive from their constituents across the nation. On July 24, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* reported the results of a survey it had made of fifteen liberal or moderate Senators and Representatives of both parties from states in the East, the Midwest and the West. All reported a sharp rise in the volume of conservative mail. Though the rabid-Right fringe constituted a minority of this, still when all shadings of conservative opinion were put to-

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gether, they sometimes constituted a majority view. Mail samplings showed the same ideas constantly being repeated in all sections of the nation, itself a testament to the efficacy of the propaganda wave. Among the favorite suggestions were: Impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren (the cry of the Birch Society); cut back foreign aid; curb the role of the federal government; prevent federal aid to education; strengthen Communist-control measures; support the House Un-American Activities Committee; keep Red China out of the United Nations.

Face of the Radical Right

A St. Louis physician, who opposed medical care for the aged under Social Security, also thought that all three branches of government were making "continued efforts . . . to defy the Constitution." An Oregon man, concerned about the power of the federal government, wrote that "it is now thirty years since the people of the United States gave up their freedom and independence for paternalism. . . ." One of the most extreme suggestions came from a man in Idaho who wanted the United States to adopt "a good rightist form of government" patterned after the dictatorship of Portugal. A Montana physician was certain that "at least 75 per cent of the officers of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare are either Communists or subversive conspirators."

This is the face of the radical Right, to whom anyone and everyone except its shouting converts are subject to suspicion. Senators and Congressmen, having glimpsed this in their mail, were worried. Said one: "I'm disturbed by the fact that the Military appears to be co-ordinating their efforts with right-wing economic groups and fundamentalist church denominations." Commented Rep. Edith Green (D., Ore.): "I'm greatly concerned about the way in which right-wing groups are working. I think the present situation more dangerous in some ways than the McCarthy era." She explained that McCarthy carried on "a three-ring circus," but the present campaign is more devious and subtle — and flourishes without a nationally recognized leader. ". . . If one emerges," said Rep. Green, "the situation could become much more serious."

There are, of course, candidates for the vacant post of leader. The most prominent at this moment seems to be Robert Welch, the former Massachusetts candy manufacturer who founded the John Birch Society and set out to save the U.S. from communism. Welch is the author of *The Blue Book*, the bible of the John Birch Society, a work in which he exposed both his beliefs and himself. For example, he was capable of writing: "George Catlett Marshall has been a conscious, deliberate, dedicated agent of the Soviet conspiracy"; ". . . For many reasons and after a lot of study, I personally believe [John Foster] Dulles to be a Communist agent"; ". . . While I too think that Milton Eisenhower is a Communist, and has been for thirty years, this opinion is based largely on general circumstances of his conduct. But my firm belief that Dwight Eisenhower is a dedicated, conscientious agent of the Communist conspiracy is based on an accumulation of detailed evidence so extensive and so palpable that it seems to me to put this conviction beyond any reasonable doubt." In Welch's view, Franklin Roosevelt was guilty of "plain unadulterated treason," Nelson Rockefeller is planning "to make the United States a part of a one-world Socialist government," and Chief Justice Warren should be impeached because "he has taken the lead in . . . converting this republic into a democracy" and democracy is "a weapon of demagoguery and a perennial fraud."

It follows almost inevitably from all of this that Robert Welch is a charter member of "the end justifies the means" club. Any tactics—and he hints that they might even include revolution if he ever gets the million members he seeks—are justified in the battle against communism. Welch puts it this way: "The tactics are mean and dirty, but the Communists are meaner and dirtier, and too slippery for you to put your fingers on them . . . no matter how much they look like prosperous members of the local Rotary Club."

The image of the man comes through sharp and plain. In the world of Robert Welch, no man is above suspicion, no man is safe. Such is the inevitable dead end of a world in which facts cannot compete with suspicion—a nightmare world in which no man is judged by his actions, in which even George Marshall, who perfected the Marshall Plan to fight communism, and Eisenhower, a national hero, become "dedicated" Communist agents.

The Walker Case

Yet anyone who is tempted to laugh off Robert Welch is brought to a dead halt by two hard facts: the man obviously, and mysteriously, is well financed, and at least one of the United States Army's better known officers, a major general, has been revealed as a dedicated disciple who tried his best to indoctrinate the troops serving under him in Germany with the virus of Welch's Birchism.

This was Major General Edwin A. Walker, commander of the 24th Infantry Division in West Germany and a much-decorated veteran of World War II and Korea. He had commanded the federal troops sent into Little Rock in the desegregation dispute before being ordered to a front-line command in Germany. In 1960, with a pivotal national election claiming the attention of all Americans, General Walker became carried away by the powers the National Security Council in 1958 had given the Military to propagandize their commands and all reachable civilians. On Oct. 15, 1960, the General established a "special warfare" office in his division to conduct a "pro-Blue" campaign, whose tenets were indistinguishable from those of the John Birch Society. In one address to some 200 members of a Parent-Teachers Association, whose members came from his division, he reportedly described as "definitely pink" former President Truman, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt; and he called Edward R. Murrow, now director of the U.S. Information Agency, Walter Lippmann, the newspaper columnist, and Eric Sevareid, the Columbia Broadcasting system commentator, "confirmed Communists." Quite obviously, with General

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Lester A. Kirkendall, Professor of Family Life, Oregon State University, has been actively engaged in education for more than 30 years. He was the Director of the Association for Family Living, Chicago, and has taught and lectured at many colleges and universities throughout the nation. He is acknowledged to be one of the leading authorities in sex education and has contributed extensively to the literature on this subject.

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

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Walker, as with Robert Welch, nobody is above suspicion.

Walker's far-out views remained a secret within his command until the spring of 1961 when the *Overseas Weekly*, an independent newspaper distributed widely among American troops in Europe, called public attention to his Birch-like political attitudes and his attempt to instill similar beliefs in the men who served under him. The disclosure kicked up a public storm, and the Army had to act. General Walker was relieved of his command; he was given a departmental hearing and a reprimand. Almost at once, he became a *cause célèbre* of the radical Right. A desperate effort was made to picture him as a zealous American who was being pilloried for his opposition to communism (a pillorying that could take place, of course, only with the connivance of those ubiquitous subversives in the high echelons of our government), and telegrams and letters of protest flooded in upon Senators and Congressmen. General Walker seemed in a fair way to become a martyr of the Right until Secretary McNamara appeared before a Congressional committee in early September and put the case into focus.

The General as Politico

The Defense Secretary disclosed that the official Army report after the departmental hearing had identified General Walker as a member of the Birch Society. It confirmed that he had made "inflammatory and derogatory statements" about President Truman and other prominent figures. And it found further that he had even tried to influence the men under him as to how they should vote in the 1960 Congressional elections. This "influencing," the Army found, took the form of a 24th Division publication containing an article entitled, "The Commanding General's Notebook." This urged soldiers, before voting for Senate or House members, to consult the appraisal of voting records prepared by Americans for Congressional Action, a strongly conservative Washington organization. Readers were given a phone number they could call to find out how the "ACA index" appraised the voting records of members of Congress. This, the Army report said, was a definite violation of the Hatch Act. But on this point no action against General Walker was contemplated. In the Army's view, the General was "a sincere, deeply religious, patriotic soldier," but also "an eccentric." Under the circumstances, punishment by reprimand, Secretary McNamara implied, was light enough and a long way from the persecution which was subsequently charged.

The case of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker has afforded the most dramatic public exposure of the issues that Senator Fulbright raised in his memorandum to Secretary McNamara. Here, certainly, was direct intervention by a high-ranking military officer, backed by all the prestige of rank and the power of command, into the field of domestic politics which no general (not even Eisenhower) can be expected thoroughly to know. Such intervention, such propagandizing by a general of the troops under him, raises a host of serious questions. Is General Walker an isolated example? Or does he represent a powerful clique in the Army? How many others, how highly placed, see the world we live in through Birch-like glasses? And what is their influence? Is it even remotely possible, with generals and admirals whipping up the fervor of a religious crusade over the Communist issue, ever to obtain public support for any settlement with Russia short of all-out nuclear war?

These are questions that may not concern the radical-Right shouters in Congress, who have attempted to reduce all the vital issues Fulbright raised to the simple one of "muzzling" the Brass; but they do concern many of the serious and conscientious officials in the Pentagon itself. Both civilian and military leaders in the Pentagon worry about the implications and dread lest the entire Military be smeared with a radical-Right tar brush. One Pentagon official, discussing the ill-advised NSC propaganda directive of 1958, told James E. Clayton, of *The Washington Post*: "There have always been men around here who equate every liberal measure from Social Security to aid to education with communism. These directives gave them a chance to spread those views before their troops and the general public."

Thurmond, Mundt, Goldwater, Curtis and others may declaim, as they have all summer, that the McNamara directive ordering the Brass to stay out of politics—the directive that followed Fulbright's memo—is a bleeding, unpatriotic shame; but some of the Pentagon's own Military recognize the justice of Fulbright's complaint and the necessity for McNamara's order. As one of them told Clayton: "The Military has no business meddling in domestic politics and that is what some of these officers are doing. The worst thing that could happen to our Armed Forces is for the public to believe that all, or even most, military officers belong to the radical Right."

One Pentagon official who had been investigating the problem estimated that less than 20 per cent of military officers agree with the fanatical, witch-hunt view that there's a Communist under every bed. By far the greater number of officers, this source said, feel as Fulbright does that the Communist danger is not domestic, but lies in the field of international relations. Of course, even 20 per cent of the Military is a repugnantly high percentage to be involved in fanaticism of either the Left or the Right; and even the Pentagon's own defenders, who place the figure this low, have to concede that what they consider the more reasonable and majority view is the silent view—that the high-rankers who are vocal and who help to sway public opinion seem to crop up with amazing frequency in the camp of the radical Right.

'Security' Seminar

This preponderant emphasis placed by the Military on the issues of the day is one of the most fateful developments of our times. For, clearly, we are nearing a crossroads of the postwar era. One turn leads to all-out nuclear war. The other, increasingly more difficult to take as our propaganda convinces us that even the effort to take it is both futile and ill-advised, projects the possibility, however dim, of negotiating for peace

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and disarmament; of trying to achieve some kind of peaceful coexistence with nations of alien systems and philosophies. No roadblock has been erected across the turning that leads to war; but "dead end" signs have been put up all over the place to warn us that the very idea of a peaceful solution, of an end to the arms race and international tensions, is a dangerous fraud and a suicidal delusion. And all of this has been done by the Military.

A graphic account of the techniques employed to rally support for all our military programs and to cast ice water on all hopes for diplomatic solutions has been given by Roscoe Giffin, director of the economics-of-disarmament program of the American Friends Service Committee. From Sept. 26 to Oct. 7, 1960, Giffin attended the "National Security Seminar of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces" held in Bethlehem, Pa. The seminar was more descriptively and popularly known as "A Businessman's Briefing on National Security." Daily attendance at the Bethlehem conference averaged around 400 persons, consisting of military reservists, managerial employees of local industries, numerous teachers, groups of high school students. Attendance was promoted by chambers of commerce in the area.

Giffin summarized the themes that were drilled into the audience in a series of thirty-one lectures, accompanied by numerous movies. He wrote that "in nearly every lecture" it was emphasized "that the Sino-Soviet bloc is our implacable enemy, bent on world conquest, willing and able to use the implements of modern warfare." The United States has "little responsibility for the current international chaos and our policies are clearly beyond reproach. . . ." There is "no foreseeable end to Sino-Soviet aggressive efforts," and we must be prepared "for an indefinite future of a high level of military expenditure and continued rapid increase in the destructiveness of military weaponry." Disarmament is desirable, "but given the nature of the enemy, disarmament cannot provide the security the nation requires." We are acutely aware of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and "of the need for arms control." Military spending is "a very important source of demand for the products of this economy and of the Free World as a whole." The Sino-Soviet bloc was condemned for evaluating persons only as producers for "the military-industrial ends of the nation, yet [Giffin continues] the emphasis of the United States and the West on the need for the same sort of supremacy indirectly produces the same kind of evaluation of persons." And, finally, Giffin wrote: "The major conclusion as to the basic fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy to be derived from viewing most of the movies shown is that we as a people place our faith in ever more violent weapons to overcome evil, and not in the strength of our ideals or in God."

Peace Through War

The over-all tone and impact of such a program, it seems safe to say, is that peace can be achieved only by military means, by military conquest of the infidel. We have approached that nightmare state once envisioned by the historian Charles A. Beard in which we regard as perfectly rational the idea of waging perpetual war to achieve perpetual peace. This, we are told, is the only solution; this is the way it *must* be. The intent seems obvious; maintenance of war tensions has been the aim of the military-industrial complex ever since General Electric Wilson in 1944 first envisioned the glories of a permanent war economy. Wrote Giffin: "This program probably achieves the objective of unifying the military and industrial portions of our society through increased acceptance by civilians of the military program and by impressing military personnel with their dependence on the industrial system."

The framework of the design showed clearly in this two-week Bethlehem conference, and its effect in stimulating a completely rigid and unyielding public attitude to support the military-industrial complex seemed quite plain. Speculating upon this, Giffin wrote:

> I wonder if there is some relation between such conferences as this and



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what seems to me the inflexibility of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. The connection may be as follows: (a) For the federal government to implement certain policies it must have the support of public opinion in a sizeable majority. (b) Since such public opinion is not "natural" it must be formed under the direction of accepted leaders. (c) The Departments of Defense and State have, through an efficiently intricate system of press releases, planted public speeches, advertising and conferences such as the NSS, shaped and directed U.S. public opinion along the lines of the content themes that I have previously specified. (d) Time is required to give public opinion the desired directions, and once it is formed it tends to be rather rigid. (e) In an international conflict, situations where negotiators need to be flexible in meeting new challenges and responding to openings so as to lessen the tensions and conflicts, they are tied to a rigid body of public opinion. (f) For government leaders to have continued support of the public they must then behave in accord with the dictates of that opinion which they have created, and not in terms either of the needs or opportunities of a given historical moment.

Does the pattern sound familiar? If it does, it is perhaps worth taking a harder look at the path we are traveling, at the end to which this militarily determined policy, this militarily created rigidity of public attitude, inevitably condemns us. That end is war. For if there can be no flexibility, if the very idea of coexistence and disarmament is a fantasy not even to be considered, if the very existence of a Red China certain before long to enter the nuclear age cannot be recognized, then there is left only one solution—the inconceivable violence which long-maintained tensions inevitably must trigger. What is the view of the Military regarding this final, fatal step? Is it reluctant? Or is it eager to pull the trigger? The answers to those questions are vital, for in an age in which world holocaust is just one push of a button away, fanaticism in the Military could settle the fate of all of us at a moment's whim or impulse.

This is the great issue that any discussion of Fulbright's memorandum on the influence of the radical Right among the Military must uncover. For it is obvious that the philosophy of the radical Right, as exemplified by the propagandists of Harding College and Robert Welch and his Birchites, is the intemperate view of the fanatic willing to doom the world for his cause. If this is the view that prevails to any great extent among the Military, logic says that inevitably in the the end we shall be doomed indeed.

The Brass Trumpet

The fraternization of the Military and the radical Right on speakers' rostrums throughout the nation gives part of the answer, but only part. The other part is to be found in the explicit and blood-curdling statements that some of the nation's foremost military leaders have made consistently during the last ten years. More than once, the Military has exhibited a strong tendency to promote World War III, here and now. General MacArthur, though now an advocate of disarmament, wanted to extend the Korean War into China, an act that almost certainly would have involved the world. In the Dienbienphu crisis and again when the off-China islands of Quemoy and Matsu dragged us close to war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the guidance of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, one of our most ardent militarists, advocated the use of nuclear weapons against China. In all of these crises, more sober minds among the Military, backed up by final civilian authority, averted the fateful steps that the war-minded were so eager to take. But it is important to recognize that the attitude, the bent and drive toward war, is there. Last September, Admiral Radford, in a two-day seminar in Chicago, demanded "total victory over the Communist system—not stalemate." In other words, war—for it is obvious "total victory" can be achieved no other way. Radford is not alone. General Twining once told a British journalist that, if it weren't for the politicians, he would settle the war in one afternoon by bombing Soviet Russia. General Orvil A. Anderson, commander of the Air War College, declared in 1950 that he would be happy to bomb Russia, just "give me the order to do it," and he added: "When I went up to Christ I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization."

Another savior of civilization in that same year was Truman's Secretary of the Navy Mathews, who stated publicly:

> We should boldly proclaim our undeniable objective to be world peace [he declared]. To have peace we should be willing . . . to pay any price, even the price of instituting a war to compel co-operation for peace. . . . This peace-seeking policy, though it cast us in a character new to a true democracy—an initiator of a war of aggression—would earn for us a proud and popular title—we would become the first aggressors for peace.

Charles Beard's nightmare of a perpetual war to insure perpetual peace obviously found its perfect personification in Secretary Mathews. The world, of course, has changed since Secretary Mathews spoke in 1950. The proud "first aggressors for peace" whom he envisioned are now

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virtually assured that they will also be the last. But has this reality changed the fixation of our Military that it would be a fine idea for us to trigger the holocaust? It has not.

The evidence that it has not practically hits one in the face when one begins to probe into the second half of the Fulbright memorandum, the part that has attracted practically no public attention. This deals with the relationships between the National War College and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on one side and three private organizations on the other—the Institute for American Strategy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Richardson Foundation, which is the financial angel for both.

The Richardson Foundation, whose research director is Frank R. Barnett, was endowed by a wealthy North Carolina family. Its principal function is to support the activities of its two stepchildren. The Foreign Policy Research Institute was established at the University of Pennsylvania to do the high-level cerebration on foreign-policy strategy. The Institute for American Strategy, which was set up several years ago by a number of wealthy Chicago businessmen, and which is also backed by the Richardson Foundation, serves essentially as a huckstering agency devoted to obtaining public acceptance for the ideas of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. This tightly interlocked three-way corporate package wields tremendous influence for one simple reason: it operates under the imprimatur of the federal government on the highest levels. In fact, the Foreign Policy Research Institute has been the principal adviser to the National War College on the kind of global political courses to be given promising young officers—a key role, certainly, in the molding of the Military mind.

Since this is so, it becomes of the greatest importance to discover the kind of indoctrination to which the Military is being subjected by these privately endowed organizations operating under the aegis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The record shows that the Richardson Foundation and the foreign-policy institutes it sponsors do not indulge in Birch-like domestic smear campaigns. They are concerned with foreign, not domestic policy; but their foreign-policy views dovetail nicely into the views of the radical Right. The institutes consider, for example, that domestic welfare programs are decidedly unfortunate and are to be frowned upon because, if they are undertaken, they will siphon precious billions from the armament effort to which everything else must be subordinated—a philosophy that fits perfectly into the convictions of the Military and the Military's industrial partners.

The 'Forward Strategy'

Starting with these basic beliefs, the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania has drafted and promoted, under the sponsorship of the National War College and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a comprehensive foreign policy for America which it calls the "Forward Strategy." The basic premise of this "Forward Strategy" is the premise of the radical Right—that democracy and communism are locked in a death struggle and that one or the other must be destroyed; no other solution is possible. The Communists, in this view, are inspired by a ruthless determination to win by any means, including nuclear war; and if we are not going to be destroyed, we must meet this grim nuclear determination with an equally grim nuclear determination.

The institute's ideas have been clearly spelled out in its book, *A Forward Strategy for America*, which has become almost a basic text for the Military. The heart of its message is contained in these words:

> The priority objective of any American grand strategy is, by a broad margin, the preservation and enhancement of our political system *rather than the maintenance of peace*. . . . Our policy must be based upon the premise that we *cannot tolerate the survival* of a political system which has the growing capability and the ruthless will to destroy us. We have no choice but to adopt a Catonic strategy. [Italics added.]

The "Catonic strategy" refers, of course, to the famous dictum of Cato, "Carthage must be destroyed." And so, in our day, must Russia.

The institute judges the value of



Who kept and who violated the Yalta Agreement? Who started the cold war and why? Who was to blame for the failure to reach agreement on controlling the use of atomic energy? Who is to blame for the continuing arms race? Why has there been no agreement to ban nuclear testing? These are some of the momentous questions on which this book sheds new light.

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societies, East and West, by one standard — the ruthlessness of the men they produce. Only men who are willing to embrace the "Catonic strategy" count as men. "If the Communists prove to have more courage," say these "forward strategists," "a stronger will, a more steadfast spirit, a clearer intellectual insight into conflict in the nuclear age, they obviously are the better men and deserve to win—and probably will."

To prove our manliness, therefore, we *should promptly boost* our military budget to $65 billion a year; we should foment revolts in iron-curtain countries; we should move in with our troops if Russia tries to intervene in our promoted rebellions; we should use tactical nuclear weapons against guerrillas in any country where Russian stooges are causing trouble; and if Russia takes an unreasonable dislike to all of this, we must strike first with our nuclear weapons. This would put us in the position of the victor able to "subject to his writ the entire world."

It's a glorious vision, isn't it? Just think what a wonderful world we should have made safe for democracy! Oddly enough, this is one point to which the masterminds of the "Forward Strategy" appear to have devoted little attention.

The terms in which they advocate a future of doom are the vague terms of lofty generalization so familiar to Madison Avenue in their appeal to the wellsprings of our manhood. We must be virile; we must be tough; we must strike first and win a glorious victory. But what, in precise terms, does this toughness involve? What, in precise terms, would be the shape of the world that would emerge from our victory? These are questions conveniently ignored. The "Forward Strategists" take no cognizance, for example, of an elementary fact so apparent to Great Britain in this summer of the Berlin crisis—that between half a dozen and a dozen bombs of medium-megaton range would eliminate the British Isles; the nation and its people simply would cease to exist. The propaganda that urges upon us the course of virility and ruthlessness and the first strike fails to spell out that, if in the second, retaliatory strike the United States were hit by some 250 bombs of merely ten-megaton power —a decidedly conservative estimate —some 42 million persons would be killed the first day, and millions more, probably more than 80 million, would die of injuries and radioactivity within the next sixty. In all of this rosy painting of the glories of a vague "total victory," there is *no mention of a reality* long recognized by our Air Force—that if New York, for example, were struck by just one forty-megaton monster (not Khrushchev's 100-megaton superbomb), and if the prevailing winds were right, much of the northern part of the country east of the Mississippi would be blanketed by a lethal cloud of radioactivity. When the vague terms of "Forward Strategy" are placed in the context of such realities, it becomes obvious that only a madman or an idiot can envision victory in the nuclear age.

Militarism — or Peace

No more than other people can Americans have both sides of the coin. Either we are a peace-loving people or we are not, and we had better make up our minds. If we really believe in the peace we profess, there can be no room in our policy for the imperialism of the New Militarism. If peace be our aim, the Military's objectives cannot be our objectives; there can be no room for a philosophy that calls for "the preservation and enhancement of our political system rather than the maintenance of peace," for a philosophy that dictates "we cannot tolerate the survival of a political system" inimical to our own. For a Christian people whose ideal has always been that of peace on earth and good will among men, we have bred a strange and powerful and ruthless caste that can look with equanimity upon the slaughter of the world's people by the inconceivable millions. This we must realize when we hear a Radford or a Goldwater sound the siren trumpet for a vague but glowing "total victory." They mean the incineration of the world. And the price is not theirs to pay.

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

PART VIII

IN CONCLUSION

THIS HAS BEEN a study of power—of the kind of power that has come to dominate the nation and rob the nation's people both of understanding and of choice in the fashioning of their destiny. When President Eisenhower declared in his farewell address that "the military-industrial complex" had developed an influence "felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government," he did not exaggerate; he understated the case. This complex has come, in fact, to determine all our policy; to orient the entire nation, not toward peace, but toward war. If we are ever to avoid that war, the overwhelming and insidious power of the military-industrial complex must be smashed.

It is obvious that its iron grip, which has fastened upon us the repressive atmosphere of the Warfare State, can never be broken unless the American people are permitted to understand the issue. Demagogic bellowings about the "muzzling" of the Brass, demogogic insinuations that this is being done because we are the victims of some nefarious anti-anti-Communist plot and that our high officials are "soft on communism" are, as former President Truman once said on a famous occasion, nothing more than "red herrings" to becloud the issue. The real issue is not the "muzzling" of the Brass, but the creation of a military caste so powerful that, with its Big Business collaborators, it has been able to brainwash the American people on the most vital issues of peace and war, life and death. The real issue is whether American democracy is to be preserved—whether the most crucial decisions are to be determined by a military-industrial partnership not elected by or responsible to the people, or whether they are to be made by the civilian representatives elected for the purpose.

The record of the postwar years spells out clearly the fact that we have traveled far along the road of abandonment to the Military of all civil and democratic responsibility—the fatal road that Hamilton so clearly foresaw. And the record of the past spells out clearly the pattern of the future. It says that the military mind focuses exclusively on military solutions. Inflexible must be our face toward the enemy; ever more destructive and more hellish must be our power; we must never give up a single rock on the Quemoy shores; we must never talk to Red China (though the evidence accumulates that Red China soon will be the third most powerful nation on earth, with power to destroy us); we must never settle for the preservation of our own democratic institutions, but we must embark on a holy crusade to extend them—"total victory," and total destruction of that other and inimical system, must be our objective. This is the road to the inevitable war that will sear the earth's people and turn the globe itself into a molten ball.

Fork in the Road

If this catastrophe is ever to be averted, we must brush the cobwebs from our eyes. We must abandon the idiocy that the Military possesses some divine genius that makes it omniscient in every field, even in areas leagues removed from its special expertise. We must recognize that the Military is the Military, just this and nothing more, and that its true profession is arms and war, not diplomacy and peace. The large-scale fraternization of the Military with the radical Right, the blatant use of the Military as a braid-draped front man for the propagandizing of multi-billion-dollar war industries, the heavily financed propaganda of these wedded partners in whipping up a war sentiment in the nation—all this says plainly that we have broken violently with the stable anchor of tradition that prescribed for the Military the limited role of executing policy, not fashioning it.

In this context, the tremendous concentration of power which Eisenhower saw in "the military-industrial complex"—and with which he so ineffectually wrestled—represents the supreme issue on which the survival of our own democratic institutions and the peace of the world depends. We cannot have a $50-billion-a-year war economy; we cannot base the prosperity of every town and hamlet, every city and state, upon mili-

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tary expenditures; we cannot continue to sidetrack every far-sighted domestic measure—medical care, aid to education—for the voracious demands of the Warfare State. We cannot continue to do all this without buying ourselves our ultimate doom.

The nation today has come to a plain fork in the road. The Military juggernaut, hand-in-glove with industry, whooped on by all the arts of propaganda, is high-balling along the highway that leads to ever more authoritarian government—and that holy war, by which we all can prove our manhood, which lies in the offing. The other fork of the road turns aside from this catastrophic brink. It leads to reimposition of strong civilian control over the Military; it takes formation of policy out of the hands of the Military and puts it where it belongs, in the hands of elected representatives responsible to the people; it tries to seek out the truth and find solutions to world affairs, not just to adopt the primitive attitude of holding everywhere a rigid line until the right time comes to knock over the other fellow. This second fork in the road offers at least a hope, a prayer; the Military thruway, with its phony blathering of peace through strength, can lead only to mass graves.

The Slow, Hard Road

If we are to take this second fork and try for peace, we must recognize the demands this choice will make upon us. It will ask more of us in intelligence, in self-restraint, in courage than the deceptively "easy" way of the Military. On this road will be found no sudden, miraculous solutions. We must recognize that we must live with our critical problems and try, by the slow process of negotiation and agreement, to achieve a better world. To do this, we must be prepared to go back to the lost moment of hope in 1955: we must be prepared to scuttle the philosophy of Quarles and the Military that safety is to be found in ever more awesome detonations. We must be prepared to make a genuine and all-out effort to ban the bomb and achieve disarmament.

If we ever succeed in this, we must be prepared to face a world of new and harsh problems—a domestic world of economic disruption. Military bases would shut down, war plants would fall idle; millions of workers would lose their jobs, thousands of businesses would suffer. No one who has any conception, no one who has any faith in the tremendous potential of the American economy believes for a moment that such a crisis need be more than temporary. We have at home enormous problems clamoring to be met and solved—the elimination of slums, the increasingly critical poverty of our educational plant from grade school to college levels, better care for our

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aged, better medical and hospital protection for all of us, to name just a few.

We will never solve these problems in a "guns and butter" society, for that society is a propaganda myth and experience says that it becomes, as intended by its sponsors, all guns and no butter. If and when we succeed in turning aside from the road to war, we must be prepared to accept the facts of life—and the cardinal fact will be the need for a federally stimulated economy, for the siphoning of war-industry billions into the pursuits of peace and the rebuilding and refurbishing of the domestic world we live in. Such a solution to the inevitable economic crisis we would face raises, of course, the horrible specter of the Welfare State, against which the propaganda barrages of the military-industrial complex so persistently are aimed. Experience indicates that the leaders of this complex would prefer to run the risk of dying in the ruins of their Warfare State. But would the rest of us?

Program for Peace

If the answer to that question is a resounding "No," we have left in our hands, even at this late date, a few important remedies. We can back the Kennedy Administration's effort, as personified by Secretary McNamara, to recapture for democracy civilian control over the Military. We can insist that the Pentagon be stripped of its propaganda apparatus, that it be compelled to stop brainwashing us in radical-Right seminars; we can demand that all military public-relations staffs be skeletonized, civilian-staffed and civilian-controlled, limited to their proper function of giving out necessary information. Such steps would deprive our cold-war profiteers of the uniformed front men whom they have used so effectively to promote a national war economy.

The second part of the combine—war corporations like Boeing and Lockheed that gobble up a billion dollars a year apiece, as much as was used to finance the entire federal government in the days of Benjamin Harrison—would still have to be brought under control. Stiff tax laws, paring off the fat of excess profits, might help to dim the enthusiasm of some of these mighty patriots for a war economy. Rigid policing of expense accounts and publicity budgets by federal tax sleuths might keep the industrial half of the complex from so freely using millions of dollars of taxpayers' money, received via war contracts, to brainwash the public into acceptance of the idea that ever more colossal contracts are essential to our continued existence.

It takes no imagination to envision the howls of anguished protest the mere suggestion of such measures will elicit; but we must have the sense to understand the yammering for the selfish bleat it is—and to understand, too, that the issue at stake is whether we, as a people, really control our government or whether powerful pressure groups control that government. And us.

Only if we can accomplish such reforms, only if we can achieve such a complete change of the national posture, can we really look forward with any hope to achieving the goal of world peace, the only alternative to world extinction. Much will depend, of course, on Khrushchev and the Russians, on whether Khrushchev can control his own "military-industrial complex." In the past, he has shown signs of wishing to do so, and in the past, we have played into the hands of the most militaristic, hard-line Stalinist forces in Russia by running away from every chance of agreement. Whether the tragic deterioration of world affairs that has resulted can now be halted, whether the trend can be reversed, no man can tell; but we, at least, must do our part, as we have not done it in the past. We, at least, must make the effort.

As former President Eisenhower so clearly pointed out, we must find ways to control "the military-industrial complex" with its "insidious penetration" of our minds. As General MacArthur told the Philippine Congress so eloquently, the impractical ideal of yesterday—the goal of world disarmament and world peace—has become the practical imperative of today. We recognize that imperative and work to achieve it, or we perish.

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An Open Letter to President Kennedy

Dear Mr. President: *September 25, 1961*

On the day that the announcement of Japan's Treaty with the Axis powers startled the Congress, a small group of people from 36 States representing the ordinary, average citizen, was received in audience by President Roosevelt in order that they might present a resolution to him.

It was not expected that F.D.R. would, as he did, personally accept the resolution, or that he would have it read aloud to him in the presence of the group, comment to them on its value, and then shake hands with each one. He might not have paid any attention to the resolution or to the group responsible for it, if it had not been for three converging factors:

1. *The President's personal conviction that the U.S.A. should enter the war scene to throw its weight and wealth into the Allied defense of the free world.*
2. *The coincidence of the announcement of Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy.*
3. *The fact that an angry question had been asked in the Senate that same morning about the identity and the motive of this little group of "war-mongers" seeking audience of the President. This question was called to the President's attention, and his interest aroused.*

It was, therefore, possible for the group to express to the President, in the terms of their resolution, their deep concern that the United States should accept the human responsibility of her power and wealth in the struggle going on in the world, by supporting the Allied forces. The President was urged towards participation in the war effort.

You are now urged, Mr. Kennedy, to provide dynamic leadership for peace in the name of humanity. A group of average American citizens from various states in the Union call on you not to take or sanction any action which is bound to increase the present war hazard; and to take the only action which can lead to real and lasting world stability.

In the present race for arms supremacy, there is no longer any margin for error or for free play. The whole world knows that there can be no victory for anyone in a thermo-nuclear war; that human civilization would be totally destroyed or doomed in a few short hours; and that there is no protection from nuclear attack.

In this closely-knit, interdependent whole which the world has become, there are those who are caught up in the inflationary spiral of armaments equality, which has no end but one, and those who are helplessly swept along in its wake. Armaments of these proportions threaten peace; they do not guarantee it. There is a point beyond which defensive measures become offensive tactics, and that safety point is now far behind us.

Yet, knowing these things, we continue to take step after step towards zero hour for humanity, taking upon ourselves—unasked and unwanted by the uncommitted peoples of the world—the horrifying responsibility of choosing for the whole of humanity whether they shall live or die. In our self-chosen task of defending the so-called free peoples of the world, we ignore the fact that at this stark hour of uncertainty for human survival, the greatest freedom humanity craves is the freedom to go on living.

We have got ourselves into a vicious circle, Mr. President, a deadly merry-go-round of cause and effect, action and reaction. The military tranquilizers with which we have soothed our political and economic neuroses have given way inevitably to a habit-forming drug, and addiction is now almost complete.

In this inferno of blast and fall-out, threat and counter-threat, and lunatic indifference to race suicide, there seems only one real hope—that some influential and involved power would have the courage to cut across the path of the vicious circle imprisoning us all on the wheel of self-destruction, and so break its hold over humanity. We, the United States, can be matched, measure for measure, missile for missile, in all material factors affecting our human condition. There is no equal to the spiritual strength of compassionate identification with humanity and desire for human well-being. If we so choose, we can exercise that strength as the supreme weapon of defense against the real enemy blocking human progress into the future.

In your Inaugural Address, sir, you called upon the American peoples to act rightly and generously towards the less fortunate of other nations, not because such action might redound to our credit, but simply because it is "the right thing to do." You have since called for sacrifices, personal and national.

It would seem that you, and perhaps only you, can provide the lead in putting both of these needed principles into practice. Our consideration for others is needed because we are one family under God, regardless of race, nation, political system or ideology, and religious persuasion. We are responsible for one another's well-being. Now that we hold in our hands the power over life and death, that responsibility can only be discharged on the basis of our shared human and spiritual identity. Right human relationships can be created by straightforward action in support of that which is right and good for all humanity.

Individually and nationally there is need for self-sacrifice—the genuine sacrifice of self-interest to the common good. Organized selfishness on a massive scale—obvious or devious—is responsible for much of our present danger; no nation and few persons are free from this material evil, the enemy within our gates. The sacrifice of selfishness—with all that that implies for each person and for every nation—is demanded of us now if we would survive into the future. The United States of America can choose to take the lead in the wielding of this ultimately infallible spiritual energy. We cannot wait for others to do so; others are waiting for us.

Hate and fear, aggression, greed and cupidity, can be outmatched by unselfish cooperation and understanding goodwill. These are the "dis-arming" qualities of selflessness and sacrifice. They express integrity and good faith.

We call on you, Mr. President, to dis-arm the hostile forces in the world by practicing strong leadership to your own call for world responsibility and self-sacrifice. Let us demonstrate the courage to take right action on behalf of humanity, simply because it is right.

● ● ●

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